The Demand for Power Diffusion: A Case Study of the 2005 Constitutional Referendum Voting in Kenya

Recent studies on the history of economic development demonstrate that concentration of power on a monarch or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth and that institutional changes that diffuse power, though beneficial to the society in general, are opposed by some social groups. In November 2005, Kenyans rejected a proposed constitution primarily because it did not reduce the powers of the executive to any significant degree. Using data of voting patterns in the constitutional referendum and following the rational choice framework, I estimate a model of the demand for power diffusion and demonstrate that groups voting decisions depend on expected gains and likelihood of monopolizing power. The results also reveal the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power diffusion process, and therefore the study establishes a channel through which ethnic fragmentation impacts on economic development.

Is the Median Voter Decisive? Evidence of 'Ends Against the Middle' From Referenda Voting Patterns

This paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions. Previous tests have relied on cross-sectional data while we make use of a pair of California referenda to estimate a first difference specification. The referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 percent and 67 to 55 percent, respectively. We find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules, but the empirical evidence strongly suggests that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules. This finding is consistent with high income voters with weak demand for public educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on education.

Tribalism as a Minimax-Regret Strategy: Evidence from Voting in the 2007 Kenyan Elections

Although many studies find that voting in Africa approximates an ethnic census in that voting is primarily along ethnic lines, hardly any of the studies have sought to explain ethnic voting following a rational choice framework. Using data of voter opinions from a survey conducted two weeks before the December 2007 Kenyan elections, we find that the expected benefits associated with a win by each of the presidential candidates varied significantly across voters from different ethnic groups. We hypothesize that decision to participate in the elections was influenced by the expected benefits as per the minimax-regret voting model. We test the predictions of this model using data of voter turnout in the December 2007 elections and find that turnout across ethnic groups varied systematically with expected benefits. The results suggest that individuals participated in the elections primarily to avoid the maximum regret should a candidate from another ethnic group win. The results therefore offer credence to the minimax regret model as proposed by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) and refute the Downsian expected utility model.

Effects of informative censoring on the hazard function: Application to the proportional hazards regression model

The standard analyses of survival data involve the assumption that survival and censoring are independent. When censoring and survival are related, the phenomenon is known as informative censoring. This paper examines the effects of an informative censoring assumption on the hazard function and the estimated hazard ratio provided by the Cox model.^ The limiting factor in all analyses of informative censoring is the problem of non-identifiability. Non-identifiability implies that it is impossible to distinguish a situation in which censoring and death are independent from one in which there is dependence. However, it is possible that informative censoring occurs. Examination of the literature indicates how others have approached the problem and covers the relevant theoretical background.^ Three models are examined in detail. The first model uses conditionally independent marginal hazards to obtain the unconditional survival function and hazards. The second model is based on the Gumbel Type A method for combining independent marginal distributions into bivariate distributions using a dependency parameter. Finally, a formulation based on a compartmental model is presented and its results described. For the latter two approaches, the resulting hazard is used in the Cox model in a simulation study.^ The unconditional survival distribution formed from the first model involves dependency, but the crude hazard resulting from this unconditional distribution is identical to the marginal hazard, and inferences based on the hazard are valid. The hazard ratios formed from two distributions following the Gumbel Type A model are biased by a factor dependent on the amount of censoring in the two populations and the strength of the dependency of death and censoring in the two populations. The Cox model estimates this biased hazard ratio. In general, the hazard resulting from the compartmental model is not constant, even if the individual marginal hazards are constant, unless censoring is non-informative. The hazard ratio tends to a specific limit.^ Methods of evaluating situations in which informative censoring is present are described, and the relative utility of the three models examined is discussed. ^

Retrospective Voting in Turkey: Macro and Micro Perspectives

Recent studies have shown that party systems in emerging democracies do not always adequately reflect the various cleavages of society. Under such circumstances, retrospective voting may play a more important role than cleavage voting in determining electoral outcomes. For studies of retrospective voting, the choice between macro and micro level as the independent variable is a major methodological issue. Using individual-level data on Turkey, this paper addresses two major questions: (1) Are voters' decisions based on household economic conditions or national economic conditions? Do sociopolitical conditions also count? (2) Does the future evaluation of the economy affect voting decisions apart from past evaluation? Logit models are used in this research to answer these questions.

Economic voting and electoral volatility in Turkish provinces

Two groups of questions were addressed in this paper: (1) Is voter punishment of the incumbent the primary factor in electoral volatility? Are there any other types of vote swings that underlie volatility? (2) In general, does a decline in economic growth destabilize voter behavior? If so, what kinds of vote swings does an economic downturn tend to generate? Provincial-level panel data analysis yielded the following results: (1) Changes in volatility is primarily due to vote swings from the incumbent to the opposition and also to and from left-wing and right-wing parties. (2) Lower economic growth increases electoral volatility. Economic decline induces vote swings not only from the government to the opposition but also from left-wing to right-wing parties. This is probably because right-wing parties seem more concerned with economic issues and are thus more popular than left-wing parties with lower-income voters.

