The Kurdish conflict: international humanitarian law and post-conflict mechanisms

This book is highly topical considering the recent resurgence of violence by the PKK, the incursions into Northern Iraq by the Turkish army and security forces and Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. Turkey has become an increasingly important player in Middle Eastern geopolitics. More than two decades of serious conflict in Turkey are proving to be a barrier to improved relations between Turkey and the EU. This book is the first study to address fully the legal and political dimensions of the conflict, and their impact on mechanisms for conflict resolution in the region, offering a scholarly exploration of a debate that is often politically and emotionally highly charged. Kerim Yildiz and Susan Breau look at the practical application of the law of armed conflicts to the ongoing situation in Turkey and Northern Iraq. The application of the law in this region also means addressing larger questions in international law, global politics and conflict resolution. Examples include belligerency in international law, whether the ‘war on terror’ has resulted in changes to the law of armed conflict and terrorism and conflict resolution. The Kurdish Conflict explores the practical possibilities of conflict resolution in the region, examining the political dynamics of the region, and suggesting where lessons can be drawn from other peace processes, such as in Northern Ireland. This book will be of great value to policy-makers, regional experts, and others interested in international humanitarian law and conflict resolution.

A Differentiated, Balanced and Patient Approach? The EU’s Involvement with Georgia’s Secessionist Conflicts beyond the August 2008 War. EU Diplomacy Paper 06/2015.

The August war in 2008 between Russia and Georgia caught the world by surprise but nevertheless brought the European Union (EU) to the forefront of the international efforts to end the hostilities, and the EU became the leading international actor involved with the conflict resolution process. However, in the years following the armed conflict, the conflict resolution process lost pace, and the impact of the EU beyond the immediate aftermath of the August 2008 war has been put into question. By undertaking a qualitative case study, this paper aims to explore to what extent the EU has impacted on the conflict resolution process of Georgia’s secessionist conflicts in 2008-2015. It will argue that the EU’s policies have only to a limited extent impacted on this conflict resolution process, which can be related to the objectives, priorities and time perspectives of the EU’s conflict resolution policies. The EU’s efforts have significantly contributed to the objective of conflict prevention, but the profile of the EU in the field of international conflict management weakened its position in the area of conflict transformation, where the lack of progress in turn limited the EU’s impact in the areas of international conflict management and conflict settlement. The main conclusion put forward is that in order to have a true impact, the EU needs to undertake a differentiated, balanced and patient approach to conflict resolution.

Commercial policy in war time and after; a study of the application of democratic ideas to international commercial relations,

Reprinted in part from various periodicals.

Crises and Crisis Generations: International Conflict and Military Participation in Politics

Why do states facing high levels of international threat sometimes have militaries that are heavily involved in politics and at other times relatively apolitical, professional militaries? I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in a state's history of 'acute' international crises rather than its 'chronic' threat environment. Major international crises lead to professionalization and de-politicization of militaries in both the short- and long-term. International crises underscore the need for the military to defend the state and highlight military deficiencies in this regard. Accordingly, major international crises lead to military professionalization and withdrawal from politics in order to increase military effectiveness. This effect persists years, and decades, later due to generational shifts in the officer corps. As the "Crisis Generation" of officers become generals, they bring with them a preference for professionalization and de-politicization. They guide the military towards abstention from politics. I test this theory using a new global dataset on military officers in national governing bodies from 1964-2008 and find strong support for the theory. Major international crises lead to two waves of military withdrawal from government, years apart. Further statistical analysis finds that this effect is most strongly felt in the non-security areas of governing, while in some cases, international crises may lead to militaries increasing their involvement in security policy-making. Further, international crises that end poorly for a state — i.e., defeats or stalemates — are found to drive more rapid waves of military withdrawal from government. The statistical analysis is supported by a case illustration of civil-military relations in the People's Republic of China, which demonstrates that the crisis of the Korean War (1950-53) led to two waves of military professionalization and de-politicization, decades apart. The first occurred immediately after the war. The second wave, occurring in the 1980s, involved wholesale military withdrawal from governing bodies, which was made possible by the ascent of the "Crisis Generation" of officers in the military, who had served as junior officers in the Korean War, decades prior.

