Nacionalismo y modernidad : los aportes de una controversia historiográfica

Sobre la particular mezcla y tensión de tendencias conservadoras y modernas en el nacionalsocialismo se puede decir que no se ha alcanzado pleno consenso entre los historiadores. Este artículo revisa críticamente las tesis que han configurado la controversia, tanto en la discusión general sobre la ideología y la práctica del nacionalsocialismo alemán (por ej. Herf 1984, Zitelman 1987, Mommsen 1990, Nolte 1993, Payne 1995, Roseman 1996, Kershaw y Lewin 1997, Griffin 1998), como en el debate específicamente referido a la Shoá (por ej., Lübbe 1992, Beyerchen 1997, Lindenfeld 1997 y Almog 2001). Se advierte que hay aportes interesantes en las diversas posiciones, pero al mismo tiempo resultan evidentes las dificultades que surgen del uso poco preciso de conceptos claves para el tema, como lo son “modernidad" y “racionalidad". En este sentido se hacen algunas sugerencias destinadas a lograr mayor interacción entre la construcción de marcos teórico-analíticos y la documentación histórica.

La reconstrucción histórica en el "Revisionismo" de David Irving

En este trabajo se plantea, más allá de examinar las tesis principales del "revisionismo", la propia naturaleza del conocimiento histórico. ¿Son válidas todas las interpretaciones de un hecho histórico? ¿Se trata en tales casos de "otra lectura", de una "versión alternativa", es decir, de otra apreciación de los datos disponibles? ¿Cómo saber cuando hay mala interpretación deliberada o falsificación de la evidencia? ¿Puede detectarse si la argumentación tendenciosa es deshonesta? El "revisionismo histórico" se ha definido a sí mismo como una corriente historiográfica que ofrece otra versión de Hitler y su régimen. Cerca de una veintena de autores, desde los años cuarenta del siglo XX, se adscriben en esta tendencia, algunos de los cuales han desplegado una sostenida actividad y han logrado una llamativa repercusión en los medios de difusión. Este es el caso de David Irving. Autor de más de treinta libros, artículos, conferencias y discursos dedicados al III Reich, ha pasado largos años de su vida rastreando y estudiando archivos alemanes. Pero muy lejos de constituir un nuevo enfoque historiográfico del nazismo, el "revisionismo" de David Irving está imbuido de política e ideología y sus métodos de trabajo incluyen la adulteración y la distorsión intencional de la historia.

Gordon Thomas, Los judíos del Papa. El plan secreto del Vaticano para salvar a los judíos de los nazis, trad. T. Arijón, Buenos Aires, Edhasa, 2013, 354 pp.

Fil: Massini Correas, Carlos I.. Universidad de Mendoza

Le sport dans l'Espagne franquiste

Jusqu'à sa mort, en novembre 1975, le Général Franco fut, tel que le proclamaient ses pièces de monnaie, le « Caudillo d'Espagne par la grâce de Dieu » et, selon ses apologistes, il était responsable uniquement devant Dieu et l'Histoire. Bien que durant les dernières années de sa vie, sa participation directe dans les décisions politiques courantes fut assez réduite, il est pourtant certain qu'aucune décision importante ne pouvait être prise sans son consentement. Jusqu'au tout dernier moment, il conserva, grâce à la dénommée « Constitution franquiste », le pouvoir de nommer et de destituer les ministres, pouvoir qu'il utilisa toujours à sa guise. De telles prémisses conduisent à considérer logique l'utilisation du sport au service d'une idée politique. On assista alors à une tentative de mise sur pied du modèle de l'Allemagne nazie, mais il fallait tenir compte du fait que Franco n'avait jamais été disposé à construire un état totalitaire ayant un seul et unique parti, à l'image du modèle italien ou allemand. Après l'échec des puissances de l'Axe, Franco vit très clairement la nécessité d'abandonner le côté fasciste de son régime. Et, en ce qui concerne tout particulièrement le sport, Franco ne fut jamais disposé à dépenser la moindre somme d'argent dans ce domaine, comme l'avaient pourtant fait Hitler ou Mussolini.

