Admissible Hierachic Sets

In this paper we present a solution concept for abstract systems called the admissible hierarchic set. The solution we propose is a refinement of the hierarchic solution, a generalization of the von Neumann and Morgenstern solution. For finite abstract systems we show that the admissible hierarchic sets and the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets are the only outcomes of a coalition formation procedure (Wilson, 1972 and Roth, 1984). For coalitional games we prove that the core is either a vN&M stable set or an admissible hierarchic set.

An Approach to the stability of international environmental agreements: the absorbing sets solution

We study international environmental negotiations when agreements between countries can not be binding. A problem with this kind of negotiations is that countries have incentives for free-riding from such agreements. We develope a notion of equilibrium based on the assumption that countries can create and dissolve agreements in their seeking of a larger welfare. This approach leads to a larger degree of cooperation compared to models based on the internal-external stability approach.

The von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets for 2x2 games

We analyze the von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2 2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that the games without a strict Nash equilibrium have a unique vN&M stable set and otherwise they have infinite sets.