Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Locally Efficient Estimation in Censored Data Models: Theory and Examples

In many applications the observed data can be viewed as a censored high dimensional full data random variable X. By the curve of dimensionality it is typically not possible to construct estimators that are asymptotically efficient at every probability distribution in a semiparametric censored data model of such a high dimensional censored data structure. We provide a general method for construction of one-step estimators that are efficient at a chosen submodel of the full-data model, are still well behaved off this submodel and can be chosen to always improve on a given initial estimator. These one-step estimators rely on good estimators of the censoring mechanism and thus will require a parametric or semiparametric model for the censoring mechanism. We present a general theorem that provides a template for proving the desired asymptotic results. We illustrate the general one-step estimation methods by constructing locally efficient one-step estimators of marginal distributions and regression parameters with right-censored data, current status data and bivariate right-censored data, in all models allowing the presence of time-dependent covariates. The conditions of the asymptotics theorem are rigorously verified in one of the examples and the key condition of the general theorem is verified for all examples.

Is the Market Classification of Risk Always Efficient? - Evidence from German Third Party Motor Insurance

This paper studies the empirical effects of risk classification in the mandatory third-party motor insurance of Germany following the European Union’s directive to de-regulate insurance tariffs of 1994. We find evidence that inefficient risk categories had been selected while potentially efficient information was dismissed. Risk classification did generally not improve the efficiency of contracting or the composition of insureds in this market. These findings are partly explained by the continuing existence of institutional restraints in this market such as compulsory fixed coverage and unitary owner insurance.

Is the Market Eroding Moral Norms? A Micro-Analytical Validation of Some Ideas of Anomie Theory

Anomie theorists have been reporting the suppression of shared welfare orientations by the overwhelming dominance of economic values within capitalist societies since before the outset of neoliberalism debate. Obligations concerning common welfare are more and more often subordinated to the overarching aim of realizing economic success goals. This should be especially valid with for social life in contemporary market societies. This empirical investigation examines the extent to which market imperatives and values of the societal community are anchored within the normative orientations of market actors. Special attention is paid to whether the shape of these normative orientations varies with respect to the degree of market inclusion. Empirical analyses, based on the data of a standardized written survey within the German working population carried out in 2002, show that different types of normative orientation can be distinguished among market actors. These types are quite similar to the well-known types of anomic adaptation developed by Robert K. Merton in “Social Structure and Anomie” and are externally valid with respect to the prediction of different forms of economic crime. Further analyses show that the type of normative orientation actors adopt within everyday life depends on the degree of market inclusion. Confirming anomie theory, it is shown that the individual willingness to subordinate matters of common welfare to the aim of economic success—radical market activism—gets stronger the more actors are included in the market sphere. Finally, the relevance of reported findings for the explanation of violent behavior, especially with view to varieties of corporate violence, is discussed.

Efficient team actions: Outline of a theory of teams in sport

So far, social psychology in sport has preliminary focused on team cohesion, and many studies and meta analyses tried to demonstrate a relation between cohesiveness of a team and it's performance. How a team really co-operates and how the individual actions are integrated towards a team action is a question that has received relatively little attention in research. This may, at least in part, be due to a lack of a theoretical framework for collective actions, a dearth that has only recently begun to challenge sport psychologists. In this presentation a framework for a comprehensive theory of teams in sport is outlined and its potential to integrate the following presentations is put up for discussion. Based on a model developed by von Cranach, Ochsenbein and Valach (1986), teams are information processing organisms, and team actions need to be investigated on two levels: the individual team member and the group as an entity. Elements to be considered are the task, the social structure, the information processing structure and the execution structure. Obviously, different task require different social structures, communication and co-ordination. From a cognitivist point of view, internal representations (or mental models) guide the behaviour mainly in situations requiring quick reactions and adaptations, were deliberate or contingency planning are difficult. In sport teams, the collective representation contains the elements of the team situation, that is team task and team members, and of the team processes, that is communication and co-operation. Different meta-perspectives may be distinguished and bear a potential to explain the actions of efficient teams. Cranach, M. von, Ochsenbein, G., & Valach, L. (1986).The group as a self-active system: Outline of a theory of group action. European Journal of Social Psychology, 16, 193-229.