A COMUNICAÇÃO E A MEMÓRIA DO PEQUENO LAVRADOR DO MUNICÍPIO DE RIBEIRÃO GRANDE NO ESTADO DE SÃO PAULO SÃO BERNARDO DO CAMPO 2016

Estudo do processo comunicacional e o registro de fragmentos de memória do pequeno agricultor na localidade de Ribeirão Grande, região do Vale do Paranapanema, Estado de São Paulo. Esta pesquisa tem como objetivos mostrar a realidade do pequeno agricultor; investigar sobre os processos comunicacionais que influenciam na preservação dos valores ou na perda deles, conhecer a opinião dos pequenos agricultores e moradores do município de Ribeirão Grande no Estado de São Paulo, sobre sua realidade, sua comunicação, seu modelo de vida e de produção, entender como se produz a comunicação no dia a dia do pequeno agricultor, e se há uma relação de proximidade com o jornal regional, sobre a existência ou não de um meio de comunicação que trabalhe os sentimentos de pertencimento e os interesses da ―comunidade‖. A metodologia deste trabalho incorpora a pesquisa bibliográfica, pesquisa documental e o estudo do caso de um jornal regional local, além de entrevistas semiestruturadas com os lavradores. Conclui-se que o pequeno lavrador e seu estilo de vida na região tratada não possui perscpectiva de futuro, imersos nas circunstancias que se encontram

Armas vengan de donde vengan: las dificultades de abastecimiento republicanas y su viraje al mercado negro durante el primer año de guerra (julio 1936-mayo 1937)

Esta tesis doctoral constituye una investigación sobre las dificultades que encontró el Gobierno de la República para adquirir armamento en el mercado clandestino durante el primer año de guerra, es decir, desde que se produjo el golpe de Estado hasta que el doctor Juan Negrín llegó a la presidencia del Gobierno el 17 de mayo de 1937. El objetivo de la investigación es profundizar y demostrar, desde una perspectiva muy poco estudiada hasta ahora, que los intentos republicanos para comprar armamento al margen de los suministros soviéticos, durante el primer año de la guerra, no constituyó una estrategia eficaz que permitiese al Ejército Popular de la República disponer de los recursos bélicos necesarios, ni en calidad ni en cantidad, para hacer frente al Ejército sublevado/franquista. La política de no intervención, ideada por Francia y Gran Bretaña y adoptada por 27 Estados, incluyendo a la URSS, provocó una situación asimétrica: mientras que un Gobierno legítimo y reconocido internacionalmente no pudo adquirir armas ni en los arsenales nacionales de los países que lo suscribieron ni en sus industrias privadas, los sublevados inmediatamente se vieron auxiliados por Hitler y Mussolini, quienes también se adhirieron a la no intervención. Sólo la ayuda de Stalin, vulnerando igualmente su compromiso con la no intervención, permitió que la República pudiese evitar la caída de Madrid en noviembre de 1936 y sustentar el conflicto...

The Political Logic of Disintegration: Seven Lessons from the Soviet Collapse. CEPS Essay (No. 1), September 2012

In short, the European Union, as we know it, no longer exists. The very foundations on which it was built are eroding. Shared memories of the Second World War have faded away – half the 15- and 16-year-olds in German high schools do not know that Hitler was a dictator, while a third believe that he protected human rights. The collapse of the Soviet Union has stripped away the geopolitical rationale for European unity. The democratic welfare state that was at the heart of the post-war political consensus is under siege by, among other things, sheer demographics. And the prosperity that bolstered the European project’s political legitimacy is vanishing. More than six out of ten Europeans believe that the lives of today’s children will be more difficult than those of people from their own generation. Against this background, how unthinkable is the EU’s disintegration? Should Europeans make the mistake of taking the Union for granted? Should they assume that the Union would not collapse because it should not collapse? Here, Europe’s capacity to learn from the Soviet precedent could play a crucial part. For the very survival of the EU may depend on its leaders’ ability to manage a similar mix of political, economic and psychological factors that were in play in the process of the Soviet collapse. The game of disintegration is primarily a political one driven much more by the perceptions and misperceptions of the political actors than simply by the constellation of the structural factors – institutional and economic.

Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten des General-feldmarschalls Grafen Helmuth von Moltke ...

Vol. 3: 2. Aufl.; vol. 8: 6. Aufl.

European pamphlets

A collection of miscellaneous pamphlets on Europe.

A call to arms at the end of history: a discourse-historical analysis of George W. Bush's declaration of war on terror

In this article we take a discourse-historical approach to illustrate the significance of George W Bush's (2001) declaration of a 'war on terror'. We present four exemplary 'call to arms' speeches by Pope Urban 11 (1095), Queen Elizabeth I (1588), Adolf Hitler (1938) and George W Bush (2001) to exemplify the structure, function, and historical significance of such texts in western societies over the last millennium. We identify four generic features that have endured in such texts throughout this period: (i) an appeal to a legitimate power source that is external to the orator, and which is presented as inherently good; (ii) an appeal to the historical importance of the culture in which the discourse is situated; (iii) the construction of a thoroughly evil Other; and (iv) an appeal for unification behind the legitimating external power source. We argue further that such texts typically appear in historical contexts characterized by deep crises in political legitimacy.

Pathways to human experimentation, 1933-1945: Germany, Japan and the United States

The history of human experimentation in the twelve years between Hitler's rise to power and the end of the Second World War is notorious in the annals of the twen- tieth century. The horrific experiments conducted at Dachau, Auschwitz, Ravens- brueck, Birkenau, and other National Socialist concentration camps reflected an extreme indifference to human life and human suffering. Unfortunately, they do not reflect the extent and complexity of the human experiments undertaken in the years between 1933 and 1945. Following the prosecution of twenty-three high-ranking National Socialist physicians and medical administrators for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Nuremberg Medical Trial (United States v. Karl Brandt et al.), scholars have rightly focused attention on the nightmarish researches con- ducted by a small group of investigators on concentration camp inmates. Less well known are alternative pathways that brought investigators to undertake human ex- perimentation in other laboratories, settings, and nations.

