Introduction – transnational organised crime and terrorism:different peas, same pod

The nexus between terrorism and organised crime consists in a strategic alliance between two non-state actors, able to exploit illegal markets, threaten the security of individuals, and influence policy-making on a global level. Recent Europol reports have pointed towards the importance of studying the links between organised crime and terrorist groups, and have underlined that the nature and extent of these connections have seldom been addressed from an academic perspective. Considering the degree of dangerousness that both organised crime and terrorism currently represent in the world, the collusion between these two phenomena is of urgent contemporary interest. Basing itself on geographical case-studies, this edited volume aims at contributing to the existing literature in three ways: by enriching the empirical knowledge on the nature of the crime-terror nexus and its evolution; by exploring the impact of the nexus within different economic, political and societal contexts; and by expanding on its theoretical conceptualization.

Criminals and terrorists in partnership:unholy alliance

The nexus between terrorism and organised crime consists in a strategic alliance between two non-state actors, able to exploit illegal markets, threaten the security of individuals, and influence policy-making on a global level. Recent Europol reports have pointed towards the importance of studying the links between organised crime and terrorist groups, and have underlined that the nature and extent of these connections have seldom been addressed from an academic perspective. Considering the degree of dangerousness that both organised crime and terrorism currently represent in the world, the collusion between these two phenomena is of urgent contemporary interest. Basing itself on geographical case-studies, this edited volume aims at contributing to the existing literature in three ways: by enriching the empirical knowledge on the nature of the crime-terror nexus and its evolution; by exploring the impact of the nexus within different economic, political and societal contexts; and by expanding on its theoretical conceptualization.

Environmental governance in a contested state:the influence of European Union and other external actors on energy sector regulation in Kosovo

This article examines environmental governance in Kosovo, with a particular focus on the energy sector. The article considers the degree to which the emerging model of environmental governance is characterised by hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes of coordination. We examine the roles of a number of domestic institutions and actors – ministries, agencies, and regulatory bodies– and the influence of external actors, including the EU, the US, and Serbia. The EU is building Kosovo’s own hierarchical governance capacity by strengthening domestic institutions, whilst the US focuses primarily on market liberalization, whilst simultaneously supporting EU efforts. Moreover, environmental policy change is not wholly or predominantly driven by domestic actors, which can partly be attributed to Kosovo’s limited domestic sovereignty. We conclude that the emerging model of environmental governance in Kosovo is characterized by a weak hierarchy, partly as a result of external actor involvement, which disincentivises the government from responding to domestic non-state actor pressure.

Graduate program culture and intention to persist: Working adults in cohort and non-cohort programs

Cohort programs have been instituted at many universities to accommodate the growing number of mature adult graduate students who pursue degrees while maintaining multiple commitments such as work and family. While it is estimated that as many as 40–60% of students who begin graduate study fail to complete degrees, it is thought that attrition may be even higher for this population of students. Yet, little is known about the impact of cohorts on the learning environment and whether cohort programs affect graduate student retention. Retention theory stresses the importance of the academic department, quality of faculty-student relationships and student involvement in the life of the academic community as critical determinants in students' decisions to persist to degree completion. However, students who are employed full-time typically spend little time on campus engaged in the learning environment. Using academic and social integration theory, this study examined the experiences of working adult graduate students enrolled in cohort (CEP) and non-cohort (non-CEP) programs and the influence of these experiences on intention to persist. The Graduate Program Context Questionnaire was administered to graduate students (N = 310) to examine measures of academic and social integration and intention to persist. Sample t tests and ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether differences in perceptions could be identified between cohort and non-cohort students. Multiple linear regression was used to identify variables that predict students' intention to persist. While there were many similarities, significant differences were found between CEP and non-CEP student groups on two measures. CEP students rated peer-student relationships higher and scored higher on the intention to persist measure than non-CEP students. The psychological integration measure, however, was the strongest predictor of intention to persist for both the CEP and non-CEP groups. This study supports the research literature which suggests that CEP programs encourage the development of peer-student relationships and promote students' commitment to persistence.

Defense Expenditure: Andean and Amazon Regions

The Andean and the amazon, comprised of Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, have recently undertaken significant modernization efforts ranging from equipment, logistics, doctrine, training, deployment and the re-definition of the roles and missions of their forces. In most cases, motivations to modernize have been internal, such as continuing operations against armed groups as in the case of Colombia and Peru, enhance border control and sovereignty enforcement, as in the case of Ecuador and Brazil or regime control in Venezuela. However, they are complemented by perceptions of external threats, including traditional intra-state conventional wars. The increased tensions between Colombia and Venezuela and Ecuador as well as the historic Peru-Chile tensions are the most salient examples. Although diplomacy –especially defence diplomacy- has worked to a good degree in creating and strengthening confidence building measures, the potential for inter-state conflict is higher in this region of the Americas. This region has seen the recent emergence of long-term modernization plans, initially in Colombia followed by Venezuela and Ecuador and probably best embodied in scope and scale by the Brazilian National Defence Plan (for its long term vision). Although it has been speculated that high allocation of funds to retirement pension systems has had an impact on delaying modernization plans, this comparative study on the allocation of pension and social funds in these particular countries concludes that there is no direct linkage between the poor funding of military modernization plans and the diversion of funds to military pension systems.

