Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be used to compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this notion, the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation rules are the minimally manipulable rules among all budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules link any agent to the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indifferences (which can be viewed as indirect egalitarian equivalence).

Study of the Oceanic Heat Budget Components over the Arabian Sea during the Formation and Evolution of Super Cyclone, Gonu

Oceans play a vital role in the global climate system. They absorb the incoming solar energy and redistribute the energy through horizontal and vertical transports. In this context it is important to investigate the variation of heat budget components during the formation of a low-pressure system. In 2007, the monsoon onset was on 28th May. A well- marked low-pressure area was formed in the eastern Arabian Sea after the onset and it further developed into a cyclone. We have analysed the heat budget components during different stages of the cyclone. The data used for the computation of heat budget components is Objectively Analyzed air-sea flux data obtained from WHOI (Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution) project. Its horizontal resolution is 1° × 1°. Over the low-pressure area, the latent heat flux was 180 Wm−2. It increased to a maximum value of 210 Wm−2 on 1st June 2007, on which the system was intensified into a cyclone (Gonu) with latent heat flux values ranging from 200 to 250 Wm−2. It sharply decreased after the passage of cyclone. The high value of latent heat flux is attributed to the latent heat release due to the cyclone by the formation of clouds. Long wave radiation flux is decreased sharply from 100 Wm−2 to 30 Wm−2 when the low-pressure system intensified into a cyclone. The decrease in long wave radiation flux is due to the presence of clouds. Net heat flux also decreases sharply to −200 Wm−2 on 1st June 2007. After the passage, the flux value increased to normal value (150 Wm−2) within one day. A sharp increase in the sensible heat flux value (20 Wm−2) is observed on 1st June 2007 and it decreased there- after. Short wave radiation flux decreased from 300 Wm−2 to 90 Wm−2 during the intensification on 1st June 2007. Over this region, short wave radiation flux sharply increased to higher value soon after the passage of the cyclone.

Soft budget constraints in a dynamic general equilibrium model

This paper considers an overlapping generations model in which capital investment is financed in a credit market with adverse selection. Lenders’ inability to commit ex-ante not to bailout ex-post, together with a wealthy position of entrepreneurs gives rise to the soft budget constraint syndrome, i.e. the absence of liquidation of poor performing firms on a regular basis. This problem arises endogenously as a result of the interaction between the economic behavior of agents, without relying on political economy explanations. We found the problem more binding along the business cycle, providing an explanation to creditors leniency during booms in some LatinAmerican countries in the late seventies and early nineties.

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.