The periodic table: contest and exhibition

The systemization and organization of ideas and concepts is an integral part of science. In chemistry, the organization of the periodic table of the chemical elements in the 1860s was one of the greatest scientific breakthroughs ever made and in fact during the 20th century it became a universally recognized scientific icon (1). The periodic table is the fundamental classificatory scheme of the elements and summarizes the realm of chemistry (2). Simply knowing the position of an element in the periodic table tells us about its properties and is usually enough to predict how the element will behave in a wide variety of different situations or reactions (1). Based on this potential mine of information, it is possible to make reliable predictions of the properties of the compounds that each element forms. Nowadays, the concept of the periodic table is starting to interact with other sciences and reports of periodic tables of amino acids (3), genetic codes (4), protein structures (5), and biology (6) can be found in the specialized literature. Symbiosis between science and art, for example, “The Periodic Table of The Elephants” (7), can also be seen. To appeal to a better understanding of the periodic table, the Instituto Superior de Engenharia do Instituto Politécnico do Porto and the Centro de Química da Universidade do Porto promoted a contest and exhibit with the goal of stimulating a wide and heterogeneous audience, ranging from young children and their parents to graduate students from several disciplines, to explore the nature of this icon. Imaginative educational activities such as contests (8–10), games (11, 12), and puzzles (13–15) provided a way to communicate with the general public with the goal of attracting students to science. This also constituted an interesting, informative, and entertaining alternative to non-interactive lectures. Simultaneously, artistic creativity was combined with scientific knowledge.

Electron driven reactions in complexes embedded in superfluid helium droplets

A thesis submitted to the University of Innsbruck for the doctor degree in Natural Sciences, Physics and New University of Lisbon for the doctor degree in Physics, Atomic and Molecular Physics

When does universal peace prevail? Secession and group formation in rent seeking contests and policy conflicts

This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Salvia divinorum: an hallucinogenic mint which might become a new recreational drug in Switzerland.

Salvia divinorum Epling & Jativa is an hallucinogenic mint traditionally used for curing and divination by the Mazatec Indians of Oaxaca, Mexico. Young people from Mexican cities were reported to smoke dried leaves of S. divinorum as a marijuana substitute. Recently, two S. divinorum specimens were seized in a large-scale illicit in-door and out-door hemp plantation. Salvinorin A also called divinorin A, a trans-neoclerodane diterpene, was identified in several organic solvent extracts by gas chromatography-mass spectrometry. The botanical identity of the plant was confirmed by comparing it to an authentic herbarium specimen. More plants were then discovered in Swiss horticulturists greenhouses. All these data taken together suggest that many attempts exist in Switzerland to use S. divinorum as a recreational drug. This phenomenon may be enhanced because neither the magic mint, nor its active compound are banned substances listed in the Swiss narcotic law.

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument

In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predictions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.

Non-cooperative incentives to share knowledge in competitive environments

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which there are only three players and competition takes place only within two stages. Players can share their private knowledge with their opponents and the knowledge is modelled as in uencing their marginal cost of e¤ort. We identify two main mechanisms that work towards knowledge disclosure. One of them is that before the actual competition starts, the stronger player of the rst stage of a game may have desire to share his knowledge with the "observer", be- cause this reduces the valuation of the prize of the weaker player of that stage and as a result his e¤ort level and probability of winning in a ght. Another mechanism is that the "observer" may have sometimes desire to share knowledge with the weaker player of the rst stage, because in this way, by increasing his probability of winning in that stage, he decreases the probability of winning of the stronger player. As a result, in the second stage the "observer" may have greater chances to meet the weaker player rather than the stronger one. Keywords: knowledge sharing, strategic knowledge disclosure, multistage contest game, non-cooperative games

