Health spending, illicit financial flows and tax incentives in Malawi

This analysis examines the gaps in health care financing in Malawi and how foregone taxes could fill these gaps. It begins with an assessment of the disease burden and government health expenditure. Then it analyses the tax revenues foregone by the government of Malawi by two main routes • Illicit financial flows (IFF) from the country • Tax incentives. We find that there are significant financing gaps in the health sector; for example, government expenditure is United States Dollars (USD) 177 million for 2013/2014 while projected donor contribution in 2013/2014 is USD 207 million and the total cost for the minimal health package is USD 535 million. Thus the funding gap between the government budget for health and the required spending to provide the minimal package for 2013/2014 is USD 358 million. On the other hand we estimate that almost USD 400million is lost through IFF and corporate utilization of tax incentives each year. The revenues foregone plus the current government health spending would be sufficient to cover the minimal public health package for all Malawians and would help tackle Malawi’s disease burden. Every effort must be made, including improving transparency and revising laws, to curtail IFF and moderate tax incentives.

Incentives to underprice

an initial public offering, the choices made by issuers, such as the offer price, might not appear to be wealth maximizing. In this article, we argue that the choices are strategic. Based on the model developed by Barry (1989), we show that the average change in the issuer's wealth (4.52 per cent) is lower than the average loss implied by underpricing (12.09 per cent). Our results support the notion that the choices issuers make at the offering generate a compensatory benefit in the aftermarket. That the issuer may well not suffer a net wealth loss from the offering is in accordance with continued initial public offering activity.

Environmental information provision, market valuation, and firm incentives: An empirical study of the Japanese PRTR system

The environmental performance of a listed firm could affect its level of investment in pollution prevention and its access to financial markets. Previous studies using Tobin's q that explore market response to environmental performance do not distinguish between the impact of performance on investment and market response, which may mislead conclusions. To overcome this problem, we simultaneously estimate the functions of the intangible asset, the replacement cost, and the toxic chemical risk. We find that the Japanese financial market does not value risk associated with toxic chemical releases. Nevertheless, even without market valuation, firms increase investment to reduce pollution. © 2010 by the Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System.

Financing the project : economic incentives promoting sustainable property development

This chapter is focussed on the various financial instruments and incentives that have been implemented in a range of countries to encourage sustainable developments in all property sectors. It is an area that has undergone substantial change globally since 2008. Sustainable property development has been impacted by the Global Financial Crisis, particularly with regards to the availability of private sector funding and the requirements of funders who now have a more cautious approach to risk. Sustainability, and sometimes a lack of it, is increasingly viewed as a risk in some markets; it is also seen as an area in which governments, through creation of markets and through the use of fiscal instruments can seek to speed up the pace at which the economics of sustainable development makes good business sense. However, it is not just governments that provide the incentive for sustainability- or the dis-incentive for non-sustainable behaviours.

Essays on Stock Options, Incentives, and Managerial Action

Executive compensation and managerial behavior have received an increasing amount of attention in the financial economics literature since the mid 1970s. The purpose of this thesis is to extend our understanding of managerial compensation, especially how stock option compensation is linked to the actions undertaken by the management. Furthermore, managerial compensation is continuously and heatedly debated in the media and an emerging consensus from this discussion seems to be that there still exists gaps in our knowledge of optimal contracting. In Finland, the first executive stock options were introduced in the 1980s and throughout the last 15 years it has become increasingly popular for Finnish listed firms to use this type of managerial compensation. The empirical work in the thesis is conducted using data from Finland, in contrast to most previous studies that predominantly use U.S. data. Using Finnish data provides insight of how market conditions affect compensation and managerial action and provides an opportunity to explore what parts of the U.S. evidence can be generalized to other markets. The thesis consists of four essays. The first essay investigates the exercise policy of the executive stock option holders in Finland. In summary, Essay 1 contributes to our understanding of the exercise policies by examining both the determinants of the exercise decision and the markets reaction to the actual exercises. The second essay analyzes the factors driving stock option grants using data for Finnish publicly listed firms. Several agency theory based variables are found to have have explanatory power on the likelihood of a stock option grant. Essay 2 also contributes to our understanding of behavioral factors, such as prior stock return, as determinants of stock option compensation. The third essay investigates the tax and stock option motives for share repurchases and dividend distributions. We document strong support for the tax motive for share repurchases. Furthermore, we also analyze the dividend distribution decision in companies with stock options and find a significant difference between companies with and without dividend protected options. We thus document that the cutting of dividends found in previous U.S. studies can be avoided by dividend protection. In the fourth essay we approach the puzzle of negative skewness in stock returns from an altogether different angle than in previous studies. We suggest that negative skewness in stock returns is generated by management disclosure practices and find proof for this. More specifically, we find that negative skewness in daily returns is induced by returns for days when non-scheduled firm specific news is disclosed.

