A coordination approach to the essentiality of money

The essentiality of money is commonly justi ed on e¢ ciency grounds. In this paper, we propose an alternative view on the essentiality of money. We consider an economy with llimited monitoring where agents have to coordinate on the use of two alternative technologies of exchange, money and credit. We show that although credit strictly dominates money from an e¢ ciency perspective, money is essential for coordination reasons. If agents are patient, the region of parameters where they coordinate in the use of money strictly contains the region of parameters where they coordinate in the use of credit

Show me the money and I will bring you the head: evaluation of the effects of self-interest and anger on whistleblowing

Though many of those who decided to report wrongdoings in their organizations were able to tell their stories (e.g. Bamford, 2014, Armenakis 2004), it is fair to say that there is still much left to uncover. The paper aims to contribute to the literature in three ways. First, it provides preliminary evidence that the wrongdoing linked with individual financial loss leads to higher whistleblowing rate. Secondly, it shows how the experience of anger is related to the higher likelihood to report the wrongdoer but only if the wrongful act is perceived as a cause of one’s financial loss. Finally, the paper establishes first steps for the future development of an experimental procedure that would enable to predict, and measure whistleblowing behavior in the lab environment.

Portrait of the economist as a young man: Raúl Prebisch's evolving views on the business cycle and money, 1919-1949

Includes bibliography

Prevention of Money Laundering and of the Financing of Terrorism to Ensure the Integrity of Financial Markets in Latin America and the Caribbean

This paper reviews the current status of the international fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism, highlighting the importance of its prevention for economic and financial stability in Latin America and the Caribbean. It synthesizes the recent history of international legislation and agreements with respect to the issues, and presents the framework of public and private sector actors engaged in combating these threats. It reviews Latin American and Caribbean countries’ compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (40 + 9) Recommendations, and analyzes the region’s performance with respect to their third round Mutual Evaluation Reports.

The Long-Run Relationship between Money, Nominal GDP, and the Price Level in Venezuela: 1950 to 1996

This paper explores whether a significant long-run relationship exists between money and nominal GDP and between money and the price level in the Venezuelan economy. We apply time-series econometric techniques to annual data for the Venezuelan economy for 1950 to 1996. An important feature of our analysis is the use of tests for unit roots and cointegration with structural breaks. Certain characteristics of the Venezuelan experience suggest that structural breaks may be important. Since the economy depends heavily on oil revenue, oil price shocks have had important influences on most macroeconomic variables. Also since the economy possesses large foreign debt, the world debt crisis that exploded in 1982 had pervasive effects on the Venezuelan economy. Radical changes in economic policy and political instability may have also significantly affected the movement of the macroeconomy. We find that a long-run relationship exists between narrow money (M1) and nominal GDP, the GDP deflator, and the CPI when one makes allowances for one or two structural breaks. We do not find such long-run relationships when broad money (M2) is used.

Endogenous Financing and the Long Run Impact of Money Growth on Output and Prices

Most monetary models make use of the quantity theory of money along with a Phillips curve. This implies a strong correlation between money growth and output in the short run (with little or no correlation between money and prices) and a strong long run correlation between money growth and inflation and inflation (with little or no correlation between money growth and output). The empirical evidence between money and inflation is very robust, but the long run money/output relationship is ambiguous at best. This paper attempts to explain this by looking at the impact of money growth on firm financing.

Equity Markets, the Money Market, and Long-Run Monetary Neutrality

This paper outlines a process for teaching long-run neutrality of money, drawing an analogy between equity markets and the money market. The key points in the discussion include the following: (1) What is the price of money? (2) Why does the long-run demand for money trace out a rectangular hyperbola? (3) Why does the slow adjustment of goods and service prices to changes in the stock of money lead to a different short-run demand for money? and (4) Why does a successful currency reform generate similar short-run movements in the price of money as movements in equity share prices after a change in the supply of shares? I have used this approach successfully for over 30 years at all levels, wherever I need to discuss the money market in a macroeconomic model.

