893 resultados para fractal sets
Resumo:
Unsteady and two-dimensional numerical simulation is applied to study the transition process from steady convection to turbulence via subharmonic bifurcation in thermocapillary convection of a liquid bridge in the half-floating zone. The results of numerical tests show clearly the fractal structure of period-doubling bifurcations, and frequency-locking at f/4, f/8, f/16 with basic frequency f is observed with increasing temperature difference. The Feigenbaum universal constant is given by the present paper as delta(4) = 4.853, which can be compared with the theoretical value 4.6642016.
Resumo:
Short fatigue crack behaviour in a weld metal has been further investigated. The Schmid factor and the fractal dimension of short cracks on iso-stress specimens subjected to reversed bending have been determined and then applied to account for the distribution and orientation characteristics of short fatigue cracks. The result indicates that the orientation preference of short cracks is attributed to the large values of Schmid factor at relevant grains. The Schmid factors of most slip systems, which produced short cracks, are less than or equal to 0.4. Crack length measurements reveal that short crack path, compared to that of long crack, possesses a more stable and relatively larger value of fractal dimension. This is regarded as one of the typical features of short cracks.
Resumo:
In this paper we present a solution concept for abstract systems called the admissible hierarchic set. The solution we propose is a refinement of the hierarchic solution, a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern solution. For finite abstract systems we show that the admissible hierarchic sets and the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets are the only outcomes of a coalition formation procedure (Wilson, 1972 and Roth, 1984). For coalitional games we prove that the core is either a vN&M stable set or an admissible hierarchic set.
Resumo:
We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach.