The potentiality of the embryo and the somatic cell

Recent arguments on the ethics of stem cell research have taken a novel approach to the question of the moral status of the embryo. One influential argument focuses on a property that the embryo is said to posses—namely, the property of being an entity with a rational nature or, less controversially, an entity that has the potential to acquire a rational nature—and claims that this property is also possessed by a somatic cell. Since nobody seriously thinks that we have a duty to preserve the countless such cells we wash off our body every day in the shower, the argument is intended as a reductio ad absurdum of the claim that the embryo should be afforded the same moral status as a fully developed human being. This article argues that this argument is not successful and that it consequently plays into the hands of those who oppose embryonic stem cell research. It is therefore better to abandon this argument and focus instead on the different argument that potentiality, as such, is not a sufficient ground for the creation of moral obligations towards the embryo.

Rendering to Caesar and God : St Paul, the natural law tradition and the authority of law

The question of the authority of law has occupied and vexed the literature and philosophy of law for centuries. Law is something that characteristically implies obedience, but the precise nature of law’s authority remains contentious. The return to the writings of the Apostle Paul in contemporary philosophy, theology and jurisprudence begs attention in relation to the authority of law, and so this article will consider his analysis and critique of law with a focus on his Epistle to the Romans. It argues that Paul’s conception of the authority of law is explained on the basis that the law is from God, it externally sanctions obedience by virtue of the civil authorities, and it convicts internally in conscience. This triad is justified by the law of love (‘‘love your neighbor as yourself’’), and will be explained in relation to the natural law tradition as well as converse ideas in positivism. Hence, considering the reasoning of Paul in relation to traditional jurisprudential themes and the law of love provides a useful alternative analysis and basis for further investigation regarding the authority of law and the need for its obedience.

Despairing Justice and the Ethics of Legal Interpretation

This study discusses legal interpretation. The question is how legal texts, for instance laws, statutes and regulations, can and do have meaning. Language makes interpretation difficult as it holds no definite meanings. When the theoretical connection between semantics and legal meaning is loosened and we realise that language cannot be a means of justifying legal decisions, the responsibility inherent in legal interpretation can be seen in full. We are thus compelled to search for ways to analyse this responsibility. The main argument of the book is that the responsibility of legal interpretation contains a responsibility towards the text that is interpreted (and through the mediation of the text also towards the legal system), but not only this. It is not simply a responsibility to read and read well, but it transcends on a broader scale. It includes responsibility for the effects of the interpretation in a particular situation and with regard to the people whose case is decided. Ultimately, it is a responsibility to do justice. These two aspects of responsibility are conceptualised here as the two dimensions of the ethics of legal interpretation: the textual and the situational. The basic conception of language presented here is provided by Ludwig Wittgenstein s later philosophy, but the argument is not committed to only one philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein can be counterpointed in interesting ways by Jacques Derrida s ideas on language and meaning. Derrida s work also functions as a contrast to hermeneutic theories. It is argued that the seed to an answer to the question of meaning lies in the inter-personal and situated activity of interpretation and communication, an idea that can be discerned in different ways in the works of Wittgenstein, Derrida and Hans-Georg Gadamer. This way the question of meaning naturally leads us to think about ethics, which is approached here through the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. His thinking, focusing on topics such as otherness, friendship and hospitality, provides possibilities for answering some of the questions posed in this book. However, at the same time we move inside a normativity where ethics and politics come together in many ways. The responsibility of legal interpretation is connected to the political and this has to be acknowledged lest we forget that law always implies force. But it is argued here that the political can be explored in positive terms as it does not have to mean only power or violence.

Divergencies of Perception : The Possibilities of Merleau-Pontian Phenomenology in Analyses of Contemporary Art

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) has been known as the philosopher of painting. His interest in the theory of perception intertwined with the questions concerning the artist s perception, the experience of an artwork and the possible interpretations of the artwork. For him, aesthetics was not a sub-field of philosophy, and art was not simply a subject matter for the aesthetic experience, but a form of thinking. This study proposes an opening for a dialogue between Merleau-Pontian phenomenology and contemporary art. The thesis examines his phenomenology through certain works of contemporary art and presents readings of these artworks through his phenomenology. The thesis both shows the potentiality of a method, but also engages in the critical task of finding the possible limitations of his approach. The first part lays out the methodological and conceptual points of departure of Merleau-Ponty s phenomenological approach to perception as well as the features that determined his discussion on encountering art. Merleau-Ponty referred to the experience of perceiving art using the notion of seeing with (voir selon). He stressed a correlative reciprocity described in Eye and Mind (1961) as the switching of the roles of the visible and the painter. The choice of artworks is motivated by certain restrictions in the phenomenological readings of visual arts. The examined works include paintings by Tiina Mielonen, a photographic work by Christian Mayer, a film by Douglas Gordon and Philippe Parreno, and an installation by Monika Sosnowska. These works resonate with, and challenge, his phenomenological approach. The chapters with case studies take up different themes that are central to Merleau-Ponty s phenomenology: space, movement, time, and touch. All of the themes are interlinked with the examined artworks. There are also topics that reappear in the thesis, such as the notion of écart and the question of encountering the other. As Merleau-Ponty argued, the sphere of art has a particular capability to address our being in the world. The thesis presents an interpretation that emphasises the notion of écart, which refers to an experience of divergence or dispossession. The sudden dissociation, surprise or rupture that is needed in order for a meeting between the spectator and the artwork, or between two persons, to be possible. Further, the thesis suggests that through artworks it is possible to take into consideration the écart, the divergence, that defines our subjectivity.

