Electricity without borders: a plan to make the internal market work. Bruegel Blueprint Series 20, 5 September 2013

The most straightforward European single energy market design would entail a European system operator regulated by a single European regulator. This would ensure the predictable development of rules for the entire EU, significantly reducing regulatory uncertainty for electricity sector investments. But such a first-best market design is unlikely to be politically realistic in the European context for three reasons. First, the necessary changes compared to the current situation are substantial and would produce significant redistributive effects. Second, a European solution would deprive member states of the ability to manage their energy systems nationally. And third, a single European solution might fall short of being well-tailored to consumers’ preferences, which differ substantially across the EU. To nevertheless reap significant benefits from an integrated European electricity market, we propose the following blueprint: First, we suggest adding a European system-management layer to complement national operation centres and help them to better exchange information about the status of the system, expected changes and planned modifications. The ultimate aim should be to transfer the day-to-day responsibility for the safe and economic operation of the system to the European control centre. To further increase efficiency, electricity prices should be allowed to differ between all network points between and within countries. This would enable throughput of electricity through national and international lines to be safely increased without any major investments in infrastructure. Second, to ensure the consistency of national network plans and to ensure that they contribute to providing the infrastructure for a functioning single market, the role of the European ten year network development plan (TYNDP) needs to be upgraded by obliging national regulators to only approve projects planned at European level unless they can prove that deviations are beneficial. This boosted role of the TYNDP would need to be underpinned by resolving the issues of conflicting interests and information asymmetry. Therefore, the network planning process should be opened to all affected stakeholders (generators, network owners and operators, consumers, residents and others) and enable the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to act as a welfare-maximising referee. An ultimate political decision by the European Parliament on the entire plan will open a negotiation process around selecting alternatives and agreeing compensation. This ensures that all stakeholders have an interest in guaranteeing a certain degree of balance of interest in the earlier stages. In fact, transparent planning, early stakeholder involvement and democratic legitimisation are well suited for minimising as much as possible local opposition to new lines. Third, sharing the cost of network investments in Europe is a critical issue. One reason is that so far even the most sophisticated models have been unable to identify the individual long-term net benefit in an uncertain environment. A workable compromise to finance new network investments would consist of three components: (i) all easily attributable cost should be levied on the responsible party; (ii) all network users that sit at nodes that are expected to receive more imports through a line extension should be obliged to pay a share of the line extension cost through their network charges; (iii) the rest of the cost is socialised to all consumers. Such a cost-distribution scheme will involve some intra-European redistribution from the well-developed countries (infrastructure-wise) to those that are catching up. However, such a scheme would perform this redistribution in a much more efficient way than the Connecting Europe Facility’s ad-hoc disbursements to politically chosen projects, because it would provide the infrastructure that is really needed.

MIGRATION PANORAMA. Schengen in the spotlight: a Europe with or without borders? APRIL 2016 (First edition)

The first edition of this new multi-authored publication entitled ‘Migration Panorama’ focuses on the consequences of the refugee and migration crisis on the Schengen area and the concept of a borderless union. Several external and EPC authors have contributed to building a comprehensive picture on the manifold challenges and possible consequences of maintaining and/or returning to internal border controls among Schengen countries. How does a signatory of the Schengen agreement see the current developments? What would be the impact of the reintroduction of physical borders on Europe’s digital economy? In what way do the V4 countries envisage to solve the ‘Schengen crisis’? How dangerous are the empty threats to expel Greece out of the Schengen area? What is the symbolic meaning of the Belgian border controls following the French decision to dismantle parts of the Calais ‘jungle’? Is saving Schengen only a question of national sovereignty or a matter of shared European responsibility? All these questions and many others are tackled in this first issue of the ‘Migration Panorama’ produced by EPC’ s Migration and Diversity Programme.

Externality effects of information and communication technologies across country Borders

As information and communications technology (ICT) involves both traditional capital and knowledge capital, potential spillovers through various mechanisms can occur. We posit that ICT capital may boost productivity growth, not only in the home country, but also in other countries. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence of such spillovers using panel data on 37 countries from 1996 to 2004. Our results support the existence of ICT spillovers across country borders. Furthermore, we find that developing countries could reap more benefits from ICT spillovers than developed countries. This is particularly important for policy decisions regarding national trade liberalization and economic integration. Developing economies that are more open to foreign trade may have an economic advantage and may develop knowledge-intensive activities, which will lead to economic development in the long run.

Constructing a normative national identity: the Leitkultur debate in Germany 2000/2001

In recent years, public discourse about German national identity has increasingly focussed on the large foreign population within Germany's borders. Whilst right-wing politicians such as Edmund Stoiber foster fears of identity loss ('Überfremdung'), more liberal observers, and indeed the ruling red-green coalition, acknowledge that multiethnicity has by now become an integral part of this identity. The debate experienced its provisional climax in late 2000 and early 2001. Friedrich Merz, then parliamentary leader of the CDU party, introduced the term 'Leitkultur' into the political discourse. The notion suggests the existence of a clearly identifiable spectrum of German cultural values and proposes that foreigners who wished to live in Germany should adhere to these values. Merz's proposal triggered a wave of highly controversial comments which have been evaluated for the purpose of this paper. It draws on roughly 350 newspaper articles and interviews and aims to introduce the English-speaking reader to the complex range of arguments. The Leitkultur debate is taken as symptomatic of the current state of public discourse about foreigners and national identity in Germany.

