An analysis of the nature and effectiveness of corporate governance in smaller listed Australian companies

The objective of this thesis is to investigate the corporate governance attributes of smaller listed Australian firms. This study is motivated by evidence that these firms are associated with more regulatory concerns, the introduction of ASX Corporate Governance Recommendations in 2004, and a paucity of research to guide regulators and stakeholders of smaller firms. While there is an extensive body of literature examining the effectiveness of corporate governance, the literature principally focuses on larger companies, resulting in a deficiency in the understanding of the nature and effectiveness of corporate governance in smaller firms. Based on a review of agency theory literature, a theoretical model is developed that posits that agency costs are mitigated by internal governance mechanisms and transparency. The model includes external governance factors but in many smaller firms these factors are potentially absent, increasing the reliance on the internal governance mechanisms of the firm. Based on the model, the observed greater regulatory intervention in smaller companies may be due to sub-optimal internal governance practices. Accordingly, this study addresses four broad research questions (RQs). First, what is the extent and nature of the ASX Recommendations that have been adopted by smaller firms (RQ1)? Second, what firm characteristics explain differences in the recommendations adopted by smaller listed firms (RQ2), and third, what firm characteristics explain changes in the governance of smaller firms over time (RQ3)? Fourth, how effective are the corporate governance attributes of smaller firms (RQ4)? Six hypotheses are developed to address the RQs. The first two hypotheses explore the extent and nature of corporate governance, while the remaining hypotheses evaluate its effectiveness. A time-series, cross-sectional approach is used to evaluate the effectiveness of governance. Three models, based on individual governance attributes, an index of six items derived from the literature, and an index based on the full list of ASX Recommendations, are developed and tested using a sample of 298 smaller firms with annual observations over a five-year period (2002-2006) before and after the introduction of the ASX Recommendations in 2004. With respect to (RQ1) the results reveal that the overall adoption of the recommendations increased from 66 per cent in 2004 to 74 per cent in 2006. Interestingly, the adoption rate for recommendations regarding the structure of the board and formation of committees is significantly lower than the rates for other categories of recommendations. With respect to (RQ2) the results reveal that variations in rates of adoption are explained by key firm differences including, firm size, profitability, board size, audit quality, and ownership dispersion, while the results for (RQ3) were inconclusive. With respect to (RQ4), the results provide support for the association between better governance and superior accounting-based performance. In particular, the results highlight the importance of the independence of both the board and audit committee chairs, and of greater accounting-based expertise on the audit committee. In contrast, while there is little evidence that a majority independent board is associated with superior outcomes, there is evidence linking board independence with adverse audit opinion outcomes. These results suggest that board and chair independence are substitutes; in the presence of an independent chair a majority independent board may be an unnecessary and costly investment for smaller firms. The findings make several important contributions. First, the findings contribute to the literature by providing evidence on the extent, nature and effectiveness of governance in smaller firms. The findings also contribute to the policy debate regarding future development of Australia’s corporate governance code. The findings regarding board and chair independence, and audit committee characteristics, suggest that policy-makers could consider providing additional guidance for smaller companies. In general, the findings offer support for the “if not, why not?” approach of the ASX, rather than a prescriptive rules-based approach.

Barriers to information technology governance adoption : a preliminary empirical investigation

The adoption of IT Governance (ITG) continues to be an important topic for research. Many researchers have focused their attention on how these practices are currently being implemented in the many diverse areas and industries. Literature shows that a majority of these studies have only been based on industries and organizations in developed countries. There exist very few researches that look specifically within the context of a developing country. Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of research on identifying the barriers or inhibitors to IT Governance adoption within the context of an emerging yet still developing Asian country. This research sets out to justify, substantiate and improve on a priori model developed to study the barriers to the adoption of ITG practice using qualitative data obtained through a series of semi-structured interviews conducted on organizations in Malaysia.

Corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in transitional countries – evidence from Chinese listed firms

The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices adopted by Chinese listed firms are associated with the quality of earnings information. Based on a review of agency and institutional theory, this study develops hypotheses that predict the monitoring effectiveness of the board and the audit committee. Using a combination of univariate and multivariate analyses, the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management are tested from 2004 to 2008. Through analysing the empirical results, a number of findings are summarised as below. First, board independence is weakened by the introduction of government officials as independent directors on the boards. Government officials acting as independent directors, claim that they meet the definition of independent director set by the regulation. However, they have some connection with the State, which is the controlling shareholder in listed SOEs affiliated companies. Consequently, the effect of the independent director’s expertise in constraining earnings management is mitigated as demonstrated by an insignificant association between board expertise and earnings management. An alternative explanation for the inefficiency of board independence may point to the pre-selection of independent directors by the powerful CEO. It is argued that a CEO can manipulate the board composition and choose the "desirable" independent directors to monitor themselves. Second, a number of internal mechanisms, such as board size, board activities, and the separation of the roles of the CEO and chair are found to be significantly associated with discretionary accruals. This result suggests that there are advantages in having a large and active board in the Chinese setting. This can offset the disadvantages associated with large boards, such as increased bureaucracy, and hence, increase the constraining effects of a large and resourceful board. Third, factor analysis identifies two factors: CEO power and board power. CEO power is the factor which consists of CEO duality and turnover, and board power is composed of board size and board activity. The results of CEO power show that if a Chinese listed company has CEO duality and turnover at the same time, it is more likely to have a high level of earnings management. The significant and negative relationship between board power and accruals indicate that large boards with frequent meetings can be associated with low level of earnings management. Overall, the factor analysis suggests that certain governance mechanisms complement each other to become more efficient monitors of opportunistic earnings management. A combination of board characteristics can increase the negative association with earnings management. Fourth, the insignificant results between audit committees and earnings management in Chinese listed firms suggests that the Chinese regulator should strengthen the audit committee functions. This thesis calls for listed firms to disclose more information on audit committee composition and activities, which can facilitate future research on the Chinese audit committee’s monitoring role. Fifth, the interactive results between State ownership and board characteristics show that dominant State ownership has a moderating effect on board monitoring power as the State totally controls 42% of the issued shares. The high percentage of State ownership makes it difficult for the non-controlling institutional shareholders to challenge the State’s dominant status. As a result, the association between non-controlling institutional ownership and earnings management is insignificant in most situations. Lastly, firms audited by the international Big4 have lower abnormal accruals than firms audited by domestic Chinese audit firms. In addition, the inverse U-shape relationship between audit tenure and earnings quality demonstrates the changing effects of audit quality after a certain period of appointment. Furthermore, this thesis finds that listing in Hong Kong Stock Exchanges can be an alternative governance mechanism to discipline Chinese firms to follow strict Hong Kong listing requirements. Management of Hong Kong listed companies are exposed to the scrutiny of international investors and Hong Kong regulators. This in turn reduces their chances of conducting self-interested earnings manipulation. This study is designed to fill the gap in governance literature in China that is related to earnings management. Previous research on corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management in China is not conclusive. The current research builds on previous literature and provides some meaningful implications for practitioners, regulators, academic, and international investors who have investment interests in a transitional country. The findings of this study contribute to corporate governance and earnings management literature in the context of the transitional economy of China. The use of alternative measures for earnings management yields similar results compared with the accruals models and produces additional findings.

Corporate governance and misappropriation

This study examines the occurrence of misappropriation-type fraud within Australian listed firms and the relation between the incidence of this type of fraud and a firm's governance strength. We measure governance strength using factors relating to traditional corporate governance, such as board composition, CEO duality, and audit committee composition, as well as factors relating to information technology governance. In our study, we use actual dollar amount of fraud reported by listed companies responding to the 2004 KPMG Fraud Survey as one of three different misappropriation measures and publicly available firm-specific data to measure the other variables in the model. Our study found that where the chief executive officer (CEO) also holds the position of chairperson of the board of directors, the likelihood of fraud increases. We also find that the greater the number of independent directors on the audit committee, the lower the level of fraud. Taken together, these results are particularly encouraging as they provide support for regulatory bodies such as the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), which place considerable emphasis on the importance of establishing good corporate governance practices. The study provides empirical evidence that employing good corporate governance reduces the risk of the misappropriation of assets.