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

The nature of avidyÄ in Buddhism and VedÄ nta

This thesis deals with the nature of ignorance as it was interpreted in the Upani~adic tradition, specifically in Advaita Vedanta, and in early and Mahayana Buddhism , e specially in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. The approach i s a historical and comparative one. It examines the early thoughts of both the upanis.a ds and Buddhism abou t avidya (ignorance), shows how the notion was treated by the more speculative and philosphically oriented schools which base d themselves on the e arly works, and sees how their views differ. The thesis will show that the Vedinta tended to treat avidya as a topic for metaphysical s peculation as t he s chool developed, drifting from its initial e xistential concerns, while the Madhyamika remained in contact with the e xistential concerns evident in the first discourses of the Buddha. The word "notion" has been chosen for use in referring t o avidya, even though it may have non-intellectual and emotional connotations, to avoid more popular a lternatives such as "concept" or "idea". In neither the Upani,ads, Advaita Vedanta, or Buddhism is ignorance merely a concept or an idea. Only in a secondary sense, in texts and speech , does it become one. Avidya has more to do with the lived situation in which man finds himself, with the subjectobject separation in which he f eels he exists, than with i i i intel lect ual constr ucts . Western thought has begun to r ealize the same with concerns such as being in modern ontology, and has chosen to speak about i t i n terms of the question of being . Avidya, however, i s not a 'question' . If q ue stions we r e to be put regarding the nature of a vidya , they would be more of t he sort "What is not avidya?", though e ven here l anguage bestows a status t o i t which avidya does not have. In considering a work of the Eastern tradition, we f ace t he danger of imposing Western concepts on it. Granted t hat avidya is customari ly r endered i n English as ignorance, the ways i n which the East and West view i gno rance di f f er. Pedagogically , the European cultures, grounded in the ancient Greek culture, view ignorance as a l ack or an emptiness. A child is i gnorant o f certain t hings and the purpose o f f ormal education , in f act if not in theory, is to fill him with enough knowledge so that he can cope wit h t he complexities and the e xpectations of s ociety. On another level, we feel t hat study and research will l ead t o the discovery o f solutions, which we now lack , for problems now defying solut i on . The East, on the o t her hand, sees avidya in a d i fferent light.Ignorance isn't a lack, but a presence. Religious and philosophical l iterature directs its efforts not towards acquiring something new, but at removing t.he ideas and opinions that individuals have formed about themselves and the world. When that is fully accomplished, say the sages , t hen Wisdom, which has been obscured by those opinions, will present itself. Nothing new has to be learned, t hough we do have t o 'learn' that much. The growing interest in t he West with Eastern religions and philosophies may, in time, influence our theoretical and practical approaches to education and learning, not only in the established educati onal institutions, but in religious , p sychological, and spiritual activities as well. However, the requirements o f this thesis do no t permit a formulation of revolutionary method or a call to action. It focuses instead on the textual arguments which attempt to convince readers that t he world in which they take themselves to exist is not, in essence, real, on the ways i n which the l imitations of language are disclosed, and on the provisional and limited schemes that are built up to help students see through their ignorance. The metaphysic s are provisional because they act only as spurs and guides. Both the Upanisadic and Buddhist traditions that will be dealt with here stress that language constantly fails to encompass the Real. So even terms s uch as 'the Real', 'Absolute', etc., serve only to lead to a transcendent experience . The sections dealing with the Upanisads and Advaita Vedanta show some of the historical evolution of the notion of avidya, how it was dealt with as maya , and the q uestions that arose as t o its locus. With Gau?apada we see the beginnings of a more abstract treatment of the topic, and , the influence of Buddhism. Though Sankhara' S interest was primarily directed towards constructing a philosophy to help others attain mok~a ( l iberation), he too introduced t echnica l t e rminology not found in the works of his predecessors. His work is impressive , but areas of it are incomplete. Numbers of his followers tried to complete the systematic presentation of his insi ghts . Their work focuses on expl anat i ons of adhyasa (superimposition ) , t he locus and object of ignorance , and the means by which Brahman takes itself to be the jiva and the world. The section on early Buddhism examines avidya in the context o f the four truths, together with dubkha (suffering), the r ole it p l ays in t he chain of dependent c ausation , a nd t he p r oblems that arise with t he doctrine of anatman. With t he doct rines of e arly Buddhism as a base, the Madhyamika elaborated questions that the Buddha had said t e nded not t o edi f ication. One of these had to do with own - being or svabhava. Thi s serves a s a centr e around which a discussion o f i gnorance unfolds, both i ndividual and coll ective ignorance. There follows a treatment of the cessation of ignorance as it is discussed within this school . The final secti on tries to present t he similarities and differences i n the natures o f ignorance i n t he two traditions and discusses the factors responsible for t hem . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Sinha for the time spent II and suggestions made on the section dealing with Sankara and the Advait.a Vedanta oommentators, and Dr. Sprung, who supervised, direoted, corrected and encouraged the thesis as a whole, but especially the section on Madhyamika, and the final comparison.

Does Chance hide Necessity? : a reevaluation of the debate ‘determinism - indeterminism’ in the light of quantum mechanics and probability theory

