Merchant marine inquiry--fuel shortage : Executive hearing[s] before the special subcommittee on fuel shortage of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Seventy-seventh Congress, first session, pursuant to authority of H. Res. 281, a resolution authorizing investigation of the national defense program as it relates to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries. October 15 and November 5, 1941.

Edward J. Hart, chairman of subcommittee.

New perspectives on the governance of executive compensation:an examination of the role and effect of compensation consultants

We develop a multi-theoretic approach, drawing on economic, institutional, managerial power and social comparison literatures to explain the role of the external compensation consultant in the top management pay setting institutional field. Taking advantage of recent disclosure requirements in the UK, we collect data on compensation consultant use in 232 large companies. We show that consultants are a prevalent part of the CEO pay setting scene, and document evidence of all advisor use. Our econometric results show that consultant use is associated with firm size and the equity pay mix. We also show that CEO pay is positively associated with peer firms that share consultants, with higher board and consultant interlocks, and some evidence that where firms supply other business services to the firm, CEO pay is greater. © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

The use of presidential executive orders to control the management and administration of the federal government

As long as governmental institutions have existed, efforts have been undertaken to reform them. This research examines a particular strategy, coercive controls, exercised through a particular instrument, executive orders, by a singular reformer, the president of the United States. The presidents studied-- Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton--are those whose campaigns for office were characterized to varying degrees as against Washington bureaucracy and for executive reform. Executive order issuance is assessed through an examination of key factors for each president including political party affiliation, levels of political capital, and legislative experience. A classification typology is used to identify the topical dimensions and levels of coerciveness. The portrayal of the federal government is analyzed through examination of public, media, and presidential attention. The results show that executive orders are significant management tools for the president. Executive orders also represent an important component of the transition plans for incoming administrations. The findings indicate that overall, while executive orders have not increased in the aggregate, they are more intrusive and significant. When the factors of political party affiliation, political capital, and legislative experience are examined, it reveals a strong relationship between executive orders and previous executive experience, specifically presidents who served as a state governor prior to winning national election as president. Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton (all former governors) have the highest percent of executive orders focusing on the federal bureaucracy. Additionally, the highest percent of forceful orders were issued by former governors (41.0%) as compared to their presidential counterparts who have not served as governors (19.9%). Secondly, political party affiliation is an important, but not significant, predictor for the use of executive orders. Thirdly, management strategies that provide the president with the greatest level of autonomy--executive orders--redefine the concept of presidential power and autonomous action. Interviews of elite government officials and political observers support the idea that executive orders can provide the president with a successful management strategy, requiring less expenditure of political resources, less risk to political capital, and a way of achieving objectives without depending on an unresponsive Congress. ^

State legislative term limits and the law of unintended consequences: An examination of member behavior, power structures, and legislative organization in Florida

The implementation of term limits on state legislators has provided a wealth of data for study. Florida, the second largest state in the Union with term limits, has not been comprehensively studied. This research examines the effects of term limits on electoral competition, member composition, legislator career paths, legislative leadership, and intra- and inter-governmental influences on Florida's legislature. This study looks at the Florida legislature from 1992 when term limits were enacted through 2004, three electoral cycles in which term limits have been in effect. This study uses both quantitative and qualitative data where appropriate. Electoral data is used to assess electoral and demographic effects, as well as member career trajectories. Interview data with current and former legislators, lobbyists, and executive branch officials is used to analyze both changes in legislative organization and intra- and inter-governmental influences on the legislative process. Term limits has only created greater competition when a legislative seat opens and has actually created a greater advantage for incumbents. Women and minorities have only made minimal gains in winning seats post-term limits. Newly elected legislators are not political novices with a vast majority having previous elective experience. Leadership is more centralized under term limits and the Senate has gained an advantage over the more inexperienced House. Lastly, the influence of staff, lobbyists, and most importantly, the governor has greatly increased under term limits. This research finds that term limits have not produced the consequences that proponents had envisioned.^

The use of presidential executive orders to control the management and administration of the federal government

As long as governmental institutions have existed, efforts have been undertaken to reform them. This research examines a particular strategy, coercive controls, exercised through a particular instrument, executive orders, by a singular reformer, the president of the United States. The presidents studied- Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton-are those whose campaigns for office were characterized to varying degrees as against Washington bureaucracy and for executive reform. Executive order issuance is assessed through an examination of key factors for each president including political party affiliation, levels of political capital, and legislative experience. A classification typology is used to identify the topical dimensions and levels of coerciveness. The portrayal of the federal government is analyzed through examination of public, media, and presidential attention. The results show that executive orders are significant management tools for the president. Executive orders also represent an important component of the transition plans for incoming administrations. The findings indicate that overall, while executive orders have not increased in the aggregate, they are more intrusive and significant. When the factors of political party affiliation, political capital, and legislative experience are examined, it reveals a strong relationship between executive orders and previous executive experience, specifically presidents who served as a state governor prior to winning national election as president. Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Clinton (all former governors) have the highest percent of executive orders focusing on the federal bureaucracy. Additionally, the highest percent of forceful orders were issued by former governors (41.0%) as compared to their presidential counterparts who have not served as governors (19.9%). Secondly, political party affiliation is an important, but not significant, predictor for the use of executive orders. Thirdly, management strategies that provide the president with the greatest level of autonomy-executive orders redefine the concept of presidential power and autonomous action. Interviews of elite government officials and political observers support the idea that executive orders can provide the president with a successful management strategy, requiring less expenditure of political resources, less risk to political capital, and a way of achieving objectives without depending on an unresponsive Congress.

The effect of board capital and CEO power on corporate social responsibility disclosures

This study examines the effect of directors’ human and social capital (i.e. board capital) on the level of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures by drawing on insights from a resource-based view. It also investigates the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) power on this relationship. Data were obtained from annual reports of companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange in Bangladesh from 2005 to 2013. We employ outside directors’ experiences and expertise as a proxy for board capital and measure CEO power using a ‘power index’ that comprises CEO duality, ownership, tenure and family CEO status. Results show that board capital is positively associated with CSR disclosure levels; however, CEO power is negatively associated with CSR disclosures and reduces the effect of board capital on CSR disclosures. Thus, we conclude that although board capital can improve CSR practices, CEO power can also inhibit these practices.

New modalities of state power: neoliberal responsibilisation and the work of academy chains

This paper draws on interview data gathered as part of a broader study around issues of equity and schooling. It features the voices of the Executive Director and four Head Teachers from one of England's top performing academy chains, ‘CONNECT’. The notion of neoliberal responsibilisation is drawn on to examine, first, the ways in which Head Teachers describe their work and, second, the chain's expectations of them as CONNECT leaders. Responsibilisation of the self was apparent in Head Teachers' construction of themselves as ideal neoliberal workers – performing and enterprising subjects who readily accept the business principles and results-orientation of their ‘data-driven’ environment. Responsibilising of Head Teachers by the organisation was evident in the rigorous ‘non-negotiable’ standards and accountabilities at CONNECT that they were expected to comply with. These non-negotiables cultivated and rewarded Head Teachers’ entrepreneurial identity of achievement motivation. The paper illustrates how such neoliberal responsibilisation is both a crucial and highly troubling element in the work of academy chains as new modalities of state power.