Economic voting and electoral volatility in Turkish provinces


Autoria(s): Hazama, Yasushi
Data(s)

15/06/2009

15/06/2009

01/05/2009

Resumo

Two groups of questions were addressed in this paper: (1) Is voter punishment of the incumbent the primary factor in electoral volatility? Are there any other types of vote swings that underlie volatility? (2) In general, does a decline in economic growth destabilize voter behavior? If so, what kinds of vote swings does an economic downturn tend to generate? Provincial-level panel data analysis yielded the following results: (1) Changes in volatility is primarily due to vote swings from the incumbent to the opposition and also to and from left-wing and right-wing parties. (2) Lower economic growth increases electoral volatility. Economic decline induces vote swings not only from the government to the opposition but also from left-wing to right-wing parties. This is probably because right-wing parties seem more concerned with economic issues and are thus more popular than left-wing parties with lower-income voters.

Identificador

IDE Discussion Paper. No. 202. 2009.5

http://hdl.handle.net/2344/829

IDE Discussion Paper

202

Idioma(s)

en

eng

Publicador

Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO

日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所

Palavras-Chave #Electoral volatility #Economic voting #Panel analysis #Elections #Turkey #Constitutional law #314.89 #METU Turkey トルコ
Tipo

Working Paper

Technical Report