959 resultados para UNIVERSAL PRIMERS


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INTRODUÇÃO: A candidíase vaginal é uma condição que afeta um grande número de mulheres em idade fértil. Candida albicans é a espécie mais frequentemente isolada de secreção vaginal, entretanto, outras espécies mais resistentes às drogas antifúngicas podem ser isoladas de amostras clínicas vaginais. MÉTODOS: Foram identificadas as espécies de 30 isolados vaginais de Candida sp por PCR utilizando o primer universal ITS4 e primers espécie-específicos para C. albicans, C. glabrata, C. tropicalis e C. krusei. A sensibilidade destes isolados frente à anfotericina B, fluconazol e voriconazol foi determinada pelo método de macrodiluição M27-A2 do CLSI. RESULTADOS: Através dos ensaios de PCR, 28 isolados foram caracterizados como C. albicans e 2 isolados apresentaram amplificação para os primers específicos de C. albicans e C. glabrata. A concentração inibitória mínima para anfotericina B variou de 0,03µg/mL a 0,25µg/mL, para o fluconazol de 0,125µg/mL a 16µg/mL e para o voriconazol de 0,03µg/mL a 0,25µg/mL. CONCLUSÕES: A identificação de Candida ao nível de espécie através de ensaios de PCR deve ser relevante para o gerenciamento clínico destas infecções.

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Flavivirus is a genus of arthropod-transmitted viruses of the family Flaviviridae, and in Brazil, up to eleven different Flavivirus have been isolated. We collected blood from farmers in the municipality of Theobroma, which is located 320km from the City of Porto Velho, the former capital of the Brazilian State of Rondônia. For viral isolation, we used newborn mouse brain, followed by RT-PCR with specific universal Flavivirus primers. We obtained fragments 958bp and 800bp in length. Based on BLAST, these sequences were 91% similar to a sequence of Cacipacore virus.

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We investigate the effects of bank control over borrower firms whether by representation on boards of directors or by the holding of shares through bank asset management divisions. Using a large sample of syndicated loans, we find that banks are more likely to act as lead arrangers in loans when they exert some control over the borrower firm. Bank-firm governance links are associated with higher loan spreads during the 2003-2006 credit boom, but lower spreads during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Additionally, these links mitigate credit rationing effects during the crisis. The results are robust to several methods to correct for the endogeneity of the bank- firm governance link. Our evidence, consistent with intertemporal smoothing of loan rates, suggests there are costs and benefits from banks’ involvement in firm governance.

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Doutoramento em Estudos da Criança (área de especialização em Educação Especial).

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Tarea (A):(...) Trataremos de extender a Sp(n,1) los resultados conseguidos sobre la imagen del homomorfismo de Lepowsky cuando G es SO(n,1) ó SU(n,1). (...) Tarea (B): (...) Para todo grupo de Lie de rango uno, con rango (G) = rango (K), los elementos del álgebra B son W-invariantes y que este resultado ya ha sido establecido para los grupos SO(2n,1) y SU(n,1); durante el período correspondiente a este subsidio esperamos extender este resultado a todo grupo de Lie de rango uno con rango (G) = rango (K). Tarea (C): Durante este período esperamos también avanzar en la determinación del dual unitario del grupo Spin (2n,C).

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We provide some guidelines for deriving new projective hash families of cryptographic interest. Our main building blocks are so called group action systems; we explore what properties of this mathematical primitives may lead to the construction of cryptographically useful projective hash families. We point out different directions towards new constructions, deviating from known proposals arising from Cramer and Shoup's seminal work.

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This paper analyzes secession and group formation in a general model of contest inspired by Esteban and Ray (1999). This model encompasses as special cases rent seeking contests and policy conflicts, where agents lobby over the choice of a policy in a one-dimensional policy space. We show that in both models the grand coalition is the efficient coalition structure and agents are always better off in the grand coalition than in a symmetric coalition structure. Individual agents (in the rent seeking contest) and extremists (in the policy conflict) only have an incentive to secede when they anticipate that their secession will not be followed by additional secessions. Incentives to secede are lower when agents cooperate inside groups. The grand coalition emerges as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of a sequential game of coalition formation in rent seeking contests.