Economic voting and electoral volatility in Turkish provinces
Data(s) |
15/06/2009
15/06/2009
01/05/2009
|
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Resumo |
Two groups of questions were addressed in this paper: (1) Is voter punishment of the incumbent the primary factor in electoral volatility? Are there any other types of vote swings that underlie volatility? (2) In general, does a decline in economic growth destabilize voter behavior? If so, what kinds of vote swings does an economic downturn tend to generate? Provincial-level panel data analysis yielded the following results: (1) Changes in volatility is primarily due to vote swings from the incumbent to the opposition and also to and from left-wing and right-wing parties. (2) Lower economic growth increases electoral volatility. Economic decline induces vote swings not only from the government to the opposition but also from left-wing to right-wing parties. This is probably because right-wing parties seem more concerned with economic issues and are thus more popular than left-wing parties with lower-income voters. |
Identificador |
IDE Discussion Paper. No. 202. 2009.5 http://hdl.handle.net/2344/829 IDE Discussion Paper 202 |
Idioma(s) |
en eng |
Publicador |
Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO 日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所 |
Palavras-Chave | #Electoral volatility #Economic voting #Panel analysis #Elections #Turkey #Constitutional law #314.89 #METU Turkey トルコ |
Tipo |
Working Paper Technical Report |