Outline of a theory of efficient teams in Sport.

Introduction So far, social psychology in sport has preliminary focused on team cohesion, and many studies and meta-analyses tried to demonstrate a relation between cohesiveness of a team and its performance. How a team really co-operates and how the individual actions are integrated towards a team action is a question that has received relatively little attention in research. This may, at least in part, be due to a lack of a theoretical framework for collective actions, a dearth that has only recently begun to challenge sport psychologists. Objectives In this presentation a framework for a comprehensive theory of teams in sport is outlined and its potential to integrate research in the domain of team performance and, more specifically, the following presentations, is put up for discussion. Method Based on a model developed by von Cranach, Ochsenbein and Valach (1986), teams are considered to be information processing organisms, and team actions need to be investigated on two levels: the individual team member and the group as an entity. Elements to be considered are the task, the social structure, the information processing structure and the execution structure. Obviously, different task require different social structures, communication processes and co-ordination of individual movements. Especially in rapid interactive sports planning and execution of movements based on feedback loops are not possible. Deliberate planning may be a solution mainly for offensive actions, whereas defensive actions have to adjust to the opponent team's actions. Consequently, mental representations must be developed to allow a feed-forward regulation of team member's actions. Results and Conclusions Some preliminary findings based on this conceptual framework as well as further consequences for empirical investigations will be presented. References Cranach, M.v., Ochsenbein, G. & Valach, L. (1986). The group as a self-active system: Outline of a theory of group action. European Journal of Social Psychology, 16, 193-229.

Propuestas regulatorias para el diseño de un mercado ibérico a plazo eficiente de la energía = Regulatory proposals for the development of an efficient iberian energy forward market