Responsibility to Protect and Sovereignty

The responsibility to protect ('R2P') principle articulates the obligations of the international community to prevent conflict occurring, to intervene in conflicts, and to assist in rebuilding after conflicts. The doctrine is about protecting civilians in armed conflicts from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. This book examines interventions in East Timor, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Kosovo. The chapters explore and question UN debates with respect to the doctrine both before and after its adoption in 2005; contrasting state attitudes to international military intervention; and what takes place after intervention. It also discusses the ability of the Security Council to access reliable information and credible and transparent processes to enable it to make a determination on the occurrence of atrocities in a Member State. Questioning whether there is a need to find a closer operational link between the responsibilities to prevent and react and a normative link between R2P and principles of international law, the contributions examine the effectiveness of the framework of R2P for international decision-making in response to mass atrocity crimes and ask how an international system to deal with threats and mass atrocities can be developed in the absence of a central authority. This book will be valuable to those interested in international law, human rights, and security, peace and conflict studies

Book review : Olivier Corten, The Law Against War

Olivier Corten’s The Law Against War is a comprehensive, meticulously-researched study of contemporary international law governing the use of armed force in international relations. As a translated and updated version of a 2008 book published in French, it offers valuable insights into the positivist methodology that underpins much of the European scholarship of international law. Corten undertakes a rigorous analysis of state practice from 1945 onwards, with a view to clarifying the current meaning and scope of international law’s prohibition on the use of force. His central argument is that the majority of states remain attached to a strict interpretation of this rule. For Corten, state practice indicates that the doctrines of anticipatory self-defence, pre-emptive force and humanitarian intervention have no basis in contemporary international law. His overall position accords with a traditional, restrictive view of the circumstances in which states are permitted to use force...

The Responsibility to Protect and International Law

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a major new international principle, adopted unanimously in 2005 by Heads of State and Government. Whilst it is broadly acknowledged that the principle has an important and intimate relationship with international law, especially the law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights and armed conflict, there has yet to be a volume dedicated to this question. The Responsibility to Protect and International Law fills that gap by bringing together leading scholars from North America, Europe and Australia to examine R2P’s legal content. The Responsibility to Protect and International Law focuses on questions relating to R2P’s legal quality, its relationship with sovereignty, and the question of whether the norm establishes legal obligations. It also aims to introduce readers to different legal perspectives, including feminism, and pressing practical questions such as how the law might be used to prevent genocide and mass atrocities, and punish the perpetrators.

Bridging East and West : The Establishment of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in the United States Foreign Policy of Bridge Building, 1964-1972.

The dissertation examines the foreign policies of the United States through the prism of science and technology. In the focal point of scrutiny is the policy establishing the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the development of the multilateral part of bridge building in American foreign policy during the 1960s and early 1970s. After a long and arduous negotiation process, the institute was finally established by twelve national member organizations from the following countries: Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), France, German Democratic Republic (GDR), Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, Soviet Union and United States; a few years later Sweden, Finland and the Netherlands also joined. It is said that the goal of the institute was to bring together researchers from East and West to solve pertinent problems caused by the modernization process experienced in industrialized world. It originates from President Lyndon B. Johnson s bridge building policies that were launched in 1964, and was set in a well-contested and crowded domain of other international organizations of environmental and social planning. Since the distinct need for yet another organization was not evident, the process of negotiations in this multinational environment enlightens the foreign policy ambitions of the United States on the road to the Cold War détente. The study places this project within its political era, and juxtaposes it with other international organizations, especially that of the OECD, ECE and NATO. Conventionally, Lyndon Johnson s bridge building policies have been seen as a means to normalize its international relations bilaterally with different East European countries, and the multilateral dimension of the policy has been ignored. This is why IIASA s establishment process in this multilateral environment brings forth new information on US foreign policy goals, the means to achieve these goals, as well as its relations to other advanced industrialized societies before the time of détente, during the 1960s and early 1970s. Furthermore, the substance of the institute applied systems analysis illuminates the differences between European and American methodological thinking in social planning. Systems analysis is closely associated with (American) science and technology policies of the 1960s, especially in its military administrative applications, thus analysis within the foreign policy environment of the United States proved particularly fruitful. In the 1960s the institutional structures of European continent with faltering, and the growing tendencies of integration were in flux. One example of this was the long, drawn-out process of British membership in the EEC, another is de Gaulle s withdrawal from NATO s military-political cooperation. On the other hand, however, economic cooperation in Europe between East and West, and especially with the Soviet Union was expanding rapidly. This American initiative to form a new institutional actor has to be seen in that structural context, showing that bridge building was needed not only to the East, but also to the West. The narrative amounts to an analysis of how the United States managed both cooperation and conflict in its hegemonic aspirations in the emerging modern world, and how it used its special relationship with the United Kingdom to achieve its goals. The research is based on the archives of the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, and IIASA. The primary sources have been complemented with both contemporary and present day research literature, periodicals, and interviews.