An empirical analysis of the money demand function in India

This paper empirically analyzes India’s money demand function during the period of 1980 to 2007 using monthly data and the period of 1976 to 2007 using annual data. Cointegration test results indicated that when money supply is represented by M1 and M2, a cointegrating vector is detected among real money balances, interest rates, and output. In contrast, it was found that when money supply is represented by M3, there is no long-run equilibrium relationship in the　money demand function. Moreover, when the money demand function was estimated using　dynamic OLS, the sign onditions of the coefficients of output and interest rates were found to be　consistent with theoretical rationale, and statistical significance was confirmed when money supply was represented by either M1 or M2. Consequently, though India’s central bank presently uses M3 as an indicator of future price movements, it is thought appropriate to focus on M1 or M2, rather than M3, in managing monetary policy.

The SRM and the dream to resolve banks without public money. CEPS Commentary, 19 December 2013

In his assessment of the compromise agreement reached on the Single Resolution Mechanisn (SRM), Daniel Gros finds that the popular perception that the periphery has the most to gain from the establishment of a unified resolution regime might have gotten it backwards. In reality, he finds that Germany and other surplus countries have a bigger interest in tying the hands of their national resolution authorities, which have a tendency to be too generous.

The Asset Quality Review and Capital Needs: Why re-capitalise banks with public money? CEPS Policy Brief No. 311, 19 December 2013

It is generally assumed that any capital needs discovered by the Asset Quality Review the ECB is scheduled to finish by the end of 2014 should be filled by public funding (= fiscal backstop). This assumption is wrong, however. Banks that do not have enough capital should be asked to obtain it from the market; or be restructured using the procedures and rules recently agreed. The Directorate-General for Competition at the European Commission should be particularly vigilant to ensure that no further state aid flows to an already oversized European banking system. The case for a public backstop was strong when the entire euro area banking system was under stress, but this is no longer the case. Banks with a viable business model can find capital; those without should be closed because any public-sector re-capitalisation would likely mean throwing good money after bad.

The Danish Flexicurity Model - a Lesson for the US? ACES Working Paper No. 2, May 2007

Within recent years, increasing international competition has caused an increase in job transitions worldwide. Many countries find it difficult to manage these transitions in a way that ensures a match between labour and demand. One of the countries that seem to manage the transitions in a successful way is Denmark, where unemployment has been dropping dramatically over the last decade without a drop in job quality. This success is ascribed the so-called Danish flexicurity model, where an easy access to hiring and firing employees (flexibility) is combined with extensive active and passive labour market policies (security). The Danish results have gained interest not only among other European countries, where unemployment rates remain high, but also in the US, where job loss is often related to lower job quality. It has, however, been subject to much debate both in Europe and in the US, whether or not countries with distinctively different political-economic settings can learn from one another. Some have argued that cultural differences impose barriers to successful policy transfer, whereas others see it as a perfectly rational calculus to introduce 'best practices' from elsewhere. This paper presents a third strategy. Recent literature on policy transfer suggests that successful cross national policy transfer is possible, even across the Atlantic, but that one must be cautious in choosing the form, content and level of the learning process. By analysing and comparing the labour market policies and their settings in Denmark and the US in detail, this paper addresses the question, what and how the US can learn from the Danish model. Where the US and Denmark share a high degree of flexibility, they differ significantly on the level of security. This also means that the Danish budget for active and passive labour market policies is significantly higher than the American, and it seems unlikely that political support for the introduction of Danish levels of security in the US can be established. However, the paper concludes that there is a learning potential between the US and Demnark in the different local level efficiency of the money already spent. A major reason for the Danish success has been the introduction of tailor made initiatives to the single displaced worker and a stronger coordination between local level actors. Both of which are issues, where a lack of efficiency in the implementation of American active labour market policies has been reported.