El mercado ibérico de futuros de energía eléctrica gestionado por OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, con sede en Lisboa), también conocido como el mercado ibérico de derivados de energía, comenzó a funcionar el 3 de julio de 2006. Se analiza la eficiencia de este mercado organizado, por lo que se estudia la precisión con la que sus precios de futuros predicen el precio de contado. En dicho mercado coexisten dos modos de negociación: el mercado continuo (modo por defecto) y la contratación mediante subasta. En la negociación en continuo, las órdenes anónimas de compra y de venta interactúan de manera inmediata e individual con órdenes contrarias, dando lugar a operaciones con un número indeterminado de precios para cada contrato. En la negociación a través de subasta, un precio único de equilibrio maximiza el volumen negociado, liquidándose todas las operaciones a ese precio. Adicionalmente, los miembros negociadores de OMIP pueden liquidar operaciones “Over-The-Counter” (OTC) a través de la cámara de compensación de OMIP (OMIClear). Las cinco mayores empresas españolas de distribución de energía eléctrica tenían la obligación de comprar electricidad hasta julio de 2009 en subastas en OMIP, para cubrir parte de sus suministros regulados. De igual manera, el suministrador de último recurso portugués mantuvo tal obligación hasta julio de 2010. Los precios de equilibrio de esas subastas no han resultado óptimos a efectos retributivos de tales suministros regulados dado que dichos precios tienden a situarse ligeramente sesgados al alza. La prima de riesgo ex-post, definida como la diferencia entre los precios a plazo y de contado en el periodo de entrega, se emplea para medir su eficiencia de precio. El mercado de contado, gestionado por OMIE (“Operador de Mercado Ibérico de la Energía”, conocido tradicionalmente como “OMEL”), tiene su sede en Madrid. Durante los dos primeros años del mercado de futuros, la prima de riesgo media tiende a resultar positiva, al igual que en otros mercados europeos de energía eléctrica y gas natural. En ese periodo, la prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser negativa en los mercados de petróleo y carbón. Los mercados de energía tienden a mostrar niveles limitados de eficiencia de mercado. La eficiencia de precio del mercado de futuros aumenta con el desarrollo de otros mecanismos coexistentes dentro del mercado ibérico de electricidad (conocido como “MIBEL”) –es decir, el mercado dominante OTC, las subastas de centrales virtuales de generación conocidas en España como Emisiones Primarias de Energía, y las subastas para cubrir parte de los suministros de último recurso conocidas en España como subastas CESUR– y con una mayor integración de los mercados regionales europeos de energía eléctrica. Se construye un modelo de regresión para analizar la evolución de los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo durante sus cuatro primeros años como una función de doce indicadores potenciales de liquidez. Los únicos indicadores significativos son los volúmenes negociados en las subastas obligatorias gestionadas por OMIP, los volúmenes negociados en el mercado OTC y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear. El número de creadores de mercado, la incorporación de agentes financieros y compañías de generación pertenecientes a grupos integrados con suministradores de último recurso, y los volúmenes OTC compensados por OMIClear muestran una fuerte correlación con los volúmenes negociados en el mercado continuo. La liquidez de OMIP está aún lejos de los niveles alcanzados por los mercados europeos más maduros (localizados en los países nórdicos (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) y Alemania (EEX)). El operador de mercado y su cámara de compensación podrían desarrollar acciones eficientes de marketing para atraer nuevos agentes activos en el mercado de contado (p.ej. industrias consumidoras intensivas de energía, suministradores, pequeños productores, compañías energéticas internacionales y empresas de energías renovables) y agentes financieros, captar volúmenes del opaco OTC, y mejorar el funcionamiento de los productos existentes aún no líquidos. Resultaría de gran utilidad para tales acciones un diálogo activo con todos los agentes (participantes en el mercado, operador de mercado de contado, y autoridades supervisoras). Durante sus primeros cinco años y medio, el mercado continuo presenta un crecimento de liquidez estable. Se mide el desempeño de sus funciones de cobertura mediante la ratio de posición neta obtenida al dividir la posición abierta final de un contrato de derivados mensual entre su volumen acumulado en la cámara de compensación. Los futuros carga base muestran la ratio más baja debido a su buena liquidez. Los futuros carga punta muestran una mayor ratio al producirse su menor liquidez a través de contadas subastas fijadas por regulación portuguesa. Las permutas carga base liquidadas en la cámara de compensación ubicada en Madrid –MEFF Power, activa desde el 21 de marzo de 2011– muestran inicialmente valores altos debido a bajos volúmenes registrados, dado que esta cámara se emplea principalmente para vencimientos pequeños (diario y semanal). Dicha ratio puede ser una poderosa herramienta de supervisión para los reguladores energéticos cuando accedan a todas las transacciones de derivados en virtud del Reglamento Europeo sobre Integridad y Transparencia de los Mercados de Energía (“REMIT”), en vigor desde el 28 de diciembre de 2011. La prima de riesgo ex-post tiende a ser positiva en todos los mecanismos (futuros en OMIP, mercado OTC y subastas CESUR) y disminuye debido a la curvas de aprendizaje y al efecto, desde el año 2011, del precio fijo para la retribución de la generación con carbón autóctono. Se realiza una comparativa con los costes a plazo de generación con gas natural (diferencial “clean spark spread”) obtenido como la diferencia entre el precio del futuro eléctrico y el coste a plazo de generación con ciclo combinado internalizando los costes de emisión de CO2. Los futuros eléctricos tienen una elevada correlación con los precios de gas europeos. Los diferenciales de contratos con vencimiento inmediato tienden a ser positivos. Los mayores diferenciales se dan para los contratos mensuales, seguidos de los trimestrales y anuales. Los generadores eléctricos con gas pueden maximizar beneficios con contratos de menor vencimiento. Los informes de monitorización por el operador de mercado que proporcionan transparencia post-operacional, el acceso a datos OTC por el regulador energético, y la valoración del riesgo regulatorio pueden contribuir a ganancias de eficiencia. Estas recomendaciones son también válidas para un potencial mercado ibérico de futuros de gas, una vez que el hub ibérico de gas –actualmente en fase de diseño, con reuniones mensuales de los agentes desde enero de 2013 en el grupo de trabajo liderado por el regulador energético español– esté operativo. El hub ibérico de gas proporcionará transparencia al atraer más agentes y mejorar la competencia, incrementando su eficiencia, dado que en el mercado OTC actual no se revela precio alguno de gas. ABSTRACT The Iberian Power Futures Market, managed by OMIP (“Operador do Mercado Ibérico de Energia, Pólo Português”, located in Lisbon), also known as the Iberian Energy Derivatives Market, started operations on 3 July 2006. The market efficiency, regarding how well the future price predicts the spot price, is analysed for this energy derivatives exchange. There are two trading modes coexisting within OMIP: the continuous market (default mode) and the call auction. In the continuous trading, anonymous buy and sell orders interact immediately and individually with opposite side orders, generating trades with an undetermined number of prices for each contract. In the call auction trading, a single price auction maximizes the traded volume, being all trades settled at the same price (equilibrium price). Additionally, OMIP trading members may settle Over-the-Counter (OTC) trades through OMIP clearing house (OMIClear). The five largest Spanish distribution companies have been obliged to purchase in auctions managed by OMIP until July 2009, in order to partly cover their portfolios of end users’ regulated supplies. Likewise, the Portuguese last resort supplier kept that obligation until July 2010. The auction equilibrium prices are not optimal for remuneration purposes of regulated supplies as such prices seem to be slightly upward biased. The ex-post forward risk premium, defined as the difference between the forward and spot prices in the delivery period, is used to measure its price efficiency. The spot market, managed by OMIE (Market Operator of the Iberian Energy Market, Spanish Pool, known traditionally as “OMEL”), is located in Madrid. During the first two years of the futures market, the average forward risk premium tends to be positive, as it occurs with other European power and natural gas markets. In that period, the ex-post forward risk premium tends to be negative in oil and coal markets. Energy markets tend to show limited levels of market efficiency. The price efficiency of the Iberian Power Futures Market improves with the market development of all the coexistent forward contracting mechanisms within the Iberian Electricity Market (known as “MIBEL”) – namely, the dominant OTC market, the Virtual Power Plant Auctions known in Spain as Energy Primary Emissions, and the auctions catering for part of the last resort supplies known in Spain as CESUR auctions – and with further integration of European Regional Electricity Markets. A regression model tracking the evolution of the traded volumes in the continuous market during its first four years is built as a function of twelve potential liquidity drivers. The only significant drivers are the traded volumes in OMIP compulsory auctions, the traded volumes in the OTC market, and the OTC cleared volumes by OMIClear. The amount of market makers, the enrolment of financial members and generation companies belonging to the integrated group of last resort suppliers, and the OTC cleared volume by OMIClear show strong correlation with the traded volumes in the continuous market. OMIP liquidity is still far from the levels reached by the most mature European markets (located in the Nordic countries (Nasdaq OMX Commodities) and Germany (EEX)). The market operator and its clearing house could develop efficient marketing actions to attract new entrants active in the spot market (e.g. energy intensive industries, suppliers, small producers, international energy companies and renewable generation companies) and financial agents as well as volumes from the opaque OTC market, and to improve the performance of existing illiquid products. An active dialogue with all the stakeholders (market participants, spot market operator, and supervisory authorities) will help to implement such actions. During its firs five and a half years, the continuous market shows steady liquidity growth. The hedging performance is measured through a net position ratio obtained from the final open interest of a month derivatives contract divided by its accumulated cleared volume. The base load futures in the Iberian energy derivatives exchange show the lowest ratios due to good liquidity. The peak futures show bigger ratios as their reduced liquidity is produced by auctions fixed by Portuguese regulation. The base load swaps settled in the clearing house located in Spain – MEFF Power, operating since 21 March 2011, with a new denomination (BME Clearing) since 9 September 2013 – show initially large values due to low registered volumes, as this clearing house is mainly used for short maturity (daily and weekly swaps). The net position ratio can be a powerful oversight tool for energy regulators when accessing to all the derivatives transactions as envisaged by European regulation on Energy Market Integrity and Transparency (“REMIT”), in force since 28 December 2011. The ex-post forward risk premium tends to be positive in all existing mechanisms (OMIP futures, OTC market and CESUR auctions) and diminishes due to the learning curve and the effect – since year 2011 – of the fixed price retributing the indigenous coal fired generation. Comparison with the forward generation costs from natural gas (“clean spark spread”) – obtained as the difference between the power futures price and the forward generation cost with a gas fired combined cycle plant taking into account the CO2 emission rates – is also performed. The power futures are strongly correlated with European gas prices. The clean spark spreads built with prompt contracts tend to be positive. The biggest clean spark spreads are for the month contract, followed by the quarter contract and then by the year contract. Therefore, gas fired generation companies can maximize profits trading with contracts of shorter maturity. Market monitoring reports by the market operator providing post-trade transparency, OTC data access by the energy regulator, and assessment of the regulatory risk can contribute to efficiency gains. The same recommendations are also valid for a potential Iberian gas futures market, once an Iberian gas hub – currently in a design phase, with monthly meetings amongst the stakeholders in a Working Group led by the Spanish energy regulatory authority since January 2013 – is operating. The Iberian gas hub would bring transparency attracting more shippers and improving competition and thus its efficiency, as no gas price is currently disclosed in the existing OTC market.

