Y te llevaste en andas al ángel de los perdedores : El nómos de Antígona en su discurso final a partir del vocabulario legal en Antígona de Sófocles

Abordamos en Antígona la voz nómos utilizada por la protagonista en los vv. 908 y 914 de su último discurso. Con ese término califica la razón de su proceder, según la cual nunca habría realizado un entierro por un hijo o un esposo muerto pues la gente sensata justificaría sólo la sepultura de su hermano ya que un esposo y un hijo podría volver a tener pero nunca un hermano, con su padre y madre muertos. Pese a su uso, observa Etxabe (2009: 61), tales palabras no han sido articuladas con un argumento legal. No obstante, a un estudio con tales propósitos pareciera poder objetarse el hecho de que el léxico jurídico implica ante todo generalidad, lo que entraría en contradicción con la particularidad y excepcionalidad que caracteriza aquello que Antígona califica como nómos. Revisamos entonces qué implica para Antígona el entierro de su hermano y luego abordamos el asunto desde los estudios más recientes sobre la legalidad griega. En un contexto histórico en el cual tiene lugar un ordenamiento del sistema jurídico, que implica un cambio de actitud con respecto a las leyes no escritas frecuentemente asociadas a Antígona, la expresión nómos de este pasaje requiere la integración del trabajo filológico y los estudios del derecho griego, de la familia y de las relaciones de género en la Atenas del siglo V a.C.

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Y te llevaste en andas al ángel de los perdedores : El nómos de Antígona en su discurso final a partir del vocabulario legal en Antígona de Sófocles

Abordamos en Antígona la voz nómos utilizada por la protagonista en los vv. 908 y 914 de su último discurso. Con ese término califica la razón de su proceder, según la cual nunca habría realizado un entierro por un hijo o un esposo muerto pues la gente sensata justificaría sólo la sepultura de su hermano ya que un esposo y un hijo podría volver a tener pero nunca un hermano, con su padre y madre muertos. Pese a su uso, observa Etxabe (2009: 61), tales palabras no han sido articuladas con un argumento legal. No obstante, a un estudio con tales propósitos pareciera poder objetarse el hecho de que el léxico jurídico implica ante todo generalidad, lo que entraría en contradicción con la particularidad y excepcionalidad que caracteriza aquello que Antígona califica como nómos. Revisamos entonces qué implica para Antígona el entierro de su hermano y luego abordamos el asunto desde los estudios más recientes sobre la legalidad griega. En un contexto histórico en el cual tiene lugar un ordenamiento del sistema jurídico, que implica un cambio de actitud con respecto a las leyes no escritas frecuentemente asociadas a Antígona, la expresión nómos de este pasaje requiere la integración del trabajo filológico y los estudios del derecho griego, de la familia y de las relaciones de género en la Atenas del siglo V a.C.

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Professional Liability of the Construction Professional as an Expert Witness in the Spanish Legal Framework

Inside COBRA 2011 RICS International Research Conference, the present paper is linked to analyze the liability of the construction professional in his practice as a expert witness in the Spanish legal framework. In a large number of legal procedures related to the building it is necessary the intervention of the expert witness to report on the subject of litigation, and to give an opinion about possible causes and solutions. This field is increasingly importantly for the practice of construction professional that requires an important specialization. The expert provides his knowledge to the judge in the matter he is dealing with (construction, planning, assessment, legal, ...), providing arguments or reasons as the base for his case and acting as part of the evidence. Although the importance of expert intervention in the judicial process, the responsibilities arising from their activity is a slightly studied field. Therefore, the study has as purpose to think about the regulation of professional activities raising different aims. The first is to define the action of the construction professional-expert witness and the need for expert evidence, establishing the legal implications of this professional activity. The different types of responsibilities (the civil, criminal and administrative) have been established as well as the economic, penal or disciplinary damages that can be derived from the expert report

Writ for the attachment of goods or estate: action brought by Edward Hutchinson, Treasurer of Harvard College, 1731 June 5

Writ of attachment authorizing the Suffolk County Sheriff to seize £150 in money or property from John Orme, George Lawrence, and Samuel Pearce, all of Watertown, in response to action brought by Harvard College Treasurer Edward Hutchinson regarding the bond of John White. The case-specific information is handwritten onto a printed form.

