O sistema da ONU e as crianças-soldado: convergências e divergências nas abordagens sobre crianças e conflitos armados

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Non-State United States Support For The Contras During The Reagan Era

Under President Ronald Reagan, the White House pursued a complex foreign policy towards the Contras, rebels in trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in Nicaragua. In 1979, the leftist Sandinista government seized power in Nicaragua. The loss of the previous pro-United States Somoza military dictatorship deeply troubled the conservatives, for whom eradication of communism internationally was a top foreign policy goal. Consequently, the Reagan Administration sought to redress the policy of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, and assume a hard line stance against leftist regimes in Central America. Reagan and the conservatives within his administration, therefore, supported the Contra through military arms, humanitarian aid, and financial contributions. This intervention in Nicaragua, however, failed to garner popular support from American citizens and Democrats. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984 Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras in a series of legislation called the Boland Amendments. These Amendments barred any military aid from reaching the Contras, including through intelligence agencies. Shortly after their passage, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey and influential members of Reagan¿s National Security Council (NSC) including National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, NSC Aide Oliver North, and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter cooperated to identify and exploit loopholes in the legislation. By recognizing the NSC as a non-intelligence body, these masterminds orchestrated a scheme in which third parties, including foreign countries and private donors, contributed both financially and through arms donations to sustain the Contras independently of Congressional oversight. This thesis explores the mechanism and process of soliciting donations from private individuals, recognizing the forces and actors that created a situation for covert action to continue without detection. Oliver North, the main actor of the state, worked within his role as an NSC bureaucrat to network with influential politicians and private individuals to execute the orders of his superiors and shape foreign policy. Although Reagan articulated his desire for the Contras to remain a military presence in Nicaragua, he delegated the details of policy to his subordinates, which allowed this scheme to flourish. Second, this thesis explores the individual donors, analyzing their role as private citizens in sustaining and encouraging the policy of the Reagan Administration. The Contra movement found non-state support from followers of the New Right, demonstrated through financial and organizational assistance, that allowed the Reagan Administration¿s statistically unpopular policy in Nicaragua to continue. I interpret these donors as politically involved, but politically philanthropic, individuals, donating to their charity of choice to further the principles of American freedom internationally in a Cold War environment. The thesis then proceeds to assess the balance of power between the executive and other political actors in shaping policy, concluding that the executive cannot act alone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

The Implementation of Full-time Schools: The Situation in the Federal State of Sao Paulo (Brazil)

During the past years, Brazil has been mentioned internationally as a one of the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China). These countries have been taking increasing space in the economical and political global scenarios in the XXI century. The facts that they possess a vast territory and stand among the highest populated countries increase their relevance within the United Nations. Besides, three of them constitute nuclear powers and two of them belong to the United Nations Security Council. Brazil has significantly participated in forums such as WTO and UNO, representing central political articulation and stability to Latin America and in the structuring and growth of MERCOSUL (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela). Once again among the ten greatest economies of the world, the country has launched ambitious poverty-fighting programs helping more than 20 million people in the last years, such as the “Bolsa Família” (Familienstipendium) Program or and its complements). Nevertheless, Latin American countries are far from generating structural funds as the “European Social Fund” to assist specific demands of big cities as Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires. The commitments are restricted to commercial areas and bring nothing but slow and scarce advances to education or infra-structure and to the integration of systems related to these areas.

Future pandemic influenza control (FPIC) related strategic management plan based on the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza review of health policy decisions, their practice and implications

This cross-sectional study is based on the qualitative and quantitative research design to review health policy decisions, their practice and implications during 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic in the United States and globally. The “Future Pandemic Influenza Control (FPIC) related Strategic Management Plan” was developed based on the incorporation of the “National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (2005)” for the United States from the U.S. Homeland Security Council and “The Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan for the Health Sector (2006)” from the Canadian Pandemic Influenza Committee for use by the public health agencies in the United States as well as globally. The “global influenza experts’ survey” was primarily designed and administered via email through the “Survey Monkey” system to the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic experts as the study respondents. The effectiveness of this plan was confirmed and the approach of the study questionnaire was validated to be convenient and the excellent quality of the questions provided an efficient opportunity to the study respondents to evaluate the effectiveness of predefined strategies/interventions for future pandemic influenza control.^ The quantitative analysis of the responses to the Likert-scale based questions in the survey about predefined strategies/interventions, addressing five strategic issues to control future pandemic influenza. The effectiveness of strategies defined as pertinent interventions in this plan was evaluated by targeting five strategic issues regarding pandemic influenza control. For the first strategic issue pertaining influenza prevention and pre pandemic planning; the confirmed effectiveness (agreement) for strategy (1a) 87.5%, strategy (1b) 91.7% and strategy (1c) 83.3%. The assessment of the priority level for strategies to address the strategic issue no. (1); (1b (High Priority) > 1a (Medium Priority) > 1c (Low Priority) based on the available resources of the developing and developed countries. For the second Strategic Issue encompassing the preparedness and communication regarding pandemic influenza control; the confirmed effectiveness (agreement) for the strategy (2a) 95.6%, strategy (2b) 82.6%, strategy (2c) 91.3% and Strategy (2d) 87.0%. The assessment of the priority level for these strategies to address the strategic issue no. (2); (2a (highest priority) > 2c (high priority) >2d (medium priority) > 2b (low priority). For the third strategic issue encompassing the surveillance and detection of pandemic influenza; the confirmed effectiveness (agreement) for the strategy (3a) 90.9% and strategy (3b) 77.3%. The assessment of the priority level for theses strategies to address the strategic Issue No. (3) (3a (high priority) > 3b (medium/low priority). For the fourth strategic issue pertaining the response and containment of pandemic influenza; the confirmed effectiveness (agreement) for the strategy (4a) 63.6%, strategy (4b) 81.8%, strategy (4c) 86.3%, and strategy (4d) 86.4%. The assessment of the priority level for these strategies to address the strategic issue no. (4); (4d (highest priority) > 4c (high priority) > 4b (medium priority) > 4a (low priority). The fifth strategic issue about recovery from influenza and post pandemic planning; the confirmed effectiveness (agreement) for the strategy (5a) 68.2%, strategy (5b) 36.3% and strategy (5c) 40.9%. The assessment of the priority level for strategies to address the strategic issue no. (5); (5a (high priority) > 5c (medium priority) > 5b (low priority).^ The qualitative analysis of responses to the open-ended questions in the study questionnaire was performed by means of thematic content analysis. The following recurrent or common “themes” were determined for the future implementation of various predefined strategies to address five strategic issues from the “FPIC related Strategic Management Plan” to control future influenza pandemics. (1) Pre Pandemic Influenza Prevention, (2) Seasonal Influenza Control, (3) Cost Effectiveness of Non Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPI), (4) Raising Global Public Awareness, (5) Global Influenza Vaccination Campaigns, (6)Priority for High Risk Population, (7) Prompt Accessibility and Distribution of Influenza Vaccines and Antiviral Drugs, (8) The Vital Role of Private Sector, (9) School Based Influenza Containment, (10) Efficient Global Risk Communication, (11) Global Research Collaboration, (12) The Critical Role of Global Public Health Organizations, (13) Global Syndromic Surveillance and Surge Capacity and (14) Post Pandemic Recovery and Lessons Learned. The future implementation of these strategies with confirmed effectiveness to primarily “reduce the overall response time’ in the process of ‘early detection’, ‘strategies (interventions) formulation’ and their ‘implementation’ to eventually ensure the following health outcomes: (a) reduced influenza transmission, (b) prompt and effective influenza treatment and control, (c) reduced influenza related morbidity and mortality.^

From authoritarianism to upheaval : the political economy of the Syrian uprising and regime persistence

The ensuing bloodshed and deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Syria, the failure of the United Nations Security Council to reach a consensus on what action to take, and the involvement of contending external actors partially reflect the complexity of the current impasse. Despite the importance of regional and international factors, however, this papers attempts to argue that the domestic dynamics of the Syrian crisis have been vitally important in determining the course of the popular uprising and the regime’s response. In this, Syria’s crisis belongs with the Arab Spring the trajectories and prospects of which have been shaped by dynamics within regimes. It will be seen that the formal and informal institutional structure of the Ba‘thist regime in Syria has been critical to its resilience and ability to stay united so far while attempting to crush a peaceful popular uprising that turned into insurgency in the face of the regime’s violent crackdown.

