Climate Change, Neutrality and the Harm Principle

This paper aims at evaluating the compatibility of coercive climate policies with liberal neutrality. More precisely, it focuses on the doctrine of state neutrality as associated with the "harm principle". It argues that given the difficulty of attributing causal responsibilities for climate harms to individuals, the harm principle doesn't work in this case, at least if one endorses a liberal atomistic ontology. Furthermore, the definition of what constitutes climate harms implies making moral assumptions, which makes it impossible to justify climate policies in a neutral way. Finally, the paper shows another consequence of applying neutrality to the case of climate change, that is the risk of a shift from political forms of decision-making to technocracy. Focusing too much on liberty of choice may (paradoxically) be to the detriment of political freedom. The paper concludes that climate change is an intrinsically moral issue and that it should be the occasion of a political debate about our current values and lifestyles. It should not be reduced to a mere question of carbon metric.

IN DUBIO PRO NATURA? A Philosophical Analysis of the Precautionary Principle in Environmental and Health Risk Governance

In this book, I apply a philosophical approach to study the precautionary principle in environmental (and health) risk decision-making. The principle says that unacceptable environmental and health risks should be anticipated, and they ought to be forestalled before the damage comes to fruition even if scientific understanding of the risks is inadequate. The study consists of introductory chapters, summary and seven original publications which aim at explicating the principle, critically analysing the debate on the principle, and constructing a basis for the well-founded use of the principle. Papers I-V present the main thesis of this research. In the two last papers, the discussion is widened to new directions. The starting question is how well the currently embraced precautionary principle stands up to critical philosophical scrutiny. The approach employed is analytical: mainly conceptual, argumentative and ethical. The study draws upon Anglo-American style philosophy on the one hand, and upon sources of law as well as concrete cases and decision-making practices at the European Union level and in its member countries on the other. The framework is environmental (and health) risk governance, including the related law and policy. The main thesis of this study is that the debate on the precautionary principle needs to be shifted from the question of whether the principle (or its weak or strong interpretation) is well-grounded in general to questions about the theoretical plausibility and ethical and socio-political justifiability of specific understandings of the principle. The real picture of the precautionary principle is more complex than that found (i.e. presumed) in much of the current academic, political and public debate surrounding it. While certain presumptions and interpretations of the principle are found to be sound, others are theoretically flawed or include serious practical problems. The analysis discloses conceptual and ethical presumptions and elementary understandings of the precautionary principle, critically assesses current practices invoked in the name of the precautionary principle and public participation, and seeks to build bridges between precaution, engagement and philosophical ethics. Hence, it is intended to provide a sound basis upon which subsequent academic scrutiny can build.

Dismissal of the illusion of uncertainty in the assessment of a likelihood ratio

The use of the Bayes factor (BF) or likelihood ratio as a metric to assess the probative value of forensic traces is largely supported by operational standards and recommendations in different forensic disciplines. However, the progress towards more widespread consensus about foundational principles is still fragile as it raises new problems about which views differ. It is not uncommon e.g. to encounter scientists who feel the need to compute the probability distribution of a given expression of evidential value (i.e. a BF), or to place intervals or significance probabilities on such a quantity. The article here presents arguments to show that such views involve a misconception of principles and abuse of language. The conclusion of the discussion is that, in a given case at hand, forensic scientists ought to offer to a court of justice a given single value for the BF, rather than an expression based on a distribution over a range of values.

Condition-dependence, pleiotropy and the handicap principle of sexual selection in melanin-based colouration.

The signalling function of melanin-based colouration is debated. Sexual selection theory states that ornaments should be costly to produce, maintain, wear or display to signal quality honestly to potential mates or competitors. An increasing number of studies supports the hypothesis that the degree of melanism covaries with aspects of body condition (e.g. body mass or immunity), which has contributed to change the initial perception that melanin-based colour ornaments entail no costs. Indeed, the expression of many (but not all) melanin-based colour traits is weakly sensitive to the environment but strongly heritable suggesting that these colour traits are relatively cheap to produce and maintain, thus raising the question of how such colour traits could signal quality honestly. Here I review the production, maintenance and wearing/displaying costs that can generate a correlation between melanin-based colouration and body condition, and consider other evolutionary mechanisms that can also lead to covariation between colour and body condition. Because genes controlling melanic traits can affect numerous phenotypic traits, pleiotropy could also explain a linkage between body condition and colouration. Pleiotropy may result in differently coloured individuals signalling different aspects of quality that are maintained by frequency-dependent selection or local adaptation. Colouration may therefore not signal absolute quality to potential mates or competitors (e.g. dark males may not achieve a higher fitness than pale males); otherwise genetic variation would be rapidly depleted by directional selection. As a consequence, selection on heritable melanin-based colouration may not always be directional, but mate choice may be conditional to environmental conditions (i.e. context-dependent sexual selection). Despite the interest of evolutionary biologists in the adaptive value of melanin-based colouration, its actual role in sexual selection is still poorly understood.