Towards the development of a best practice index for the disclosure of organisations' climate change-related corporate governance practices

The aim of this study is to develop a disclosure guide for climate-change-related corporate governance (CCCG) practices. Drawing from existing climate change policy guidelines together with content analysis of leading Australian companies’ disclosure practices, we develop a best practice index for the disclosure of CCCG practises. The best practice index is further informed, validated and refined by the contribution of experts from a range of stakeholder groups. Our index represents the most comprehensive list generated to date, utilising experts’ opinions, in relation to CCCG disclosure practices. This CCCG disclosure index would be useful for companies seeking to provide information in relation their CCCG practices

Corporate governance and risk management : the role of risk management and compensation committees

This paper examines the role of compensation and risk committees in managing and monitoring the risk behaviour of Australian financial firms in the period leading up to the global financial crisis (2006–2008). This empirical study of 711 observations of financial sector firms demonstrates how the coordination of risk management and compensation committees reduces information asymmetry. The study shows that the composition of the risk and compensation committees is positively associated with risk, which, in turn, is associated with firm performance. More importantly, information asymmetry is reduced when a director is a member of both the risk and compensation committees which moderate the negative association between risk and firm performance for firms with high risk.

Ownership, corporate governance and liquidity in Caribbean firms

This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership structure and corporate governance relate to stock liquidity in the Caribbean. Based on panel data of 71 firms from three selected Caribbean markets − Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago − results show that firms with concentrated ownership are associated with lower liquidity. The identity of the largest shareholder also matters: family firms and firms with foreign holding companies are more liquid than government firms. Although the second largest shareholding does not appear to matter to liquidity, there is some evidence showing that firms with foreign holding companies as the second largest shareholder are less liquid. Caribbean firms suffer from poor corporate governance but this study is unable to establish a significant relationship between corporate governance and liquidity.

Disclosure of climate change-related corporate governance practices

Based on a survey of climate change experts in different stakeholder groups and interviews with corporate climate change managers, this study provides insights into the gap between what information stakeholders expect and what Australian corporations disclose. This paper focuses on annual reports and sustainability reports with specific reference to the disclosure of climate change-related corporate governance practices. The findings culminate in the refinement of a best practice index for the disclosure of climate-change-related corporate governance practises. Interview results indicate that the low levels of disclosures made by Australian companies may be due to a number of factors. These include a potential expectations gap, the absence of pressure from powerful stakeholders, a concern for stakeholder information overload, the cost of providing information, limited perceived accountability for climate change, and preferring other media for disclosure.

Essays on corporate governance, stakeholders, and restructuring

This dissertation consists of an introductory section and three theoretical essays analyzing the interaction of corporate governance and restructuring. The essays adopt an incomplete contracts approach and analyze the role of different institutional designs to facilitate the alignment of the objectives of shareholders and management (or employees) over the magnitude of corporate restructuring. The first essay analyzes how a firm's choice of production technology affects the employees' human capital investment. In the essay, the owners of the firm can choose between a specific and a general technology that both require a costly human capital investment by the employees. The specific technology is initially superior in using the human capital of employees but, in contrast to the general technology, it is not compatible with future innovations. As a result, anticipated changes in the specific technology diminish the ex ante incentives of the employees to invest in human capital unless the shareholders grant the employees specific governance mechanisms (a right of veto, severance pay) so as to protect their investments. The results of the first essay indicate that the level of protection that the shareholders are willing to offer falls short of the socially desirable one. Furthermore, when restructuring opportunities become more abundant, it becomes more attractive both socially and from the viewpoint of the shareholders to initially adopt the general technology. The second essay analyzes how the allocation of authority within the firm interacts with the owners' choice of business strategy when the ability of the owners to monitor the project proposals of the management is biased in favor of the status quo strategy. The essay shows that a bias in the monitoring ability will affect not only the allocation of authority within the firm but also the choice of business strategy. Especially, when delegation has positive managerial incentive effects, delegation turns out to be more attractive under the new business strategy because the improved managerial incentives are a way for the owners to compensate their own reduced information gathering ability. This effect, however, simultaneously makes the owners hesitant to switch the strategy since it would involve a more frequent loss of control over the project choice. Consequently, the owners' lack of knowledge of the new business strategy may lead to a suboptimal choice of strategy. The third essay analyzes the implications of CEO succession process for the ideal board structure. In this essay, the presence of the departing CEO on the board facilitates the ability of the board to find a matching successor and to counsel him. However, the ex-CEO's presence may simultaneously also weaken the ability of the board to restructure since the predecessor may use the opportunity to distort the successor's project choice. The results of the essay suggest that the extent of restructuring gains, the firm's ability to hire good outside directors and the importance of board's advisory role affect at which point and for how long the shareholders may want to nominate the predecessor to the board.