Medidas de radón en espacios de trabajo subterráneos del Campus de la Universidad de Alicante

Las medidas del gas radiactivo radón en lugares de trabajo subterráneos del Campus de la Universidad de Alicante fueron realizadas mediante dispositivos E-PERM® de corto plazo durante el invierno de 2010 y el verano de 2011. Las concentraciones de radón obtenidas muestran valores máximos de 73,8 Bq/m3 en invierno y 84,0 Bq/m3 en verano, así como una media aritmética de 30,3 Bq/m3. Aunque no se abordan concentraciones medias anuales, todos los resultados se encuentran por debajo de los valores recogidos en la Recomendación 90/143/EURATOM de la Comisión Europea relativa a la protección de la población contra los peligros de una exposición al radón en el interior de edificios así como los establecidos por la Instrucción IS-33 del Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear en lugares de trabajo, contribuyendo a la evaluación de la distribución de radón a nivel nacional y prestando atención a los problemas que este gas puede ocasionar en espacios subterráneos.

Syria and the red lines of international law. CEPS Commentary, 4 September 2013

As the US and its allies France and Turkey dither over whether or not to punish Assad for having used sarin gas to kill his own people, the crucial question is: What response might the outside world legally take without the authority of the UN Security Council, which remains blocked by two veto-wielding members, Russia and China? Sadly, international law provides no clear-cut answers to this dilemma. To respond to what US Secretary of State John Kerry has rightly called a “moral obscenity”, this commentary explores ways in which formal interpretations of international law might give way to a more pragmatic approach to punish the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons.

EU Law, International Law and Economic Sanctions against Terrorism: The Judiciary in Distress? Research Papers in Law, 3/2008

From the Introduction. This article seeks to examine the relationship between European Union law, international law, and the protection of fundamental rights in the light of recent case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) relating to economic sanctions against individuals. On 3 September 2008, the ECJ delivered its long-awaited judgment in Kadi and Al Barakaat on appeal from the CFI.3 In its judgment under appeal,4 the CFI had held that the European Community (EC) is competent to adopt regulations imposing economic sanctions against private organisations in pursuance of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions seeking to combat terrorism; that although the EC is not bound directly by the UN Charter, it is bound pursuant to the EC Treaty to respect international law and give effect to UNSC; and that the CFI has jurisdiction to examine the compatibility of EC regulations implementing UNSC resolutions with fundamental rights not as protected by the EC but as protected by jus cogens. On appeal, following the Opinion of Maduro AG, the ECJ rejected the CFI’s approach. It held that UNSC resolutions are binding only in international law. It subjected the contested regulations to full review under EC human rights standards and found them in breach of the right to a hearing, the right to judicial protection and the right to property. Kadi and Al Barakaat is the most important judgment ever delivered by the ECJ on the relationship between EC and international law and one of its most important judgments on fundamental rights. It is imbued by constitutional confidence, commitment to the rule of law but also some scepticism towards international law. In the meantime, the CFI has delivered a number of other judgments on anti-terrorist sanctions assessing the limits of the “emergency constitution” at European level. The purpose of this paper is to examine the above case law and explore the dilemmas and tensions facing the EU judiciary in seeking to define and protect the EU’s distinct constitutional space. It is divided as follows. It first looks at the judgment in Kadi. After a short presentation of the factual and legal background, it explores the question whether the EU has competence to adopt smart sanctions. It then examines whether the EU is bound by resolutions of the Security Council, whether the ECJ has jurisdiction to review Community measures implementing such resolutions and the applicable standard of judicial scrutiny. It analyses the contrasting views of the CFI, the Advocate General, and the ECJ taking account also of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Further, it explores the consequences of annulling the contested regulation. It then turns to discussing CFI case law in relation to sanctions lists drawn up not by the UN Security Council but by the EC. The paper concludes by welcoming the judgment of the ECJ. Whilst its reasoning on the issue of Community competence is questionable, once such competence is established, it is difficult to support the abrogation of Community standards for the protection of fundamental rights. Such standards should ensure procedural due process whilst recognising the importance of public security.