Growth for Europe – Is the Juncker Plan the answer? EPC Discussion Paper, 20 March 2015

Executive Summary. The euro area is still suffering from low growth and high unemployment. For the recovery to become a reality, there needs to be a balance between fiscal discipline, supply side improvements and actions aimed at stimulating demand and growth. Increasing investment, both private and public, are important components in overcoming the recession. This becomes especially clear when comparing investment dynamics during the crisis with pre-crisis levels. Total investment is still much lower than before the crisis and public investment is well below its pre-crisis peak as well. In late November 2014, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker submitted a long-awaited proposal for a European Investment Plan that aims to stimulate private investment. Apart from the creation of the new European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), through which private investors will receive public guarantees, the investment plan also aims to provide project assistance and improve the Single Market by removing sector-specific or other financial barriers to investment. While generally perceived as a first positive step towards increasing private investment, some commentators have expressed reservations about the plan. These include, among others, the lack of fresh money for the initial contributions to EFSI. Since a substantial amount of these contributions is reshuffled from other places in the European budget, the question was raised whether EFSI can fund additional projects or just replicates investment projects that would have happened without the plan. Other criticism relates to the high estimate of the expected leverage ratio of 1:15, and to the risk that the plan will only have a limited impact on stressed economies. The Juncker Plan addresses private investment, but so far there really is no clear strategy to stimulate productive public investment on the European and national level. Countries with fiscal space are reluctant to engage in higher spending, while those willing and in need of it the most are restricted by the rules. Member States and the Commission should therefore discuss options for further improving the euro area's economic governance. In addition to urging countries with fiscal space to increase investing in national public goods, investment could be treated with budget flexibility. One could, for instance, upgrade the importance of public investment in the European Semester. Additional deficit granted for public investment purposes could be attached to certain Country-Specific Recommendations. Another solution would be to allow some form of budget flexibility, such as the formulation of a new Golden Rule for productive public investment becoming part of the Stability and Growth Pact's application. Besides relying on a larger amount of flexibility in the rules, the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) could be another solution to fund investment in European public goods. It will also be necessary to overcome the mistrust among Member States that is preventing further action. The political bargain of stronger conditionality, such as through contractual arrangements, could improve the situation. Increased trust will also be an important condition for tackling long-reaching economic governance reforms such as the creation of a Fiscal Capacity, which could take the form of a macroeconomic shock insurance. Such a Fiscal Capacity could make a real difference in providing the necessary funding to maintain productive public investment, even in times of deep recessions. The proposals presented do not attempt to be conclusive, but shall rather be an input for a wider debate on how to increase growth and employment in Europe. The paper draws heavily on the discussion of a Workshop on Growth and Investment, which the European Policy Centre (EPC) hosted on 10 December 2014 under Chatham-House Rule, with a group of economists and representatives from the European institutions.

spotlight europe #2015/03 — August 2015: Money or Democracy? Greece and the Euro Dilemma

The negotiations on the third bailout package for Greece are still going on, but the euro area has already paid a high price for it. The compromise on which it is based is clearly very controversial. Some of its critics believe that it does not make sense in economic terms, whereas others point out that it may have an adverse political effect. But what in fact is Greece actually supposed to be doing, and what does all this mean with regard to sovereignty and democracy?

Financial assistance to Greece: Three programmes. EPC Discussion Paper, 26 February 2016

There are a lot of myths surrounding the bailout money that was given to Greece. Many people still believe that the money never went to the Greek people, but to the Greek and European banks; that the intervention of the euro-area governments and the IMF dealt almost exclusively with the Greek debt; that very little money was used to finance Greek public expenditure; that most Greek debt was reimbursed; that no cuts were made to the stock of Greek government bonds on the market; and, finally, that so far, no cuts have been made to the debt of the Greek state towards the euro-area countries. In this Discussion Paper, Fabio Colasanti debunks some of those myths by taking stock of the numbers behind the financial support given to Greece by the countries of the euro-area and the IMF. Examining the three bailout programmes in detail, he discusses the reasons for and against a restructuring of the Greek public debt in 2010, its implementation in 2012, the degree in which the Greek debt towards the euro-area countries has already been cut, and the scope for further cuts. Finally, the paper explains how both issues were and are still dominated by internal political considerations, both in the creditor countries and in Greece.