Production and Productive Reason

This article explores two rival understandings of production and what it means to be a rational productive subject. Against ‘technicist’ models of productive reason, it defends a ‘phronetic’ model on both normative and pragmatic grounds. The discussion begins with a description of the general principles underpinning technicist theories of workplace organisation, principles which continue to inform work design approaches to this day. The technicist model is thereafter criticised on three counts: that it represents a specific managerial agenda which privileges sectional interests; that it is suspect morally for a number of reasons; and that despite its aspiration of arriving at ‘one best method’, it represents but one way of organising work processes. The phronetic model is then set out using the notion of ‘practices’ as a guide. This notion is important in providing a view of production in which technical reason is subsumed under a broader practical reason incorporating individual experience and judgement. Against the charge that this view is merely an instance of nostalgic craft romanticism having little relevance to present industrial realities, there are recognisable contemporary instances of phronetic production, one of the most interesting being Volvo’s innovations in automotive assembly systems.

The C-terminal domain of the Salmonella enterica WbaP (UDP-galactose:Und-P galactose-1-phosphate transferase) is sufficient for catalytic activity and specificity for undecaprenyl monophosphate

Two families of membrane enzymes catalyze the initiation of the synthesis of O-antigen lipopolysaccharide. The Salmonella enterica Typhimurium WbaP is a prototypic member of one of these families. We report here the purification and biochemical characterization of the WbaP C-terminal (WbaP(CT)) domain harboring one putative transmembrane helix and a large cytoplasmic tail. An N-terminal thioredoxin fusion greatly improved solubility and stability of WbaP(CT) allowing us to obtain highly purified protein. We demonstrate that WbaP(CT) is sufficient to catalyze the in vitro transfer of galactose (Gal)-1-phosphate from uridine monophosphate (UDP)-Gal to the lipid carrier undecaprenyl monophosphate (Und-P). We optimized the in vitro assay to determine steady-state kinetic parameters with the substrates UDP-Gal and Und-P. Using various purified polyisoprenyl phosphates of increasing length and variable saturation of the isoprene units, we also demonstrate that the purified enzyme functions highly efficiently with Und-P, suggesting that the WbaP(CT) domain contains all the essential motifs to catalyze the synthesis of the Und-P-P-Gal molecule that primes the biosynthesis of bacterial surface glycans.

A graded BDI agent model to represent and reason about preferences

In this research note, we introduce a graded BDI agent development framework, g-BDI for short, that allows to build agents as multi-context systems that reason about three fundamental and graded mental attitudes (i.e. beliefs, desires and intentions). We propose a sound and complete logical framework for them and some logical extensions to accommodate slightly different views on desires. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Political Liberalism, Free Speech and Public Reason

In this paper, I critically assess John Rawls' repeated claim that the duty of civility is only a moral duty and should not be enforced by law. In the first part of the paper, I examine and reject the view that Rawls' position may be due to the practical difficulties that the legal enforcement of the duty of civility might entail. I thus claim that Rawls' position must be driven by deeper normative reasons grounded in a conception of free speech. In the second part of the paper, I therefore examine various arguments for free speech and critically assess whether they are consistent with Rawls' political liberalism. I first focus on the arguments from truth and self-fulfilment. Both arguments, I argue, rely on comprehensive doctrines and therefore cannot provide a freestanding political justification for free speech. Freedom of speech, I claim, can be justified instead on the basis of Rawls' political conception of the person and of the two moral powers. However, Rawls' wide view of public reason already allows scope for the kind of free speech necessary for the exercise of the two moral powers and therefore cannot explain Rawls' opposition to the legal enforcement of the duty of civility. Such opposition, I claim, can only be explained on the basis of a defence of unconstrained freedom of speech grounded in the ideas of democracy and political legitimacy. Yet, I conclude, while public reason and the duty of civility are essential to political liberalism, unconstrained freedom of speech is not. Rawls and political liberals could therefore renounce unconstrained freedom of speech, and endorse the legal enforcement of the duty of civility, while remaining faithful to political liberalism.

