2008 Portuguese tobacco law: What are the effects on smoking rates?

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Business article: M&A as the Portuguese route to Brazil

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

Growth and unemployment: understanding Okun's law for Portugal

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

The Swiss Business Elite (1980-2000): How the Changing Composition of the Elite Explains the Decline of the Swiss Company Network

In this paper we analyse the decline of the Swiss corporate network between 1980 and 2000. We address the theoretical and methodological challenge of this transformation by the use of a combination of network analysis and multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). Based on a sample of top managers of the 110 largest Swiss companies in 1980 and 2000 we show that, beyond an adjustment to structural pressure, an explanation of the decline of the network has to include the strategies of the fractions of the business elites. We reveal that three factors contribute crucially to the decline of the Swiss corporate network: the managerialization of industrial leaders, the marginalization of law degree holders and the influx of hardly connected foreign managers.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees

Large law firms seem to prefer hourly fees over contingent fees. Thispaper provides a moral hazard explanation for this pattern of behavior.Contingent legal fees align the interests of the attorney with those ofthe client, but not necessarily with those of the partnership. We showthat the choice of hourly fees is a solution to an agency problem withmultiple principals, where the interests of one principal (law firm)collide with the interests of the other principal (client).

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, The "Right-to-Cancel" Law - Know Your Rights!, May 2006

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: The "Right-to-Cancel" Law - Know Your Rights!

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, "Lemon Law" -- Know Your Rights!, February 2003

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Iowa's "Lemon Law" -- Know Your Rights!

It's parties that choose electoral systems (or Duverger's Law upside down)

This article presents, discusses and tests the hypothesis that it is the number of parties what can explain the choice of electoral systems, rather than the other way round. Already existing political parties tend to choose electoral systems that, rather than generate new party systems by themselves, will crystallize, consolidate or reinforce previously existing party configurations. A general model develops the argument and presents the concept of 'behavioral-institutional equilibrium' to account for the relation between electoral systems and party systems. The most comprehensive dataset and test of these notions to date, encompassing 219 elections in 87 countries since the 19th century, are presented. The analysis gives strong support to the hypotheses that political party configurations dominated by a few parties tend to establish majority rule electoral systems, while multiparty systems already existed before the introduction of proportional representation. It also offers the new theoretical proposition that strategic party choice of electoral systems leads to a general trend toward proportional representation over time.

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economictheory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Shouldcorporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two majorcontributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analyticalframework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insightsinto how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed bytheir employees.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

Iowa Values Fund and Business Assistance Programs 2007 Annual Report, 2007

Following is the 2007 Annual Report of the Iowa Values Fund (IVF 2005) and Business Assistance Programs covering activity during Fiscal Year 2007 (FY ‘07) and cumulative for the first four years of the Iowa Values Fund Programs. The IVF (2005) is the primary funding source for a menu of financial assistance programs the Iowa Department of Economic Development (IDED) offers as incentives to Iowa companies to expand here, to recruit new companies into Iowa and assist new entrepreneurial ventures. In addition to IDED the law appropriates IVF (2005) funds for economic development activities to the Board of Regents, the Departments of Cultural Affairs and Natural Resources and to Community Colleges for certain workforce training programs. In addition to the IVF (2005), IDED allocates a portion of Community Development Block Grant and Federal Emergency Stimulus funds and several tax credit programs, all of which are included in this report.

Dynamic optimal law enforcement with learning

We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency's current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates data and information (on criminals, on opportunities of crime) enhancing the ability to apprehend in the future at a lower marginal cost.We focus on the impact of enforcement learning on optimal stationary compliance rules. In particular, we show that the optimal stationary fine could be less-than-maximal and the optimal stationary probability of detection could be higher-than-otherwise.

Optimal law enforcement under asymmetric information

In this paper, we focus on the problem created by asymmetric informationabout the enforcer's (agent's) costs associated to enforcement expenditure. This adverse selection problem affects optimal law enforcement because a low cost enforcer may conceal its information by imitating a high cost enforcer, and must then be given a compensation to be induced to reveal its true costs. The government faces a trade-off between minimizing the enforcer's compensation and maximizing the net surplus of harmful acts. As a consequence, the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced leading to more offenses being committed. We show that asymmetry of information does not affect law enforcement as long as raising public funds is costless. The consideration of costly raising of public funds permits to establish the positive correlation between asymmetry of information between government and enforcers andthe crime rate.

Iowa Prison Industries Five Year Transition and Business Plan 2011-2015, 2011

IPI is comprised of three divisions. Private Sector funds are handed over to the General Fund. Traditional Industries and Farms funds are managed by IPI. The auditor of the state provides oversight on policies, procedures, and compliance with state law. Each year, the auditor is responsible for providing the Governor, legislature, Director of Corrections, and the public the findings of their comprehensive audits. IPI has received a clean bill of health and has not been cited for any violations in ten (10) years. IPI operates under the guidance of an advisory board, comprised of seven members. The advisory board meets at least four (4) times per year at a location of the board‟s choice, generally at a different prison each quarter. The board reviews the financials, policies, approves any new private sector ventures and offers comprehensive guidance on issues that will impact correctional industries as well as the public and local businesses. Each member serves for two (2) years and may be re-appointed. IPI has found that retaining board members has helped immensely with the continuity of transition and has afforded IPI with superb leadership and guidance. IPI is 100% self-funding. We receive no appropriations from the general fund. We hire our staff, pay their salaries, and pay the stipend of the offenders. We pay for our raw materials, equipment, and construct our buildings all from the proceeds of our sales. We operate with a revolving fund and retain any earnings at year-ends. The retained earnings are used for expansion of our work programs.