Las Mujeres en Colombia por la paz

Tesina de Master para el Magíster en Género y Desarrollo, Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Complutense de Madrid. 94 p.

Truth Recovery and Justice after Conflict: Managing Violent Pasts

Breen Smyth, M. (2007). Truth Recovery and Justice after Conflict: Managing Violent Pasts. Abingdon: Routledge. RAE2008

So Why Did the Guns Fall Silent? How Interplay, not Stalemate, Explains the Northern Ireland Peace Process

The precise rationale for, and timing of, the Northern Ireland peace process of the 1990s and beyond, which developed after more than two decades of conflict, has yet to be fully explained. It has been a common assumption that it arose from a stalemate involving the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the 'regular' pro-state forces of the British Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary and the 'irregular/ultra' pro-state loyalist paramilitary groups of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA). Under this interpretation, military/paramilitary deadlock led to ripeness for peace, amid reappraisals by all parties to the conflict of the utility of violence accompanied by reinterpretations of earlier political orthodoxies. The IRA could not remove the British sovereign claim to Northern Ireland; British forces could not militarily defeat the IRA and loyalists and republicans were engaged in a futile inter-communal sectarian war. This stalemate thesis has obvious attraction in explaining why a seemingly intractable war finally subsided, but is less convincing when subject to empirical testing among republican and loyalist participants in the conflict. This article moves away from 'top-down' generalist narratives of the onset of peace, which tend to argue the stalemate thesis, to assess 'bottom-up' interpretations from the actual combatants as to why they ceased fighting. It suggests an asymmetry, rather than mutuality, of perception that there was 'military' cessation by the armed non-state groups, with neither republican nor loyalist interpretations grounded in notions of stalemate. The article concludes by urging a wider consideration of the important and persistent interplay of the military and political in conflicts such as Northern Ireland.

Ethnic conflicts and international politics : an analysis of the communal regional, and global dimensions of the Cyprus problem

The thesis assesses the impact of international factors on relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots during and after the Cold War. Through an analysis of the Cyprus problem it explores both why external actors intervene in communal conflicts and how they influence relations between ethnic groups in plural societies. The analytical framework employed throughout the study draws on contributions of International Relations theorists and students of ethnic conflict. The thesis argues that, as in the global political system, relations between ethnic groups in unranked communal systems are anarchic; that is, actors within the system do not recognize a sovereign political authority. In bipolar communal systems dominated by two relatively equal groups, the struggle for security and power often leads to appeals for assistance from external actors. The framework notes that neighboring states and Great Powers may heed calls for assistance, or intervene without a prior request, if it is in their interest to do so. The convergence of regional and global interests in communal affairs exacerbates ethnic conflicts and precludes the development of effective political institutions. The impact of external intervention in ethnic conflicts has the potential to alter the basis of communal relations. The Cyprus problem is examined both during and after the Cold War in order to gauge how global and regional actors and the structure of their respective systems have affected relations between ethnic groups in Cyprus. The thesis argues that Cyprus's descent into civil war in 1963 was due in part to the entrenchment of external interests in the Republic's constitution. The study also notes that power politics involving the United States, Soviet Union, Greece and Turkey continued to affect the development of communal relations throughout the 1960s, 70s, and, 80s. External intervention culminated in July and August 1974, after a Greek sponsored coup was answered by Turkey's invasion and partition of Cyprus. The forced expulsion of Greek Cypriots from the island's northern territories led to the establishment of ethnically homogeneous zones, thus altering the context of communal relations dramatically. The study also examines the role of the United Nations in Cyprus, noting that its failure to settle the dispute was due in large part to a lack of cooperation from Turkey, and the United States' and Soviet Union's acceptance of the status quo following the 1974 invasion and partition of the island. The thesis argues that the deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era has made a solution to the dispute unlikely for the time being. Barring any dramatic changes in relations between communal and regional antagonists, relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots will continue to develop along the lines established in July/August 1974. The thesis concludes by affirming the validity of its core hypotheses through a brief survey of recent works touching on international politics and ethnic conflict. Questions requiring further research are noted as are elements of the study that require further refinement.