The importance of International Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Justice: Kadi and the autonomy of the EC legal order. Research Papers in Law, 1/2009

From the Introduction. In the USA, the debate is still ongoing as to whether and to what extent the Supreme Court could or should refer to foreign precedent, in particular in relation to constitutional matters such as the death penalty.1 In the EU, in particular the recent Kadi case of 20082 has triggered much controversy,3 thereby highlighting the opposite angle to a similar discussion. The focus of attention in Europe is namely to what extent the European Court of Justice (hereafter “ECJ”) could lawfully and rightfully refuse to plainly ‘surrender’ or to subordinate the EC legal system to UN law and obligations when dealing with human rights issues. This question becomes all the more pertinent in view of the fact that in the past the ECJ has been rather receptive and constructive in forging interconnectivity between the EC legal order and international law developments. A bench mark in that respect was undoubtedly the Racke case of 1998,4 where the ECJ spelled out the necessity for the EC to respect international law with direct reference to a ruling of the International Court of Justice. This judgment which was rendered 10 years earlier than Kadi equally concerned EC/EU economic sanctions taken in implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions. A major question is therefore whether it is at all possible, and if so to determine how, to reconcile those apparently conflicting judgments.

La légalité de l'intervention militaire française au Mali : contribution à l’étude du cadre juridique de la lutte armée contre le terrorisme international

Mémoire récipiendaire de la mention "Excellent", avec les félicitations du jury.

Kosowo - przed ostatecznym rozwiazaniem. Proces uregulowania statusu miedzynarodowego = uwarunkowania polityczne i historyczne perspektywy rozwoju sytuacji. Prace OSW 2008. Kosovo before the final decision. Regulation Kosovo's international status - historical and political conditions and prospects for future developments. OSW Study 27/2008

The question of Kosovo's status is currently one of the most important issues in international politics. Since 1999, Kosovo has been an international protectorate which was created in the aftermath of the NATO intervention to stop the brutal pacification of the Albanian insurgency by Serb forces. The province has since de facto become independent of Serbia. Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council, which established the protectorate, does not preclude any possible outcome as regards its status. Aware that after the crimes of 1999, any attempt to re-integrate Kosovo into Serbia would lead to a massive Albanian uprising, the West has decided that the best solution would be to award Kosovo internationally supervised independence, while at the same time granting very wide autonomy to the Kosovo Serbs. Serbia and Russia rejected the solution proposed by the West, and so Kosovo became an arena of international rivalry for influence in the Western Balkans as well as another element of rivalry, transcending the regional dimension, between Russia and the West. Russia has been using the Kosovo case to build a new model of its relations with the United States and the EU. Since there is a group of countries sceptical about, or even opposed to, Kosovo's independence within the EU, the Kosovo settlement will be a test of the EU's ability to speak with one voice with regard to its external policy.

The ICC and its Deteriorating Relationship with Africa in Light of the Kenya Cases: What Should the EU Position be? IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/09 • November 2013

Summary. The African Union (AU), a union consisting of 54 African States, held an Extraordinary Summit on 11-12 October 2013, to discuss its relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court). The meeting took place just weeks before the trial of Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta is scheduled to begin, and was clearly intended to voice discontent and put on hold the ongoing ICC proceedings against Kenyatta as well as his deputy, Vice-President William Ruto. Before the Summit, there were even widespread rumors that the Assembly of the AU would call for a mass withdrawal of African States Parties from the ICC Statute. Eventually, the Assembly did not go that far and took two important, but less controversial decisions. It called for the granting of immunities to Heads of States from prosecutions by international criminal tribunals and requested a deferral of the ICC cases against Kenyatta and Ruto through a resolution adopted by the UN Security Council (UNSC). After providing a background to the Kenya cases, this policy brief aims to evaluate what the position of the EU and its Member States as outspoken supporters of the ICC and the fight against impunity should be, especially given the fact that France and the UK, as permanent UNSC members, could block a UNSC deferral at any time.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

La légalité de l'intervention militaire française au Mali : contribution à l’étude du cadre juridique de la lutte armée contre le terrorisme international.

Mémoire récipiendaire de la mention "Excellent", avec les félicitations du jury.

Third USC/FAR consolidated plan for foreign affairs research, fy-1974-75 /

Mode of access: Internet.