The scrutiny of the principle of subsidiarity by autonomous regional parliaments with particular reference to the participation of the Parliament of Catalonia in the early warning system

The purpose of this article is to offer a practical approach to the new European dimension for regional parliaments signified by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The parliamentary scrutiny of subsidiarity by way of the early warning system has assigned a new mission to legislative assemblies with the aim of reinforcing the intervention of regions in the drafting of policies by Union institutions. In the Spanish case, the institutionalisation of this mechanism came about with Act nº 24/2009, which attributes to the Joint Committee for the European Union, in the name of the Cortes Generales [the Spanish Parliament], the function of receiving the proposals for legislative acts by the EU and transferring them to the regional parliaments in order for the latter to issue, in a brief period of four weeks, a report on compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. The majority of regional parliaments have also carried out normative reforms to regulate the procedure of participation in the early warning system.

The single principle of compositional data analysis, continuing fallacies, confusionsand misunderstandings and some suggested remedies

In any discipline, where uncertainty and variability are present, it is important to haveprinciples which are accepted as inviolate and which should therefore drive statisticalmodelling, statistical analysis of data and any inferences from such an analysis.Despite the fact that two such principles have existed over the last two decades andfrom these a sensible, meaningful methodology has been developed for the statisticalanalysis of compositional data, the application of inappropriate and/or meaninglessmethods persists in many areas of application. This paper identifies at least tencommon fallacies and confusions in compositional data analysis with illustrativeexamples and provides readers with necessary, and hopefully sufficient, arguments topersuade the culprits why and how they should amend their ways

Indirect likelihood inference (revised)

Standard indirect Inference (II) estimators take a given finite-dimensional statistic, Z_{n} , and then estimate the parameters by matching the sample statistic with the model-implied population moment. We here propose a novel estimation method that utilizes all available information contained in the distribution of Z_{n} , not just its first moment. This is done by computing the likelihood of Z_{n}, and then estimating the parameters by either maximizing the likelihood or computing the posterior mean for a given prior of the parameters. These are referred to as the maximum indirect likelihood (MIL) and Bayesian Indirect Likelihood (BIL) estimators, respectively. We show that the IL estimators are first-order equivalent to the corresponding moment-based II estimator that employs the optimal weighting matrix. However, due to higher-order features of Z_{n} , the IL estimators are higher order efficient relative to the standard II estimator. The likelihood of Z_{n} will in general be unknown and so simulated versions of IL estimators are developed. Monte Carlo results for a structural auction model and a DSGE model show that the proposed estimators indeed have attractive finite sample properties.

The harm principle and the greatest happiness principle: the missing link

In this article I present a possible solution for the classic problem of the apparent incompatibility between Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle and his Principle of Liberty arguing that in the other-regarding sphere the judgments of experience and knowledge accumulated through history have moral and legal force, whilst in the self-regarding sphere the judgments of the experienced people only have prudential value and the reason for this is the idea according to which each of us is a better judge than anyone else to decide what causes us pain and which kind of pleasure we prefer (the so-called epistemological argument). Considering that the Greatest Happiness Principle is nothing but the aggregate of each person's happiness, given the epistemological claim we conclude that, by leaving people free even to cause harm to themselves, we still would be maximizing happiness, so both principles (the Greatest Happiness Principle and the Principle of Liberty) could be compatible.

The relation between the general maxim of causality and the principle of uniformity in hume's theory of knowledge

ABSTRACT When Hume, in the Treatise on Human Nature, began his examination of the relation of cause and effect, in particular, of the idea of necessary connection which is its essential constituent, he identified two preliminary questions that should guide his research: (1) For what reason we pronounce it necessary that every thing whose existence has a beginning should also have a cause and (2) Why we conclude that such particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects? (1.3.2, 14-15) Hume observes that our belief in these principles can result neither from an intuitive grasp of their truth nor from a reasoning that could establish them by demonstrative means. In particular, with respect to the first, Hume examines and rejects some arguments with which Locke, Hobbes and Clarke tried to demonstrate it, and suggests, by exclusion, that the belief that we place on it can only come from experience. Somewhat surprisingly, however, Hume does not proceed to show how that derivation of experience could be made, but proposes instead to move directly to an examination of the second principle, saying that, "perhaps, be found in the end, that the same answer will serve for both questions" (1.3.3, 9). Hume's answer to the second question is well known, but the first question is never answered in the rest of the Treatise, and it is even doubtful that it could be, which would explain why Hume has simply chosen to remove any mention of it when he recompiled his theses on causation in the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Given this situation, an interesting question that naturally arises is to investigate the relations of logical or conceptual implication between these two principles. Hume seems to have thought that an answer to (2) would also be sufficient to provide an answer to (1). Henry Allison, in his turn, argued (in Custom and Reason in Hume, p. 94-97) that the two questions are logically independent. My proposal here is to try to show that there is indeed a logical dependency between them, but the implication is, rather, from (1) to (2). If accepted, this result may be particularly interesting for an interpretation of the scope of the so-called "Kant's reply to Hume" in the Second Analogy of Experience, which is structured as a proof of the a priori character of (1), but whose implications for (2) remain controversial.