Is Regulatory Convergence Efficient? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 02.3, May 1992

One of the important themes in the new institutionalism is the convergence of market regulations in a world with three powerful clusters of countries (Western Europe, North America, and East Asia) on a small number of regimes, like disorganized capitalism, free market capitalism, and coordinated market capitalism. This paper examines the political-economic theory of regulatory convergence. It reconstructs and compares three welfarist approaches: the optimal regulatory regime (Tinbergen), the rule of constitutional law (Buchanan), and regulatory rivalry (Hayek). The paper concludes that most plausible results of convergence theory are completely opposite to the expressed political intentions of the theorists. Tinbergen's theory predicts neoliberalism, not social democracy. The theories of Buchanan and Hayek predict respectively a consensual or spontaneous formation of corporatist regulations, not the return of classical constitutionalism or liberalism. The paper summons new institutionalists to repair the weak scientific elements of convergence theory and to make a distinction between the ideological origins of this theory and its unintended ideological consequences.

Market analysis and consumer impacts source document. Part III: consumer behavior and attitudes toward fuel efficient vehicles. Final report.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Office of Research and Development, Washington, D.C.

General theory of most efficient codes.

Mode of access: Internet.

The stock market barometer : a study of its forecast value based on Charles H. Dow's theory of the price movement. With an analysis of the market and its history since 1897 /

Reprint of 1922 ed. with a new introduction.

Macroeconomic Dynamics of Market Risk Capital Requirements and Credit Supply Interdependence

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

The modelling of energy efficient drying for DSM (BL)