Rethinking the national question: Anti-statist discourses within the Kurdish national movement

Why and under what conditions have the Kurds become agents of change in the Middle East in terms of democratization? Why did the Kurds' role as democratic agents become particularly visible in the 1990s? How does the Kurdish movement's turn to democratic discourse affect the political systems of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria? What are the implications of the Kurds' adoption of "democratic discourse" for the transnational aspect of the Kurdish movement? Since the early 1990s, Kurdish national movements in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria have undergone important political and ideological transformations. As a result of the Kurds' growing role in shaping the debates on human rights and democratization in these four countries, the Kurdish national movement has acquired a dual character: an ethno-cultural struggle for the recognition of Kurdish identity, and a democratization movement that seeks to redefine the concepts of governance and citizenship in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The process transformation has affected relations between the Kurdish movements and their respective central governments in significant ways. On the basis of face-to-face interviews and archival research conducted in Turkey, Iraq and parts of Europe, the present work challenges the current narrative of Kurdish nationalism, which is predominantly drawn from a statist interpretation of Kurdish nationalist goals, and argues instead that the Kurdish question is no longer a problem of statelessness but a problem of democracy in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The main contributions of this work are three fold. First, the research unfolds the reasons behind the growing emphasis of the Kurdish movement on the concepts of democracy, human rights, and political participation, which started in the early 1990s. Second, the findings challenge the existing scholarship that explains Kurdish nationalism as a problem of statelessness and shifts the focus to the transformative potentials of the Kurdish national movement in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria through a comparative lens. Third, this work explores the complex transnational coordination and negotiations between the Kurdish movements across borders and explains the regional repercussions of this process.

The emergence of borders: moral questions mapped out

In this paper, we examine the extent to which the concept of emergence can be applied to questions about the nature and moral justification of territorial borders. Although the term is used with many different senses in philosophy, the concept of “weak emergence” - advocated by, for example, Sawyer (2002, 2005) and Bedau (1997 ) - is especially applicable, since it forces a distinction between prediction and explanation that connects with several issues in the discussion of territory. In particular, we argue, weak emergentism about borders allows us to distinguish between (a) using a theory of territory to say where a border should be drawn, and (b) looking at an existing border and saying whether or not it is justified (Miller, 2012; Nine, 2012; Stilz, 2011). Many authors conflate these two factors, or identify them by claiming that having one without the other is in some sense incoherent. But on our account - given the concept of emergence - one might unproblematically be able to have (b) without (a); at the very least, the distinction between these two issues is much more significant than has often been recognised, and more importantly gives us some reason to prefer “statist” as opposed to “cultural” theories of territorial borders. We conclude with some further reflections on related matters concerning, firstly, the apparent causal powers of borders, and secondly, the different ways in which borders are physically implemented (e.g., land vs. water).

Negative Archaeology. The Archaeological Borders of the Present

Nowadays, archaeology is trying to redefine its relation with objects. This change is taking place at the same time as the West is breaking once and for all with the generation who did the rural exodus in the mid of the twentieth century. The present paper proposes a revision of the conditions that allow us to both define this rupture and at the same time determine our affinity with materiality. This is done through a reconsideration of the relation between the past and the present and the dynamics marking this difference. We are situated in a moment when the experience of time is shifting and thus so is the integrity of archaeological objects. Under the name of Negative Archaeology, the border between past and present is explored. This border determines the creation of the past in a present which intends to homogenise changes. Archaeology is a unique discipline which could prevent this process, or at least bear witness to the dynamics to which objects seem to be subjected. Obscolescence is introduced as a concept in an attempt to name the aforementioned problem.

Feminist Street Performances in Puerto Rico: Alternative Imaginaries Shifting the Ideal(ized) National Body

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-08

From local scenarios to national maps: a participatory framework for envisioning the future of Tanzania

Tackling societal and environmental challenges requires new approaches that connect top-down global oversight with bottom-up subnational knowledge. We present a novel framework for participatory development of spatially explicit scenarios at national scale that model socioeconomic and environmental dynamics by reconciling local stakeholder perspectives and national spatial data. We illustrate results generated by this approach and evaluate its potential to contribute to a greater understanding of the relationship between development pathways and sustainability. Using the lens of land use and land cover changes, and engaging 240 stakeholders representing subnational (seven forest management zones) and the national level, we applied the framework to assess alternative development strategies in the Tanzania mainland to the year 2025, under either a business as usual or a green development scenario. In the business as usual scenario, no productivity gain is expected, cultivated land expands by ~ 2% per year (up to 88,808 km²), with large impacts on woodlands and wetlands. Despite legal protection, encroachment of natural forest occurs along reserve borders. Additional wood demand leads to degradation, i.e., loss of tree cover and biomass, up to 80,426 km² of wooded land. The alternative green economy scenario envisages decreasing degradation and deforestation with increasing productivity (+10%) and implementation of payment for ecosystem service schemes. In this scenario, cropland expands by 44,132 km² and the additional degradation is limited to 35,778 km². This scenario development framework captures perspectives and knowledge across a diverse range of stakeholders and regions. Although further effort is required to extend its applicability, improve users’ equity, and reduce costs the resulting spatial outputs can be used to inform national level planning and policy implementation associated with sustainable development, especially the REDD+ climate mitigation strategy.