Margetinggeschichte:Die Genese einer modernen Sozialtechnik, Hartmut Berghoff

Book revew: Marketinggeschichte: die Genese einer modernen Sozialtechnik [Marketing history: The genesis of a modern social technique], edited by Hartmut Berghoff, Frankfurt/Main, Campus Verlag, 2007, 409 pp., illus., [euro]30.00 (paperback), ISBN 978-3-593-38323-1. This edited volume is the result of a workshop at Göttingen University in 2006 and combines a number of different approaches to the research into the history of marketing in Germany's economy and society. The majority of contributions loosely focus around the occurrence of a ‘marketing revolution’ in the 1970s, which ties in with interpretations of the Americanisation of German business. This revolution replaced the indigenous German idea of Absatzwirtschaft (the economics of sales) with the American-influenced idea of Marketing, which was less functionally oriented and more strategic, and which aimed to connect processes within the firm in order to allow a greater focus on the consumer. The entire volume is framed by Hartmut Berghoff's substantial and informative introduction, which introduces a number of actors and trends beyond the content of the volume. Throughout the various contributions, authors provide explanations of the timing and nature of marketing revolutions. Alexander Engel identifies an earlier revolution in the marketing of dyes, which undergoes major change with the emergence of chemical dyes. While the natural dyestuff had been a commodity, with producers removed from consumers via a global network of traders, chemical dyes were products and were branded at an early stage. This was a fundamental change in the nature of production and sales. As Roman Rossfeld shows in his contribution on the Swiss chocolate industry (which focuses almost exclusively on Suchard), even companies that produced non-essential consumer goods which had always required some measure of labelling grappled for years with the need to develop fewer and higher impact brands, as well as an efficient sales operation. A good example for the classical ‘marketing revolution’ of the 1970s is the German automobile industry. Ingo Köhler convincingly argues that the crisis situation of German car manufacturers – the change from a seller's to a buyer's market, appreciation of the German mark which undermines exports, the oil crises coupled with higher inflation and greater frugality of consumers and the emergence of new competitors – lead companies to refocus from production to the demands of the consumer. While he highlights the role of Ford in responding most rapidly to these problems, he does not address whether the multinational was potentially transferring American knowledge to the German market. Similarly, Paul Erker illustrates that a marketing revolution in transport and logistics happened much later, because the market remained highly regulated until the 1980s. Both Paul Erker and Uwe Spiekermann in their contribution, present comparisons of two different sectors or companies (the tire manufacturer Continental and the logistics company Dachser, and agriculture and trade, respectively). In both cases, however, it remains unclear why these examples were chosen for comparison, as both seem to have little in common and are not always effectively used to demonstrate differences. The weakest section of the book is the development of marketing as an academic discipline. The attempt at sketching the phases in the evolution of marketing as an academic discipline by Ursula Hansen and Matthias Bode opens with an undergraduate-level explanation on the methodology of historical periodisation that seems extraneous. Considerably stronger is the section on the wider societal impact of marketing, and Anja Kruke shows how the new techniques of opinion research was accepted by politics and business – surprisingly more readily by politicians than their commercial counterparts. In terms of contemporary personalities, Hans Domizlaff emerges as one fascinating figure of German marketing history, which several contributors refer to and whose career as the German cigarette manufacturer Reemtsma is critically analysed by Tino Jacobs. Domizlaff was Germany's own ‘marketing guru’, whose successful campaigns led to the wide-ranging reception of his ideas about the nature of good branding and marketing. These are variously described as intuitive, elitist, and sachlich, a German concept of a sober, fact-based, and ‘no frills’ approach. Domizlaff did not believe in market research. Rather, he saw the genius of the individual advertiser as key to intuitively ascertaining the people's moods, wishes, and desires. This seems to have made him peculiarly suited to the tastes of the German middle class, according to Thomas Mergel's contribution on the nature of political marketing in the republic. Especially in politics, any form of hard sales tactics were severely frowned upon and considered to demean the citizen as incapable of making an informed choice, a mentality that he dates back to the traditions of nineteenth-century liberalism. Part of this disdain of ‘selling politics like toothpaste’ was also founded on the highly effective use of branding by the National Socialists, who identified their party through the use of an increasingly standardised image of Adolf Hitler and the swastika. Alexander Schug extends on previous research that criticised the simplistic notion of Hitler's charisma as the only explanation of the popular success and distances his approach from those who see it in terms of propaganda and demagogy. He argues that the NSDAP used the tools of advertising and branding precisely because they had to introduce their new ideology into a political marketplace dominated by more established parties. In this they were undoubtedly successful, more so than they intended: as bakers sold swastika cookies and butchers formed Führer heads out of lard, the NSDAP sought to regain control over the now effectively iconic images that constituted their brand, which was in danger of being trivialised and devalued. Key to understanding the history of marketing in Germany is on the one hand the exchange of ideas with the United States, and on the other the impact of national-socialist policies, and the question whether they were a force of modernisation or retardation. The general argument in the volume appears to favour the latter explanation. In the 1930s, some of the leading marketing experts emigrated to the USA, leaving German academia and business isolated. The aftermath of the Second World War left a country that needed to increase production to satisfy consumer demand, and there was little interest in advanced sales techniques. Although the Nazis were progressive in applying new marketing methods to their political campaign, this retarded the adoption of sales techniques in politics for a long time. Germany saw the development of idiosyncratic approaches by people like Domizlaff in the 1930s and 1940s, when it lost some leading thinkers, and only engaged with American marketing conceptions in the 1960s and 1970s, when consumers eventually became more important than producers.