A Critical Review of Opinion Polls relating to Iranian Voting Intentions: Problems of Research Methodology as applied to Complex Societies

After the 10th Iranian Presidential election on June 12, 2009, several public opinion polls taken in Iran attracted the attention of policy-makers and journalists around the world because of the political crisis that followed. In this paper I first review critically the polls conducted by the WPO (WorldPublicOpinion.org), PIPA (Program on International Policy Attitudes) at the University of Maryland. I also review an essay by Steven Kull, which is based on the aforementioned poll results and which in my opinion leads to false conclusions concerning Iran’s political prospects. I also discuss “An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public,” published by WPO-PIPA on February 3 2010. The present paper arrives at the overall conclusion that it is impossible to obtain an accurate image of political opinions in societies as complicated as that of Iran by concentrating on only one technique of research and analysis, especially when the political and social situation in the society concerned is in a state of constant flux.

Non-economic voting and incumbent strength in Turkey

Evidence suggests that incumbent parties find it harder to be re-elected in emerging than in advanced democracies because of more serious economic problems in the former. Yet the pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey since 2002. Does economic performance sufficiently account for the electoral strength of the AKP government? Reliance on economic performance alone to gain public support makes a government vulnerable to economic fluctuations. This study includes time-series regressions for the period 1950-2011 in Turkey and demonstrates that even among Turkey's long-lasting governments, the AKP has particular electoral strength that cannot be adequately explained by economic performance.

Voting behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014 : religious cleavage or economic performance?

In this study, we examine the voting behavior in Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2014. After summarizing the changes in Indonesian parties' share of the vote from a historical standpoint, we investigate the voting behavior with simple regression models to analyze the effect of regional characteristics on Islamic/secular parties' vote share, using aggregated panel data at the district level. Then, we also test the hypothesis of retrospective economic voting. The results show that districts which formerly stood strongly behind Islamic parties continued to select those parties, or gave preference to abstention over the parties in some elections. From the point of view of retrospective economic voting, we found that districts which experienced higher per capita economic growth gave more support to the ruling parties, although our results remain tentative because information on 2014 is not yet available.

Analysis of electronic and telematic voting systems in binding experiences

This paper is about analysis and assess of three experiences on telematic and electronic voting dealing with such aspects as security and achievement of the social requirements. These experiences have been chosen taking into account the deepness of the public documentation and the technological challenge they faces.

Use of Java Cards in a telematic voting system.

This paper presents a general view of the telematic voting system developed by its authors, with a special emphasis on the important role that smart cards play in this scenario. The use of smart cards as basic pieces for providing secure cryptographic operations in this type of voting scheme is justified. The differences and advantages of Java Cards in comparison with the ?classical? smart cards (those that completely conform to the ISO/IEC 7816 standard) are also discussed. As an example, the paper describes one of the applets implemented in the voting Java Card as part of the general telematic voting application.

VOTESCRIPT: Telematic voting system designed to enable final count verification

In this paper we present a global description of a telematic voting system based on advanced cryptography and on the use of smart cards (VOTESCRIPT system) whose most outstanding characteristic is the ability to verify that the tally carried out by the system is correct, meaning that the results published by the system correspond with votes cast. The VOTESCRIPT system provides an individual verification mechanism allowing each Voter to confirm whether his vote has been correctly counted. The innovation with respect to other solutions lies in the fact that the verification process is private so that Voters have no way of proving what they voted in the presence of a non-authorized third party. Vote buying and selling or any other kind of extortion are prevented. The existence of the Intervention Systems allows the whole electoral process to be controlled by groups of citizens or authorized candidatures. In addition to this the system can simply make an audit not only of the final results, but also of the whole process. Global verification provides the Scrutineers with robust cryptographic evidence which enables unequivocal proof if the system has operated in a fraudulent way.

Contributions to traditional electronic voting systems in order to reinforce citizen confidence

This document provides a general description of the telematic voting scenario designed by the author?s research group. This scenario reinforces verification procedures as key elements to achieve full acceptance of the system on the part of voters. To frame this work, a general overview of electronic voting is given and the conditions entailed by these systems are specified.

Analysis of electronic and telematic voting systems in binding experiences.

This paper is about analysis and assess of three experiences on telematic and electronic voting dealing with such aspects as security and achievement of the social requirements. These experiences have been chosen taking into account the deepness of the public documentation and the technological challenge they faces.

Identification of voting systems for the identification of preferences in public participation. Case Study: application of the Borda Count system for collective decision making at the Salonga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Abstract:The aim of this paper is to review the literature on voting systems based on Condorcet and Borda. We compared and classified them. Also we referred to some strengths and weaknesses of voting systems and finally in a case study, we made use of the Borda voting system for collective decision making in the Salonga National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Resumen: el objetivo de este trabajo es hacer una revisión bibliográfica de los sistemas de votación basados en Condorcet y Borda. Se ha comparado y clasificado los mismos. Así mismo se ha hecho referencia a algunas debilidades y fortalezas de los sistemas de votación y por último en un caso de estudio, se ha hecho uso del sistema de votación de Borda para la toma de decisión colectiva en el Parque Nacional de Salonga en la República Democrática del Congo.