Human Security and Crime in Latin America: The political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies

Organized crime and illegal economies generate multiple threats to states and societies. But although the negative effects of high levels of pervasive street and organized crime on human security are clear, the relationships between human security, crime, illicit economies, and law enforcement are highly complex. By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal economic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of the marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic livelihoods. Even criminal groups without a political ideology often have an important political impact on the lives of communities and on their allegiance to the State. Criminal groups also have political agendas. Both belligerent and criminal groups can develop political capital through their sponsorship of illicit economies. The extent of their political capital is dependent on several factors. Efforts to defeat belligerent groups by decreasing their financial flows through suppression of an illicit economy are rarely effective. Such measures, in turn, increase the political capital of anti-State groups. The effectiveness of anti-money laundering measures (AML) also remains low and is often highly contingent on specific vulnerabilities of the target. The design of AML measures has other effects, such as on the size of a country’s informal economy. Multifaceted anti-crime strategies that combine law enforcement approaches with targeted socio-economic policies and efforts to improve public goods provision, including access to justice, are likely to be more effective in suppressing crime than tough nailed-fist approaches. For anti-crime policies to be effective, they often require a substantial, but politically-difficult concentration of resources in target areas. In the absence of effective law enforcement capacity, legalization and decriminalization policies of illicit economies are unlikely on their own to substantially reduce levels of criminality or to eliminate organized crime. Effective police reform, for several decades largely elusive in Latin America, is one of the most urgently needed policy reforms in the region. Such efforts need to be coupled with fundamental judicial and correctional systems reforms. Yet, regional approaches cannot obliterate the so-called balloon effect. If demand persists, even under intense law enforcement pressures, illicit economies will relocate to areas of weakest law enforcement, but they will not be eliminated.

Innovating from the War Economy: Formal, Informal, and Illicit Economic Activities of the Military in Colombia

Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.

Operações Anfíbias em ambiente A2/AD

Com o fim da Guerra Fria e a dissolução do Pacto Militar de Varsóvia, a Rússia deixou de ser uma ameaça à hegemonia militar norte-americana e da NATO. Assim, desde esse momento para cá que se tem assistido a um quase total acesso, livre de verdadeira oposição, a qualquer teatro de operações. Durante a Guerra do Golfo, em 1990-91, e posteriormente no Afeganistão e Iraque a partir de 2001, no que constituem os dois grandes conflitos armados pós-Guerra Fria, os EUA em conjunto com a NATO, conseguiram alcançar a vitória através de um total acesso operacional aos teatros de operações, e com um grau de ameaça bastante reduzido. Contudo, este cenário de ameaça reduzida e acesso global está claramente comprometido. Isto porque um sem número de meios e tecnologias têm sido desenvolvidas e aplicadas exatamente com este propósito. Assim, em 2003 surgiu o acrónimo A2/AD – “Anti-Access/Area Denial”, para qualificar estes meios e estratégias para os empregar, por forma a negar o acesso ao cenário de conflito, ou limitar a facilidade de movimentação no teatro de operações. Estas estratégias de A2/AD diminuem a capacidade de projeção de poder, negando a facilidade de movimentação e capacidade de ação, permitindo ainda uma miríade de abordagens operacionais. Os inúmeros adversários dos EUA/NATO não irão cometer os mesmos erros que Saddam Hussein cometeu na primeira Guerra do Golfo. Em particular, a China tem desenvolvido grande parte da sua capacidade de A2/AD com base em exemplos retirados deste conflito. A proliferação deste tipo de capacidades e meios ao longo de um espectro bastante significativo de atores estatais e não-estatais obriga a que tanto os EUA como a NATO desenvolvam formas inovadoras de lhes fazer face. As operações anfíbias poderão ser uma resposta bastante capaz a este cenário de A2/AD. A capacidade única de operar transversalmente em diversos domínios, com um custo relativamente baixo e juntando forças dos vários ramos, respondendo de forma rápida a qualquer situação e providenciando uma presença avançada num cenário de conflito tornam as Operações Anfíbias numa resposta bastante válida à questão estratégica do A2/AD.