A state of war: Florida from 1939 to 1945

World War II profoundly impacted Florida. The military geography of the State is essential to an understanding the war. The geostrategic concerns of place and space determined that Florida would become a statewide military base. Florida's attributes of place such as climate and topography determined its use as a military academy hosting over two million soldiers, nearly 15 percent of the GI Army, the largest force the US ever raised. One-in-eight Floridians went into uniform. Equally, Florida's space on the planet made it central for both defensive and offensive strategies. The Second World War was a war of movement, and Florida was a major jump off point for US force projection world-wide, especially of air power. Florida's demography facilitated its use as a base camp for the assembly and engagement of this military power. In 1940, less than two percent of the US population lived in Florida, a quiet, barely populated backwater of the United States. But owing to its critical place and space, over the next few years it became a 65,000 square mile training ground, supply dump, and embarkation site vital to the US war effort. Because of its place astride some of the most important sea lanes in the Atlantic World, Florida was the scene of one of the few Western Hemisphere battles of the war. The militarization of Florida began long before Pearl Harbor. The pre-war buildup conformed to the US strategy of the war. The strategy of theUS was then (and remains today) one of forward defense: harden the frontier, then take the battle to the enemy, rather than fight them in North America. The policy of "Europe First," focused the main US war effort on the defeat of Hitler's Germany, evaluated to be the most dangerous enemy. In Florida were established the military forces requiring the longest time to develop, and most needed to defeat the Axis. Those were a naval aviation force for sea-borne hostilities, a heavy bombing force for reducing enemy industrial states, and an aerial logistics train for overseas supply of expeditionary campaigns. The unique Florida coastline made possible the seaborne invasion training demanded for US victory. The civilian population was employed assembling mass-produced first-generation container ships, while Floridahosted casualties, Prisoners-of-War, and transient personnel moving between the Atlantic and Pacific. By the end of hostilities and the lifting of Unlimited Emergency, officially on December 31, 1946, Floridahad become a transportation nexus. Florida accommodated a return of demobilized soldiers, a migration of displaced persons, and evolved into a modern veterans' colonia. It was instrumental in fashioning the modern US military, while remaining a center of the active National Defense establishment. Those are the themes of this work.

British Double Agents and Operation Fortitude: A New Perspective

On June 6th, 1944, Allied forces stormed the beaches of Normandy as a part of Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of France. While they experienced pockets of stiff resistance, Allied troops sustained far fewer casualties than they had expected. The reason for this was due to Operation Fortitude, a deception mission that intended to fool Hitler about the time and location of the Allied invasion mission. The use of double agents by British Intelligence services was essential for the effective execution of Fortitude. The story of the double agents goes beyond their success during Fortitude. Double agents were initially recruited as German agents, but key agents immediately turned themselves in to British authorities upon reaching the nation. These agents decided to become involved with British Intelligence due to broader circumstances that were happening in Europe. The emergence of Fascist regimes disrupted the political landscape of Europe and led to widespread condemnation from political and social spheres. Their development as double agents became crucial to their effectiveness during Operation Fortitude. Their successful infiltration of German Intelligence allowed them to convince Hitler and German High Command that the main Allied invasion force would come at the Pas de Calais instead of Normandy. The result was that the Allies met an unprepared German defense force on D-Day and were able to advance past the beaches. The work of the double agents during Fortitude saved thousands of Allied lives and was vital to the success of Operation Overlord.

Francisco Franco, articulista de incógnito (1945–1960)

Se trata de un análisis pormenorizado de los artículos publicados por Francisco Franco en el periódico Arriba entre los años 1945 y 1960 bajo los seudónimos de Jakim Boor, Hispanicus y Macaulay. Se lleva a cabo su disección en dos grandes categorías: enemigos del Régimen y política, economía y sociedad. Para ello, se toma como ejemplo el propio artículo de Hispanicus titulado “Lo político, lo económico y lo social”. En la primera de las dos grandes categorías se agrupan todos aquellos elementos abstractos -instituciones o ideologías- que Franco consideraba perjudiciales para la España que él gobernaba o que históricamente habían sido hostiles a este país; en la segunda se recogen el comentario sobre política en términos actuales o generales, las situaciones económicas y sociales así como los numerosos fragmentos de Historia de España que el dictador gustaba de incluir en sus colaboraciones periodísticas.