Dans cette thèse l’ancienne question philosophique “tout événement a-t-il une cause ?” sera examinée à la lumière de la mécanique quantique et de la théorie des probabilités. Aussi bien en physique qu’en philosophie des sciences la position orthodoxe maintient que le monde physique est indéterministe. Au niveau fondamental de la réalité physique – au niveau quantique – les événements se passeraient sans causes, mais par chance, par hasard ‘irréductible’. Le théorème physique le plus précis qui mène à cette conclusion est le théorème de Bell. Ici les prémisses de ce théorème seront réexaminées. Il sera rappelé que d’autres solutions au théorème que l’indéterminisme sont envisageables, dont certaines sont connues mais négligées, comme le ‘superdéterminisme’. Mais il sera argué que d’autres solutions compatibles avec le déterminisme existent, notamment en étudiant des systèmes physiques modèles. Une des conclusions générales de cette thèse est que l’interprétation du théorème de Bell et de la mécanique quantique dépend crucialement des prémisses philosophiques desquelles on part. Par exemple, au sein de la vision d’un Spinoza, le monde quantique peut bien être compris comme étant déterministe. Mais il est argué qu’aussi un déterminisme nettement moins radical que celui de Spinoza n’est pas éliminé par les expériences physiques. Si cela est vrai, le débat ‘déterminisme – indéterminisme’ n’est pas décidé au laboratoire : il reste philosophique et ouvert – contrairement à ce que l’on pense souvent. Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse un modèle pour l’interprétation de la probabilité sera proposé. Une étude conceptuelle de la notion de probabilité indique que l’hypothèse du déterminisme aide à mieux comprendre ce que c’est qu’un ‘système probabiliste’. Il semble que le déterminisme peut répondre à certaines questions pour lesquelles l’indéterminisme n’a pas de réponses. Pour cette raison nous conclurons que la conjecture de Laplace – à savoir que la théorie des probabilités présuppose une réalité déterministe sous-jacente – garde toute sa légitimité. Dans cette thèse aussi bien les méthodes de la philosophie que de la physique seront utilisées. Il apparaît que les deux domaines sont ici solidement reliés, et qu’ils offrent un vaste potentiel de fertilisation croisée – donc bidirectionnelle.

The Politics of Privacy

In 'Privacy and Politics', Kieron O'Hara discusses the relation of the political philosophy of privacy to technical aspects in Web development. Despite a vigorous debate, the concept remains ambiguous, and a series of types of privacy is defined: epistemological, spatial, ideological, decisional and economic. Each of these has a different meaning in the online environment, and will be defended by different measures. The question of whether privacy is a right is raised, and generational differences in attitude discussed, alongside the issue of whether privacy should be protected in advance, via a consent model, or retrospectively via increased transparency and accountability. Finally, reasons both theoretical and practical for ranking privacy below other values (such as security, efficiency or benefits for the wider community) are discussed.

The Schwarmgeister: The Development of Ecclesiastical Doctrine Through Schismatic Movements

Throughout the Christian story, Church doctrine and ecclesiology have been shrouded in controversy. From the Council of Nicea in 325, when are early Church fathers debated about the Trinity of Christ all the way to the modern day with Vatican II theological controversies have been important in the molding of Christian doctrine on the structure, role, and function of the Church. What makes those controversies different from the ones I treat in my thesis is that the previously mentioned controversies did not lead to schismatic divisions in the Church. The Donatist controversy and Luther's theological battle with Karlstadt were major movements that endangered the unity of the Church. These controversies propagated crucial writings and teachings in two major areas. The first area is the spiritual power and validity of the sacraments. Second is the role, function, and ecclesiology of the Church, with particular attention to the authority of the ministry. I want to demonstrate that these controversies refined the Church's thinking on sacramental issues such as baptism and Eucharist, as well as address the question of who has the power in the Church? And to what extent do they have the power to press reforms?

Good just isn't Good enough. Best System Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistical Mechanics

Statistical physicists assume a probability distribution over micro-states to explain thermodynamic behavior. The question of this paper is whether these probabilities are part of a best system and can thus be interpreted as Humean chances. I consider two strategies, viz. a globalist as suggested by Loewer, and a localist as advocated by Frigg and Hoefer. Both strategies fail because the system they are part of have rivals that are roughly equally good, while ontic probabilities should be part of a clearly winning system. I conclude with the diagnosis that well-defined micro-probabilities under-estimate the robust character of explanations in statistical physics.