EEAS 2.0: Recommendations for the amendment of Council Decision 2010/427/EU on the European External Action Service. CEPS Special Report No. 78, 13 November 2013

This Special Report offers recommendations for the amendment of the Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. Its purpose is to contribute, in practical legal terms, to the ongoing review of the Decision in 2013, as well as to the possible discussion on its revision that may take place in 2014. In particular, it sheds light on possible adjustments in the application of the Decision ‘à droit constant’, but also suggests potential alteration of its formulation.

The EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation: an assessment of Ukraine's readiness. OSW Commentary No. 45, 2011-01-17

The Action Plan on visas adopted during the recent EU-Ukraine summit is a success for Ukraine. It is the first time that Kyiv has succeeded in obtaining a definition of the conditions and criteria whose fulfilment will enable Ukraine to apply for the lifting of EU visas for its citizens. Ukraine's strong point has been its political will; the lifting of this visa regime has been a priority for all Ukrainian governments since 2005. Since Viktor Yanukovych became president, Ukraine has adopted or prepared key legal acts that brought it nearer to European standards in the area of border and migration management. One of Kyiv's strengths is also its relatively well reformed and efficiently managed border service. Moreover, illegal transit migration via Ukraine is decreasing, and fewer Ukrainians are trying to enter or stay in the EU illegally. Also, Kyiv has efficiently implemented the EU-Ukraine readmission agreement. The hardest task for Ukraine will be to meet the EU’s expectations concerning values, the condition of Ukrainian democracy, and the rule of law. Corruption remains the main barrier to Ukraine's development and modernisation; the courts are weak and the judicial system inefficient. The main undertaking of the new migration service that is being formed at the moment will be to create a civil system of registration, monitoring and regulating the stays of foreign nationals. This may prove difficult, as the supervisory authority (the Ministry of the Interior) remains an unreformed, police-type bureaucratic institution. Ukraine is lagging behind countries such as Russia, Belarus and Moldova when it comes to the introduction of biometric documents. Another problem is the lack of an electronic information system on foreign nationals, visas and border crossings which would be accessible to all the relevant services and institutions. For these reasons, the complete abolition of visas seems to be a longterm perspective, especially considering that many EU countries, which themselves are faced with the problem of migrants’ integration, are rather sceptical about the further liberalisation of movement of people with their eastern neighbours. In the immediate future, if Ukraine meets some of the requirements set by the EU, it will be able to seek the extension of the visa facilitations that have been in operation since 2008.

The Legal Status and Influence of Decisions of International Organizations and other Bodies in the European Union. College of Europe Research Paper in Law 01/2014

Introduction. The European Union’s external action is not only defined by its influence on international developments, but also by its ability and the need to respond to those developments. While traditionally many have stressed the EU’s ‘autonomy’, over the years its ‘dependence’ on global developments has become more clear.2 International law has continued to play a key role in, not only in the EU’s external relations, but also in the Union’s own legal order.3 The purpose of this paper is not to assess the role or performance of the EU in international institutions.4 Rather it purports to reverse the picture and focus on a somewhat under-researched topic: the legal status of decisions of international organizations in the EU’s legal order.5 While parts of the status of these decisions relate to the status of international agreements and international customary law, it can be argued that decisions of international organizations and other international bodies form a distinct category. In fact, it has been observed that “this phenomenon has added a new layer of complexity to the already complex law of external relations of the European Union”.6 Emerging questions relate to the possible difference between decisions of international organizations of which the EU is a member (such as the FAO) and decisions of organizations where it is not (irrespective of existing competences in that area – such as in the ILO). Questions also relate to the hierarchical status of these decisions in the EU’s legal order and to the possibility of them being invoked in direct or indirect actions before the Court of Justice. This contribution takes a broad perspective on decisions of international organizations by including decisions taken in other international institutions which do not necessarily comply with the standard definition of international organizations,7 be it bodies set-up by multilateral conventions or informal (transnational / regulatory) bodies. Some of these bodies are relatively close to the EU (such as the Councils established by Association Agreements – see further Section 5 below); others operate at a certain distance. Limiting the analysis to formal international organizations will not do justice to the manifold relationships between the European Union and various international bodies and to the effects of the norms produced by these bodies. The term ‘international decisions’ is therefore used to refer to any normative output of international institutional arrangements.