Review of the Community Residential Care Facilities Program, Department of Health and Environmental Control

This review was predicated on a credible complaint alleging substantial health and safety deficiencies in the care of a resident placed in a Community Residential Care Facility (CRCF) in Kershaw County, South Carolina. Initial investigation with subject matter experts, non-profit advocacy groups, and CRCF inspection reports revealed this single incident might be a symptom of systemic health and safety deficiencies throughout DHEC’s CRCF Program, which regulates 471 CRCFs with the approximately 17,000 vulnerable clients, primarily elderly and disabled. This review’s scope and objectives were: Assess the risk of a vulnerable population of elderly and disabled citizens residing in CRCFs living in unsatisfactory health and safety conditions; Evaluate DHEC’s CRCF Program inspection process capabilities to identify and address CRCFs with unsatisfactory health and safety living conditions; Recommend opportunities to improve the CRCF Program.

El rol de las redes de apoyo transnacional en la evolución del régimen de trata de personas en la región del mekong, 2004-2015

Con el fin de la unipolaridad no sólo se fortalecieron mecanismos de gobernanza global como los Regímenes Internacionales, sino también se fortalecieron actores no estatales. A pesar de la importancia que tomaron estos dos elementos aún no existe una teoría que explique exhaustivamente la relación que existe entre ellos. Es por lo anterior que, la investigación busca responder de qué manera el rol de las Redes de Apoyo Transnacional ha incidido en la evolución del régimen de tráfico de personas en la Región del Mekong. Asimismo tiene como objetivo comprender las relación entre el Régimen y las Redes de Apoyo Transnacional a través de la formulación de un caso de estudio basado en metodologías cualitativas, específicamente, en el análisis teórico-constructivista y el análisis de contenido de documentos producidos por actores estatales y no estatales.

¿Se encuentran protegidas las esposas o compañeras menores de 15 años de los miembros de las partes en un conflicto armado no internacional frente a la violencia sexual ejercida por sus propias parejas o por otros miembros del grupo al que pertenecen?

La protección general atribuida en los conflictos armados no internacionales por el artículo 3 común a la población civil, de la que las niñas menores de 15 años forman parte, no depende de su filiación con alguna de las partes en el conflicto, y se extiende, en principio, a todos los actos de violencia, entre los que se encuentran los de naturaleza sexual cometidos por cualquiera de las mismas, incluyendo aquellos cometidos por los miembros de la parte en el conflicto con la que se encuentren afiliadas. Los casos contra Thomas Lubanga y Bosco Ntaganda muestran que, como regla general, las niñas menores de 15 años no desarrollan de manera prolongada actividades de participación directa en las hostilidades, por lo que, a pesar de acompañar permanente al grupo y de ser “esposas” o “compañeras” de sus comandantes, no asumen una función continua de combate y no pueden ser consideradas como miembros del mismo. Además, los actos de naturaleza sexual coercitivamente desarrollados por las niñas menores de 15 años reclutadas por las FPLC en favor de los comandantes y miembros del grupo con las que se encuentran esposadas, no cumple ninguno de los tres requisitos exigidos por el concepto de participación directa en las hostilidades porque: (a) no son idóneos para causar directamente por sí mismos el umbral de daño requerido; (b) no forman parte integral de ninguna operación militar que pudiera generar dicho umbral de daño; y (c) no poseen el nexo beligerante requerido, puesto que no están específicamente diseñados para causar un menoscabo a la parte adversa de las FLPC. Tampoco las demás actividades desarrolladas por las niñas menores de 15 años alistadas o reclutadas por las FLPC, incluyendo trabajo doméstico (donde principalmente desempeñaron tareas culinarias), transporte de comida a bases aéreas y acompañamiento a las esposas de los comandantes, cumplen, según la Sala de Primera Instancia I en el caso Lubanga, con los tres requisitos necesarios para su consideración como participación directa en las hostilidades. De ahí, que las niñas no hayan perdido en ningún momento su protección general. A todo lo anterior hay que añadir que los niños y niñas menores de 15 años, al ser una población particularmente vulnerable, gozan de una especial protección durante los conflictos armados (con independencia de su naturaleza), tal y como se manifiesta en la Convención de los Derechos del Niño de 1989, los Convenios de Ginebra de 1949 y de sus Protocolos adicionales de 1977, el Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional de 1998 y las Resoluciones 1882 de 2009, 1960 de 2010 y 2106 de 2013 del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas. Esta protección especial se extiende a los actos de violencia sexual cometidos por los miembros de las fuerzas armadas nacionales o grupos armados organizados que los alistan o reclutan. En consecuencia, la protección general y especial a que son acreedoras las niñas menores de 15 años, no se limita a las agresiones provenientes de las partes adversas en el conflicto, sino que se extiende también a la violencia sexual ejercida contra ellas por los miembros del propio grupo que las alistó o reclutó, incluso en el caso de que ésta sea ejercida por los comandantes que las tomaron como esposas o compañeras. Las niñas menores de 15 años alistadas o reclutadas entre 2002 y 2003 por las FPLC de Thomas Lubanga y Bosco Ntaganda eran sin duda acreedoras de dicha protección.