Partisanship and Public Reason

In the large body of literature concerning John Rawls’s Political Liberalism (1993) and his conception of public reason, little attention has been paid to the implications that the constraints of public reason have for partisans, i.e. citizens who participate in politics through political parties. This paper argues that even on the basis of a ‘mild’ understanding of Rawls’s conception of the constraints of public reason, which takes into account the various stipulations Rawls provided throughout his later work, when applied to partisans the constraints of public reason lose none or little of their hindering force. This seriously undermines the contribution that parties and partisans can provide to the change and the varieties of public reason that Rawls himself advocates as a response to social change and, therefore, to political justification and legitimacy. Parties articulate, coordinate and enhance societal demands which, without their support, may remain unheard and fail to change the acceptable terms of public reason and political justification. If the political speech of partisans is restrained, this potential for change (and, therefore, its contribution to political legitimacy) is seriously undermined.

Necessary and sufficient conditions for a Hamiltonian graph

A graph is singular if the zero eigenvalue is in the spectrum of its 0-1 adjacency matrix A. If an eigenvector belonging to the zero eigenspace of A has no zero entries, then the singular graph is said to be a core graph. A ( k,t)-regular set is a subset of the vertices inducing a k -regular subgraph such that every vertex not in the subset has t neighbours in it. We consider the case when k=t which relates to the eigenvalue zero under certain conditions. We show that if a regular graph has a ( k,k )-regular set, then it is a core graph. By considering the walk matrix we develop an algorithm to extract ( k,k )-regular sets and formulate a necessary and sufficient condition for a graph to be Hamiltonian.

Engorgement des centres d'urgences: une raison légitime de refuser l'accès aux patients non urgents [Emergency department overcrowding: a legitimate reason to refuse access to urgent care for non-urgent patients?].

Non-urgent cases represent 30-40% of all ED consults; they contribute to overcrowding of emergency departments (ED), which could be reduced if they were denied emergency care. However, no triage instrument has demonstrated a high enough degree of accuracy to safely rule out serious medical conditions: patients suffering from life-threatening emergencies have been inappropriately denied care. Insurance companies have instituted financial penalties to discourage the use of ED as a source of non-urgent care, but this practice mainly restricts access for the underprivileged. More recent data suggest that in fact most patients consult for appropriate urgent reasons, or have no alternate access to urgent care. The safe reduction of overcrowding requires a reform of the healthcare system based on patients' needs rather than access barriers.

Public Reason that Speaks to People : Iris Marion Young and the Problem of Internal Exclusion

Dossier : In Memoriam, Iris Marion Young (1949-2006)

Does friendship give us non-derivative partial reasons ?

Une des façons d’approcher la question de l’existence de raisons partiales non-dérivatives d’une quelconque sorte consiste à expliquer ce que sont les raisons partiales et ensuite à chercher à savoir s’il y a des raisons de cette sorte. Si de telles raisons existent, alors il est au moins possible qu’il y ait des raisons partiales d’amitié. C’est cette approche que j’adopterai ici, et elle produit des résultats intéressants. Le premier a trait à la structure des raisons partiales. C’est au moins une condition nécessaire pour qu’une raison soit partiale qu’elle aie une composante relationnelle explicite. Cette composante, techniquement parlant, est un relatum dans la relation d’être une raison qui elle-même est une relation entre la personne à qui la raison s’applique et la personne concernée par l’action pour laquelle il y a une raison. La deuxième conclusion de ce texte est que cette composante relationnelle est aussi requise dans de nombreuses sortes de raisons admises comme impartiales. Afin d’éviter de banaliser la distinction entre raisons partiales et impartiales nous devons appliquer une condition suffisante additionnelle. Finalement, bien qu’il pourrait s’avérer possible de distinguer les raisons impartiales ayant une composante relationnelle des raisons partiales, cette approche suggère que la question de savoir si l’éthique est partiale ou impartiale devra se régler au niveau de l’éthique normative, ou à tout le moins, qu’elle ne pourra se régler au niveau du discours sur la nature des raisons d’agir.