What Is behind God’s Name? Martin Buber’s and Franz Rosenzweig’s Reflections on the Name of God

What meaning does God’s name convey? This was a question Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig had to answer when working on their translation of the Bible. They noticed that, as certain crucial biblical verses suggest, there is indeed a meaning behind God’s name in the Bible. Thus, an important moment in their joint translation was their account of the self-revelation of God in Exod. III, together with the question of how best to translate the tetragrammaton YHWH— the name of God. This article will explore their decisions, based both on their dialogue concerning the translation of the Bible, and on their papers, especially Rosenzweig’s well-known article ‘Der Ewige’ (‘The Eternal’) and Buber’s response to it. Less well known is the fact that there exist two unpublished typescripts by Martin Buber reflecting on the name of God, which will also be taken into consideration. Contrary to the received view that the choice of the personal pronoun to transliterate the name of God in the Bible translation was mainly Rosenzweig’s, I will show that it was actually a joint decision in which both thinkers’ philosophies,1 and a question that had haunted Buber since his youth, played an important part. The choice of the personal pronoun is an answer to this question, addressing the omnipresent God, the eternal Thou, in a kind of cultic acclamation.

The Rueter-Hess Dam and Reservoir Project: A Question of Sustainable Water

Water in sufficient quantities throughout the Colorado Front Range is becoming increasingly limited. This paper examines the consequences for continued unsustainable use of water for communities of the Denver metropolitan area. This paper also looks at the effect that water law in the West has for otherwise optimum distributions of water. In addition, four regional and state water studies are reviewed for their contribution to sustainable water. Finally, the Final Environmental Impact Statement of the Rueter-Hess dam and reservoir project in Parker, Colorado is explored. Key findings conclude that the Rueter-Hess project may not, by itself, provide sustainable water for Parker; but the project will create incentive and opportunity for communities throughout the region to address the question of sustainable water.

Evaluating the additionality of public sector assistance to Irish firms: a question of ownership?

This article presents an innovative approach to estimating the additionality of financial assistance awarded to firms by an Irish regional development agency. The 'self assessment approach' is used to derive estimates of deadweight and displacement for firms in the Shannon region of Ireland. Irish studies have derived high estimates of deadweight by international standards. In light of this, and the fact that successive Irish governments have placed emphasis on Foreign Direct Investment as an engine for growth, the primary objective here is to address the question of whether the type of firm ownership matters with respect to resulting deadweight and/or displacement estimates. The latter question is addressed using logistic regression analysis to test whether, ceteris paribus, firm ownership is a key-determining factor for estimates of deadweight and/or displacement. The results show that ownership does not matter in the case of deadweight, but regarding displacement there are differences between indigenous and foreign-owned firms albeit at very low levels. More precisely, as expected, indigenously owned firms are more likely to lead to higher estimates of displacement.

Brain, mind and consciousness in the history of neuroscience

From Platonic and Galenic roots, the first well developed ventricular theory of brain function is due to Bishop Nemesius, fourth century C.E. Although more interested in the Christian concept of soul, St. Augustine, too addressed the question of the location of the soul, a problem that has endured in various guises to the present day. Other notable contributions to ventricular psychology are the ninth century C.E. Arabic writer, Qusta ibn Lūqā, and an early European medical text written by the twelfth century C.E. author, Nicolai the Physician. By the time of Albertus Magnus, so-called medieval cell doctrine was a well-developed model of brain function. By the sixteenth century, Vesalius no longer understands the ventricles to be imaginary cavities designed to provide a physical basis for faculty psychology but as fluid-filled spaces in the brain whose function is yet to be determined

The redemption of the past. On a main motif in Walter Benjamin’s work

The following paper examines Walter Benjamin’s reflection on the category of “redemption”, mainly developed in the theses On the concept of History. To this end, we will try firstly to reconstruct Benjamin’s critique of “fate”, as it unfolds in the twenties on the field of right, economy and, especially, history. The critique of the expiatory logic of “fate” – developed in essays such as Fate and Character, Critique of violence or Capitalism as religion – will then allow us to disclose the “dialectical” structure of redemption, whereby Benjamin mobilizes his previous theory of knowledge against the doctrine of progress.