Mudança no Critério de Contabilização de Instrumentos Financeiros pelo IASB: estudo de evento sobre os títulos soberanos da Grécia,

A alteração feita pelo IASB em 2008 na classificação dos instrumentos financeiros para reduzir as perdas bancárias com a crise do subprime e de títulos soberanos dos países-membros da União Europeia, após um pedido protocolado pela Comissão da União Europeia, motivou esta pesquisa. A referida alteração ensejou a mudança do critério de avaliação, que passou de valor justo para valor amortizado, para os instrumentos reclassificados, muito embora alguns bancos não tenham aderido à reclassificação, mantendo a orientação original que determinava a avaliação pelo valor justo. Através de Estudo de Evento testou-se a Hipótese de Eficiência de Mercado - HEM, analisando 33 instituições bancárias detentoras de títulos soberanos gregos. Embora a alteração tenha colaborado para que essas instituições bancárias protelassem essas perdas no resultado, não afetou os fluxos de caixa futuros. E como evidenciam os resultados da pesquisa, o mercado foi equitativo com essas instituições, penalizando-as com base no grau de exposição aos títulos gregos, independentemente do critério utilizado, corroborando a HEM: o valor de um ativo é o valor presente dos fluxos de caixa futuros e não dos lucros. Uma consequência importante foi que os governos, através da terceira revisão do Acordo de Capital de Basileia, adotaram medidas para regulamentar com mais rigor as instituições financeiras, no intuito que essas instituições, futuramente, possam suportar melhor os efeitos de uma crise financeira.

Sovereign rescheduling probabilities in emerging markets: a comparison with credit rating agencies' ratings

This study estimates default probabilities of 124 emerging countries from 1981 to 2002 as a function of a set of macroeconomic and political variables. The estimated probabilities are then compared with the default rates implied by sovereign credit ratings of three major international credit rating agencies (CRAs) – Moody's Investor's Service, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings. Sovereign debt default probabilities are used by investors in pricing sovereign bonds and loans as well as in determining country risk exposure. The study finds that CRAs usually underestimate the risk of sovereign debt as the sovereign credit ratings from rating agencies are usually too optimistic.

Economic Vulnerability and the Severity of Debt Problems::An Analysis of the Irish EU-SILC 2008

In this article, using Ireland where debt issues are of particular salience, as a test case, we seek to locate over-indebtedness and the severity of debt problems in the context of the broader economic circumstances of households. In doing so, we first identify an economically vulnerable segment of households and then explore the debt experience of vulnerable and non-vulnerable households. Our analysis reveals a striking contrast between the debt experiences of less than one in five households defined as economically vulnerable and all others. Financial exclusion, relating to access to a bank account and a credit card, was found to increase debt levels. However, such effects were modest. The impact of economic vulnerability seems to be largely a consequence of its relationship to a wide
range of socio-economic attributes and circumstances. The manner in which a potential debt crisis
unfolds will be shaped by the broader socio-economic structuring of life-chances. Any attempt to
respond to such problems by concentrating on financial exclusion or household behaviour or, indeed,
triggering factors without taking the wider social structuring of economic vulnerability is likely to be
both seriously misguided and largely ineffective.

O papel das agências de rating e a dívida pública portuguesa

Durante as últimas décadas observou-se o crescimento da importância das avaliações fornecidas pelas agências de rating, sendo este um fator decisivo na tomada de decisão dos investidores. Também os emitentes de dívida são largamente afetados pelas alterações das classificações atribuídas por estas agências. Esta investigação pretende, por um lado, compreender se estas agências têm poder para conseguirem influenciar a evolução da dívida pública e qual o seu papel no mercado financeiro. Por outro, pretende compreender quais os fatores determinantes da dívida pública portuguesa, bem como a realização de uma análise por percentis com o objetivo de lhe atribuir um rating. Para a análise dos fatores que poderão influenciar a dívida pública, a metodologia utilizada é uma regressão linear múltipla estimada através do Método dos Mínimos Quadrados (Ordinary Least Squares – OLS), em que num cenário inicial era composta por onze variáveis independentes, sendo a dívida pública a variável dependente, para um período compreendido entre 1996 e 2013. Foram realizados vários testes ao modelo inicial, com o objetivo de encontrar um modelo que fosse o mais explicativo possível. Conseguimos ainda identificar uma relação inversa entre o rating atribuído por estas agências e a evolução da dívida pública, no sentido em que para períodos em que o rating desce, o crescimento da dívida é mais acentuado. Não nos foi, no entanto, possível atribuir um rating à dívida pública através de uma análise de percentis.

Trading the differences in expectations between the CDS and bond markets

This paper uses the framework developed by Vrugt (2010) to extract the recovery rate and term-structure of risk-neutral default probabilities implied in the cross-section of Portuguese sovereign bonds outstanding between March and August 2011. During this period the expectations on the recovery rate remain firmly anchored around 50 percent while the instantaneous default probability increases steadily from 6 to above 30 percent. These parameters are then used to calculate the fair-value of a 5-year and 10- year CDS contract. A credit-risk-neutral strategy is developed from the difference between the market price of a CDS of the same tenors and the fair-value calculated, yielding a sharpe ratio of 3.2

The LDC debt problem: a game-theoretical analisys

We review the LDC debt crisis since 1982, by means of game theory. New insights are obtained into the reasons behind the formation of the creditors' carte1 and the nature of the difficu1ties invo1ved in the formation of the debtors' carte1. The standard view that Rubinstein's barganing mode1s are appropriate for dea1ing with debt re1ief is shown to be faulty, un1ess the debtor buys out the debt.

Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default

This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector's investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks' balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks' behaviour.

Debt and default in a growth model

This paper presents a small open economy model with capital accumulation and without commitment to repay debt. The optimal debt contract specifies debt relief following bad shocks and debt increase following good shocks and brings first order benefits if the country's borrowing constraint is binding. Countries with less capital (with higher marginal productivity of capital) have a higher debt-GDP ratio, are more likely to default on uncontingent bonds, require higher debt relief after bad shocks and pay a higher spread over treasury. Debt relief prescribed by the optimal contract following the interest rate hikes of 1980-81 is more than half of the debt forgiveness obtained by the main Latin American countries through the Brady agreements.

International trade in Latina America and the Caribbean 2009: crisis and recovery

Includes bibliography

Macroeconomic policies in times of crisis: options and perspectives

Includes bibliography

Bond markets for Latin American debt in the 1990s

Includes bibliography

Unfinished business in the international dialogue on debt

Includes bibliography

Capital flows to Latin America: third quarter 2004

Includes bibliography

eu spotlight 2012/07, December 2012: At long last, the EU takes on its banks

The agreement on establishing a common banking authority is paving the way for a banking union. The decision was reached by the finance ministers only hours before last December’s EU summit. After making headway on sovereign debt by deciding on a fiscal union one year beforehand in December 2011, the EU is by now also addressing the banking crisis and we know at least who is going to supervise who and what.

Assessing the Single Supervisory Mechanism: passing the point of no return for Europe's banking union. Egmont Paper No. 58, June 2013

From the Executive Summary. Europe’s financial and sovereign debt crises have become increasingly interconnected. In order to break the negative feedback loop between the two, the EU has decided to create a common supervisory framework for the banking sector: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The SSM will involve a supervisory system including both the national supervisors and the European Central Bank (ECB). By endowing the ECB with supervisory authority over a major part of the European banking sector, the SSM’s creation will result in a shake-up of the way in which the European financial sector is being supervised. Under the right circumstances, this could be a major step forward in addressing Europe’s interconnected crises.