Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

The story of … the military jacket

Fashion and war don’t seem an obvious pairing, but the military jacket is a fashion staple. It may take the form of a double-breasted dress uniform with brass buttons and epaulettes, trimmed in rock star braid, or it may be a khaki combat jacket, worn with Doc Martens and a scowl. Here I explore how these two forms of the military jacket were frogmarched into fashion...

Measuring the traction profile on sportsfields: Equipment development and testing

Traction is recognised as an important component of the overall playability and safety of a sportsfield. It relates to the "grip", or footing, provided through an athlete's shoe when in contact with the surface, and is normally measured by the torque generated when a weighted studded disc apparatus is dropped onto the turf and twisted manually. This paper describes the development of an automated traction tester, which mechanises the dropping and twisting of the weighted studded disc. By standardising these operational stages, more repeatable and reliable results can be expected than from the original hand-operated design where positioning of the disc and speed of rotation are controlled manually and so can vary from one measurement to the next. As well as measuring the maximum torque reached during rotation of the studded disc, the automated traction tester generates a profile of torque showing changes over time and calculates the angle through which the studded disc moved before reaching maximum torque. These aspects are now covered by a utility patent (PAT/AU/2004270767). Use of the automated traction tester is illustrated by comparative data for a range of warm-season turfgrasses, by comparisons of traction under different surface conditions generated by wear on Cynodon dactylon cultivars, and by the effects of environment, management and playing patterns on traction across a multi-use sports stadium.

Portrait of Surgeon Major Dr. Meyer of Dueren (Rhineland) in military uniform Portraits Men

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Portrait of Surgeon Major Dr. Bing of Nuernberg in his military uniform Portraits Men

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Reproduction of portrait of field chaplain Rabbi Dr. Sali Levi Military; World War I; Portraits

Feldrabbiner Dr. Sali Lewi, Breslau

Portrait of Ernst Gottschalk (seated second row center) with eight unidentified soldiers; Rendsburg, Germany. Military Portraits groups

Morgen hat Reserve Ruh / Auf Wiedersehen / Beste Gruesse; postcard signer Gottschalk; addressee: L Nurzinsky, Altona-Othmarschen, Aidikes Str.

Portrait of Leopold Meyerhof in his World War I officer's uniform Military; World War I; Portraits

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Travelling with medications and medical equipment across international borders

The international traveller needs to plan ahead to ensure medicines are available and used as directed for optimal therapeutic outcome. The planning needs to take account of legal and customs requirements for travelling with medicines for personal use. The standard advice by travel health providers is that travellers should check with the country of destination for requirements when travelling into the country with medicines for personal use. This is akin to introducing a barrier to care for this category of travellers. Innovative method of care for this group of traveller is needed.

Portrait of Leo Baeck as military chaplain Military; World War I; Portraits

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Leo Baeck with unidentified soldiers Military; World War I; Portraits Groups

Center May 2000

Portrait of Hilde Rosenbaum with her father Julius Rosenbaum in military uniform Portraits Family

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