This thesis investigates the modelling of drying processes for the promotion of market-led Demand Side Management (DSM) as applied to the UK Public Electricity Suppliers. A review of DSM in the electricity supply industry is provided, together with a discussion of the relevant drivers supporting market-led DSM and energy services (ES). The potential opportunities for ES in a fully deregulated energy market are outlined. It is suggested that targeted industrial sector energy efficiency schemes offer significant opportunity for long term customer and supplier benefit. On a process level, industrial drying is highlighted as offering significant scope for the application of energy services. Drying is an energy-intensive process used widely throughout industry. The results of an energy survey suggest that 17.7 per cent of total UK industrial energy use derives from drying processes. Comparison with published work indicates that energy use for drying shows an increasing trend against a background of reducing overall industrial energy use. Airless drying is highlighted as offering potential energy saving and production benefits to industry. To this end, a comprehensive review of the novel airless drying technology and its background theory is made. Advantages and disadvantages of airless operation are defined and the limited market penetration of airless drying is identified, as are the key opportunities for energy saving. Limited literature has been found which details the modelling of energy use for airless drying. A review of drying theory and previous modelling work is made in an attempt to model energy consumption for drying processes. The history of drying models is presented as well as a discussion of the different approaches taken and their relative merits. The viability of deriving energy use from empirical drying data is examined. Adaptive neuro fuzzy inference systems (ANFIS) are successfully applied to the modelling of drying rates for 3 drying technologies, namely convective air, heat pump and airless drying. The ANFIS systems are then integrated into a novel energy services model for the prediction of relative drying times, energy cost and atmospheric carbon dioxide emission levels. The author believes that this work constitutes the first to use fuzzy systems for the modelling of drying performance as an energy services approach to DSM. To gain an insight into the 'real world' use of energy for drying, this thesis presents a unique first-order energy audit of every ceramic sanitaryware manufacturing site in the UK. Previously unknown patterns of energy use are highlighted. Supplementary comments on the timing and use of drying systems are also made. The limitations of such large scope energy surveys are discussed.

AstonCAT-plus:an efficient specialist for the TAC market design tournament

This paper describes the strategies used by AstonCAT-Plus, the post-tournament version of the specialist designed for the TAC Market Design Tournament 2010. It details how AstonCATPlus accepts shouts, clears market, sets transaction prices and charges fees. Through empirical evaluation, we show that AstonCAT-Plus not only outperforms AstonCAT (tournament version) significantly but also achieves the second best overall score against some top entrants of the competition. In particular, it achieves the highest allocative efficiency, transaction success rate and average trader profit among all the specialists in our controlled experiments.

Piaci rend és társadalmi normák. Hayek elmélete a társadalmi evolúcióról (Market order and social norms Hayek's theory of social evolution)

A hayeki szociokulturális evolúció elmélete a piaci rend elemzésének általánosítása. Hayek mind a piaci rend, mind a piaci rend alapzatául szolgáló társadalmi intézmények kialakulását és működését azonos logika alapján magyarázza. Ez a logika az egyéni cselekvések nem szándékolt következményeként értelmezi a spontán rend és a csoportszintű magatartásszabályok kialakulását és fennmaradását. A társadalmi normák magyarázatában a módszertani individualizmus elveinek érvényesítéséért az evolucionista perspektíva feladásával kellene fizetni. Hayek azonban a társadalmi normák magyarázatára is az evolucionista megközelítést alkalmazza, ezért egészíti ki a módszertani individualista megközelítést funkcionalista-evolucionista érvekkel. A szociokulturális evolúció hayeki elmélete példa arra, hogy a módszertani individualizmusra épülő magyarázat és a funkcionalista érvelés nem kiszorítja, hanem kiegészíti egymást. _____ Hayek's theory of socio-cultural evolution is a generalization of his theory of market order. He explains in the same way the development and operation of market order and those of the social institutions on which market order is based. This logic interprets the development and persistence of spontaneous order and group-level behaviour rules as an unintentional consequence of individual actions. In his explanation of social norms, enforcement of the principles of methodological individualism has to be paid for by abandoning the evolutionist perspective. But Hayek also employs an evolutionist approach in his explanation of social norms, and so he augments his methodological individualist approach with some functionalist-cum-evolutionist arguments. Hayek's theory of sociocultural evolution, for instance, exemplifies how an explanation resting on methodological individualism and a functionalist argument can complement, not preclude each other.