Essays on Financial Analyst Forecasts and Recommendations

The trade of the financial analyst is currently a much-debated issue in today’s media. As a large part of the investment analysis is conducted under the broker firms’ regime, the incentives of the financial analyst and the investor do not always align. The broker firm’s commercial incentives may be to maximise its commission from securities trading and underwriting fees. The purpose of this thesis is to extend our understanding of the work of a financial analyst, the incentives he faces and how these affect his actions. The first essay investigates how the economic significance of the coverage of a particular firm impacts the analysts’ accuracy of estimation. The hypothesis is that analysts put more effort in analysing firms with a relatively higher trading volume, as these firms usually yield higher commissions. The second essay investigates how analysts interpret new financial statement information. The essay shows that analysts underreact or overreact to prior reported earnings, depending on the short-term pattern in reported earnings. The third essay investigates the possible investment value in Finnish stock recommendations, issued by sell side analysts. It is established that consensus recommendations issued on Finnish stocks contain investment value. Further, the investment value in consensus recommendations improves significantly through the exclusion of recommendations issued by banks. The fourth essay investigates investors’ behaviour prior to financial analysts’ earnings forecast revisions. Lately, the financial press have reported cases were financial analysts warn their preferred clients of possible earnings forecast revisions. However, in the light of the empirical results, it appears that the problem of analysts leaking information to some selected customers does not appear systematically on the Finnish stock market.

Linking Reduced Deforestation and a Global Carbon Market: Impacts on Costs, Financial Flows, and Technological Innovation

25 p.

Role of the state and financial institutions in financing the fishing industry

The experience of the Government in the recovery of loans for 28 foot mechanized vessels has been unsatisfactory. The author examines the various aspects which have contributed to this situation, and considers arrangements for financing purchase of such vessels. The risks associated with the investment in 38 foot vessels are high, and it seems that the reluctance of private investors to make the required contribution from personal funds is a result of fear of the unknown. Current incentives provided by the Government to the private sector for the purchase of 38 foot vessels are considered to be adequate.

Reversal of impairment losses, firm performance and reporting incentives: Evidence from Malaysia

Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) No. 136, Impairment of Assets, was issued in 2005. The standard requires public listed companies to report their non-current assets at no more than their recoverable amount. When the value of impaired assets is recovered, or partly recovered, FRS 136 requires the impairment charges to be reversed to its new recoverable amount. This study tests whether the reversal of impairment losses by Malaysian firms is more closely associated with economic reasons or reporting incentives. The sample of this study consists of 182 public companies listed on Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) that reported reversals of their impairment charges during the period 2006-2009. These firms are matched with firms which do not reverse impairment on the basis of industrial classification and size. In the year of reversal, this study finds that the reversal firms are more profitable (before reversals) than their matched firms. On average, the Malaysian stock market values the reversals of impairment losses positively. These results suggest that the reversals generally reflect increases in the value of the previously impaired assets. After partitioning firms that are likely to manage earnings and those that are not, this study finds that there are some Malaysian firms which reverse the impairment charges to manage earnings. Their reversals are not value-relevant, and are negatively associated with future firm performance. On the other hand, the reversals of firms which are deemed not to be earnings managers are positively associated with both future firm performance and current stock price performance, and this is the dominant motivation for the reversal of impairment charges in Malaysia. In further analysis, this study provides evidence that the opportunistic reversals are also associated with other earnings management manifestations, namely abnormal working capital accruals and the motivation to avoid earnings declines. In general, the findings suggest that the fair value measurement in impairment standard provides useful information to the users of financial statements.

Financial integration and public financial institutions

This article highlights the problems associated with the existence of financiai institutions owned by a State which is a member of a federation. We show that these financiai institutions allow the States to transfer deficits to the federal government. This possibility creates incentives to higher deficits at State and federal leveis, implying an inefficiently high inflation rate. The main policy implication is that stabilization policies are more difficult to be implemented in countries such as Brazil, and Argentina which allow the members of the federation to own financiai institutions. A second policy implication is that Economic Blocks such as the European Community or Mercosur should not allow regional central banks if they create a monetary authority to help the members in financiai difficulty.

Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default

This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector's investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks' balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks' behaviour.

Europe’s financial crisis: the Euro’s flawed design and the consequences of lack of a government banker

This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.