La institucionalización de la lucha contra el terrorismo transnacional a través del derecho internacional

Hasta hace casi una década, la guerra contra el terrorismo fue una lucha solitaria de los Estados. Actualmente y debido a las implicaciones globales de este fenómeno, las acciones contra este flagelo han adquirido connotación internacional. Gran parte de los países miembros de las Naciones Unidas han acogido esta guerra –contra un enemigo común, pero indefinido- como un compromiso político en favor de la paz y seguridad internacional. La producción constante de instrumentos internacionales que condenan el terrorismo y que exigen tomar medidas para combatirlo, demuestran que esa intención política originaria se ha decantado en el ordenamiento internacional como una obligación autónoma, de carácter consuetudinario; que hace que actualmente no haya país en el mundo que pueda excusarse de combatir al terrorismo (interno o transnacional) independientemente de las justificaciones que se puedan aludir para el no cumplimiento.

Civil conflict and voting behavior : evidence from Colombia

¿Cuáles son los efectos de la guerra sobre el comportamiento político? Colombia es un caso interesante en el que el conflicto y las elecciones coexisten y los grupos armados ilegales intencionalmente afectan los resultados electorales. Sin embargo, los grupos usan diferentes estrategias para alterar estos resultados. Este artículo argumenta que los efectos diferenciales de la violencia sobre los resultados electorales son el resultado de estrategias deliberadas de los grupos ilegales, que a su turno, son consecuencia de las condiciones militares que difieren entre ellos. Usando datos panel de las elecciones al Senado de 1994 a 2006 y una aproximación por variables instrumentales para resolver posibles problemas de endogenidad, este artículo muestra que la violencia guerrillera disminuye la participación electoral, mientras que la violencia paramilitar no tiene ningún efecto sobre la participación pero reduce la competencia electoral y beneficia a nuevos partidos no-tradicionales. Esto es consistente con la hipótesis de que la estrategia de la guerrilla es sabotear las elecciones, mientras que los paramiltares establecen alianzas con ciertos candidatos.

Contribución de la misión de naciones unidas en Guatemala – Minugua, a la promoción, defensa y garantía de los derechos de la población indígena guatemalteca (1994 a 2004)

El conflicto armado en Guatemala se originó por el abuso de poder, la desigualdad, la exclusión y la profunda discriminación, sobre todo hacia la población indígena, a la que se le han desconocido históricamente sus derechos y que fue la más afligida durante el conflicto. Lo que desembocó en el nacimiento de grupos al margen de la ley, cuyo propósito fue reivindicar los derechos de la población, así como la equidad y justicia social. El conflicto se caracterizó por la formación de grupos paramilitares, la violación al Derecho Internacional Humanitario, el elevado número de víctimas del conflicto, mayoritariamente indígenas y porque más del 85% de las violaciones a los derechos humanos fueron perpetradas por el Estado. Gracias a la voluntad política, al respaldo de la comunidad internacional, especialmente de la Organización de Naciones Unidas -ONU, y a los buenos oficios de la Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación – CNR, se lograron firmar los Acuerdos de Paz y dar fin a este cruento conflicto de más de 36 años. Las partes firmantes vieron la necesidad de que un ente autónomo e imparcial de Naciones Unidas, verificara el cumplimiento de La Misión de Naciones Unidas en Guatemala - MINUGUA contribuyó a la promoción, defensa y garantía de los derechos de la población indígena guatemalteca. Específicamente, incidió en el cumplimiento de los compromisos contenidos en el Acuerdo sobre Identidad y Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas guatemaltecos –AIDPI, que fue suscrito el 31 de marzo de 1995, asimismo, contribuyó a la garantía del derecho a la justicia de la población indígena, lo que se evidenció en las acciones y el papel que desempeñó en los componentes de verdad, justicia y reparación.

Selecting an IMC Career: Influences, Choices and Destinations

Integrated marketing communication incorporates both customer and non-customer stakeholder groups. While the literature commonly refers to this distinction as marketing communication and corporate communication, respectively, and practitioners accept the need for these roles, this study aims to explore the student perspective. US-based research suggests that students are more interested in marketing communication activities such as promotion that target customer stakeholders, and less interested in corporate communication activities that target non-customer stakeholders including employees, investors, and government (Bowen, 2003). The findings of this study match its US counterpart, and present implications for both the education and practice of marketing communication