On Cobb-Douglas Preferences in Bilateral Oligopoly

Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange the goods they are endowed with for money with a finite set of buyers, and no price-taking assumptions are imposed. If trade takes place via a strategic market game bilateral oligopoly can be thought of as two linked proportional-sharing contests: in one the sellers share the aggregate bid from the buyers in proportion to their supply and in the other the buyers share the aggregate supply in proportion to their bids. The analysis can be separated into two ‘partial games’. First, fix the aggregate bid at B; in the first partial game the sellers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their supply and the aggregate supply in the equilibrium of this game is X˜ (B). Next, fix the aggregate supply at X; in the second partial game the buyers contest this fixed prize in proportion to their bids and the aggregate bid in the equilibrium of this game is ˜B (X). The analysis of these two partial games takes into account competition within each side of the market. Equilibrium in bilateral oligopoly must take into account competition between sellers and buyers and requires, for example, ˜B (X˜ (B)) = B. When all traders have Cobb-Douglas preferences ˜ X(B) does not depend on B and ˜B (X) does not depend on X: whilst there is competition within each side of the market there is no strategic interdependence between the sides of the market. The Cobb-Douglas assumption provides a tractable framework in which to explore the features of fully strategic trade but it misses perhaps the most interesting feature of bilateral oligopoly, the implications of which are investigated.

An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions

This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of difference-form group contests, that is, contests fought among groups and where their probability of victory depends on the difference of their effective efforts. This axiomatization rests on the property of Equalizing Consistency, stating that the difference between winning probabilities in the grand contest and in the smaller contest should be identical across all participants in the smaller contest. This property overcomes some of the drawbacks of the widely-used ratio-form contest success functions. Our characterization shows that the criticisms commonly-held against difference-form contests success functions, such as lack of scale invariance and zero elasticity of augmentation, are unfounded.By clarifying the properties of this family of contest success functions, this axiomatization can help researchers to find the functional form better suited to their application of interest.

Meta-analysis identifies 13 new loci associated with waist-hip ratio and reveals sexual dimorphism in the genetic basis of fat distribution.

Waist-hip ratio (WHR) is a measure of body fat distribution and a predictor of metabolic consequences independent of overall adiposity. WHR is heritable, but few genetic variants influencing this trait have been identified. We conducted a meta-analysis of 32 genome-wide association studies for WHR adjusted for body mass index (comprising up to 77,167 participants), following up 16 loci in an additional 29 studies (comprising up to 113,636 subjects). We identified 13 new loci in or near RSPO3, VEGFA, TBX15-WARS2, NFE2L3, GRB14, DNM3-PIGC, ITPR2-SSPN, LY86, HOXC13, ADAMTS9, ZNRF3-KREMEN1, NISCH-STAB1 and CPEB4 (P = 1.9 × 10⁻⁹ to P = 1.8 × 10⁻⁴⁰) and the known signal at LYPLAL1. Seven of these loci exhibited marked sexual dimorphism, all with a stronger effect on WHR in women than men (P for sex difference = 1.9 × 10⁻³ to P = 1.2 × 10⁻&supl;³). These findings provide evidence for multiple loci that modulate body fat distribution independent of overall adiposity and reveal strong gene-by-sex interactions.

Social rules govern vocal competition in the barn owl

To resolve the share of limited resources, animals often compete through exchange of signals about their relative motivation to compete. When two competitors are similarly motivated, the resolution of conflicts may be achieved in the course of an interactive process. In barn owls, Tyto alba, in which siblings vocally compete during the prolonged absence of parents over access to the next delivered food item, we investigated what governs the decision to leave or enter a contest, and at which level. Siblings alternated periods during which one of the two individuals vocalized more than the other. Individuals followed turn-taking rules to interrupt each other and momentarily dominate the vocal competition. These social rules were weakly sensitive to hunger level and age hierarchy. Hence, the investment in a conflict is determined not only by need and resource-holding potential, but also by social interactions. The use of turn-taking rules governing individual vocal investment has rarely been shown in a competitive context. We hypothesized that these rules would allow individuals to remain alert to one another's motivation while maintaining the cost of vocalizing at the lowest level.

Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit

We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)