Death for life : a study of targeted killing by States in international law

"Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline.

L’autorisation de recourir à la force accordée par le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies

L’autorisation de recourir à la force est une pratique par laquelle le Conseil de sécurité permet à des États membres des Nations Unies ou à des accords ou organismes régionaux, voire au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies de recourir à la coercition militaire. Elle est l’une des circonstances excluant l’illicéité face à l’interdiction de recourir à la force dans les relations internationales dont la règle est posée à l’article 2,§ 4 de la Charte des Nations Unies. Il est évident que cette pratique ne correspond pas clairement à la lettre de la Charte mais elle tire sa légitimité du fait qu’elle permet au Conseil de sécurité de s’acquitter de sa mission principale de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales, étant donné que le système de coercition militaire prévu par la Charte s’avère inapplicable dans la pratique. Il reste que cette pratique est empreinte d’ambiguïté : elle apparaît tantôt comme une intervention des Nations Unies, tantôt comme une action unilatérale au profit de certaines puissances capables de mener des opérations de grande envergure. Cette ambiguïté est encore exacerbée par le problème de l’autorisation présumée que certainsÉtats pourraient déduire des actes du Conseil de sécurité, pour intervenir dans divers conflits. Dans les faits, la pratique de l’autorisation de recourir à la force semble actualiser une tendance belliciste qui caractérisait les époques antérieures. Elle peut, si l’on n’y prend garde, refondre, par pans entiers, les legs du droit contre la guerre (jus contra bellum) issu du XXème siècle, droit qui a été le fruit de longues tribulations dans l’histoire des relations internationales. Le danger le plus grave est que des acquis chèrement négociés risquent d’être jetés par-dessus bord avec trop de facilité et sans délai, pour servir des visées à court terme.

Les processus décisionnels de l’intervention militaire au Canada (1990-2003) : une approche réaliste néoclassique

La décision d’intervenir militairement ou non dans un conflit est certainement l’une des plus importantes qu’un État puisse prendre. Ces décisions sont coûteuses et très prégnantes tant au plan financier, politique que social. La recherche exposée vise à analyser les processus décisionnels canadiens en matière d’intervention militaire lors de la guerre du Golfe, la guerre en Afghanistan ainsi que la guerre en Irak. Le Canada est un cas très intéressant à étudier, car malgré son statut de puissance moyenne, il a pris part à sept conflits armés depuis 1867. Cette recherche tentera donc de déterminer ce qui motive le Canada à investir des ressources financières et humaines dans certains conflits, alors qu’il choisit de ne pas s’impliquer dans d’autres. Certaines théories des relations internationales affirment que la politique de défense des États est guidée par le désir de maximiser leur puissance sur la scène internationale. D’autres théories mettent plutôt l’accent sur les valeurs des États, ou bien sur leur intégration dans des institutions internationales. Ces différentes hypothèses soulèvent l’importance des facteurs internes et externes, mais ne permettent pas de savoir lesquels priment. Ainsi, grâce à un modèle de prise de décision réaliste néoclassique, synthétisant ces deux types de facteurs, il est possible de déterminer lesquels des éléments internes (contraintes de politique interne, perception des dirigeants) ou externes (position relative du Canada dans le système international) prédominent lors de la décision d’entrer ou non en guerre.