Relational dimensions of corporate governance in translation: networked governance in China and India

The effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms has been a subject of academic research for many decades. Although the large majority of corporate governance studies prior to mid 1990s were based on data from developed market economies such as the U.S., U.K. and Japan, in recent years researchers have begun examining corporate governance in transition economies. A comparison of China and India offers a unique environment for analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance. First, both countries state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform strategies hinges on the Modern Enterprise System characterized by the separation of ownership and control. Ownership of an SOE’s assets is distributed among the government, institutional investors, managers, employees, and private investors. Effective control rights are assigned to management, which generally has a very small, or even nonexistent ownership stake. This distinctive shareholding structure creates conflict of interest not only between management (insiders) and outside investors but also between large shareholders and minority investors. Moreover, because both governments desire to retain some control—in part through partial retained ownership of commercialized SOEs, further conflicts arise between politicians and firms. Second, directors in publicly listed firms in both countries are predominantly drawn from institutions with significant non-market objectives: the government and other state enterprises, particularly in China, and extended families, particularly in India. As a result, the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms, such as the number of independent directors on the board and the number of independent supervisors on the supervisory committee, are likely to be quiet limited, although this has yet to be fully evaluated. Third, because of the political nature of the privatization process itself, typical external governance mechanisms, such as debt (in conjunction with appropriate bankruptcy procedures), takeover threats, legal protection of investors, product market competition, etc., have not been effective. Bank loans have traditionally been viewed as grants from the state designed to bail out failing firms. State-owned banks retain monopoly or quasi-monopoly positions in the banking sector and profit is not their overriding objective. If political favor is deemed appropriate, subsidized loans, rescheduling of overdue debt or even outright transfer of funds can be arranged with SOEs (soft budget constraints). In addition, a market for private, non-bank debt is limited in India and has yet to be established China. There is no active merger or takeover activity in Chinese stock markets to discipline management. Information available in the capital markets is insufficient to keep at arm’s length of the corporate decisions. In light of the above peculiarities, China and India share many of the typical institutional characteristics as a transition economy, including poor legal protection of creditors and investors, the absence of an effective takeover market, an underdeveloped capital market, a relative inefficient banking system and significant interference of politicians in firm management. Su (2005) finds that the extent of political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control can help explain corporate dividend policies and post-IPO financing choices in this situation. Allen et al. (2005) demonstrate that standard corporate governance mechanisms are weak and ineffective for publicly listed firms while alternative governance mechanisms based on reputation and relationship have been remarkably effective in the private sector. Because the peculiarities are significant in this context, the differences in the political-economies of the two countries are likely to be evident in such relational terms. In this paper we explore the peculiarities of corporate governance in this transitional environment through a systematic examination of certain aspects of these reputational and relationship dimensions. Utilising the methods of social network analysis we identify the inter-organisational relationships at board level formed by equity holdings and by shared directors. Using data drawn from the Orbis database we map these relations among the 3700 largest firms in India and China respectively and identify the roles played in these relational networks by the particularly characteristic institutions in each case. We find greatly different social network structures in each case with some support in these relational dimensions for their distinctive features of governance. Further, the social network metrics allow us to considerably refine proxies for political interference, managerial entrenchment and institutional control used in earlier econometric analysis.

The impact of equity markets and corporate governance on labour market flexibility

Drawing from various literatures, this article explores links between equity markets and labour market flexibility. Various data sources are used to test relationships for a set of OECD countries, controlling for other likely influences on flexibility such as government and industrial relations institutions. The results are generally supportive as regards employment flexibility: equity market trading activity is associated with shorter job tenure, higher activity rates, and greater employment change over the cycle. However, the relationship between equity markets and pay flexibility is less statistically robust to the addition of controls.

Understanding Risk: Recent Contributions from the Journal of Risk and Governance

Following on from the format of the previous Book Understanding Risk: Contributions from the Journal of Risk and Governance, this collection of recent contributions (including work by the editor) this book is divided in three sections .  The first section examines issues relating to corporate governance in the private sector, with emphasis being placed on issues of 'Board Decision Making,' Earnings Management and Audit Committee Effectiveness'  and ' Corporate Governance Failures.'  These contributions are complemented by the second sections which looks at governance and risk issues affecting the public sector, with a focus being places on 'Public Private Partnerships' and regulation of activities in the Life Sciences.'  Section three focuses on societal risk management in relation to health, safety and the environment.  In this context, contributions are presented in relation to major debates surrounding 'Rising Trends in Cancer Cases,' dilemmas surrounding 'Medical Self Help,' 'Mental Health Policy' and the use of 'Information Technology in Health Care.'