Integration of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica : an ethnographic approach to the refugees' legal, economic, and social experiences

This qualitative study, based on interviews to 17 refugee families, attempts to identify the reasons behind the lack of integration of Colombian refugees in Costa Rica. The model of Immigrant Modes of Incorporation and the studies of Alejandro Portes and Julia Sensenbrenner about the sources of social capital on migrant communities provided the theoretical framework used to identify the roots of the integration challenges. The findings suggest that Costa Rican policies towards the reception and integration of Colombian refugees are exclusionary. The host labor market is marked by sentiments of xenophobia towards the sample population while reported cases of persecution in the country also inhibit this population's economic integration. The lack of social capital sources contributes to inhibit this community's development, despite their participation in informal networks. There were signs of collective action. Yet, the refugee community fails to come together, while it also seems alienated from the community of Colombian entrepreneurs in Costa Rica.

An Institutional, Socio-economic, and Legal Analysis of Fisheries Co-management and Regulation in the Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica

Marine Areas for Responsible Artisanal Fishing (AMPR) have emerged as a new model for co-managing small-scale fisheries in Costa Rica, one that involves collaboration between fishers, government agencies and NGOs. This thesis aims to examine the context for collective action and co-management by small-scale fishers; evaluate the design, implementation, and enforcement of AMPRs; and conduct a linguistic analysis of fisheries legislation. The present work relies on the analysis of several types of qualitative data, including interviews with 23 key informants, rapid rural assessments, and legal documents. Findings demonstrate the strong influence of economic factors for sustaining collective action, as well as the importance of certain types of external organizations for community development and co-management. Additionally, significant enforcement gaps and institutional deficiencies were identified in the work of regulating agencies. Legal analysis suggests that mechanisms for government accountability are unavailable and that legal discourse reflects some of the most salient problems in management.

Drones y el orden legal internacional. Tecnología, estrategia y largas cadenas de acción

The main thesis of this article is that the increasing recourse to the use of unmanned aerial systems in asymmetric warfare and the beginning routinization of U.S. drone operations represent part of an evolutionary change in the spatial ordering of global politics -- Using a heuristic framework based on actor-network theory, it is argued that practices of panoptic observation and selective airstrikes, being in need of legal justification, contribute to a reterritorialization of asymmetric conflicts -- Under a new normative spatial regime, a legal condition of state immaturity is constructed, which establishes a zone of conditional sovereignty subject to transnational aerial policing -- At the same time, this process is neither a deterministic result of the new technology nor a deliberate effect of policies to which drones are merely neutral instruments -- Rather, military technology and political decisions both form part of a long chain of action which has evolved under the specific circumstances of recent military interventions

Serviço social do INSS : expressões materiais da implementação de sua competência legal no período de junho de 2009 a junho de 2014

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Serviço Social, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Política Social, 2015.

Sub-representação legal : a Lei de Cotas nos concursos públicos

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, 2016.

Análise das taxas anuais de desmatamento na Amazônia Legal a partir da relação entre autos de infração e área desmatada no período entre 2000 e 2014

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Geografia, Pós-Graduação em Geografia, 2016.