The Diffusion of Risks in Public Private Partnership Contracts

Purpose The UK government argues that the benefits of public private partnership (PPP) in delivering public infrastructure stem from: transferring risks to the private sector within a structure in which financiers put their own capital at risk; and, the performance based payment mechanism, reinforced by the due diligence requirements imposed by the lenders financing the projects (HM Treasury, 2010). Prior studies of risk in PPPs have investigated ‘what’ risks are allocated and to ‘whom’, that is to the public or the private sector. The purpose of this study is to examine ‘how’ and ‘why’ PPP risks are diffused by their financiers. Design/methodology/approach This study focuses on the financial structure of PPPs and on their financiers. Empirical evidence comes from interviews conducted with equity and debt financiers. Findings The findings show that the financial structure of the deals generates risk aversion in both debt and equity financiers and that the need to attract affordable finance leads to risk diffusion through a network of companies using various means that include contractual mitigation through insurance, performance support guarantees, interest rate swaps and inflation hedges. Because of the complexity this process generates, both procurers and suppliers need expensive expert advice. The risk aversion and diffusion and the consequent need for advice add cost to the projects impacting on the government’s economic argument for risk transfer. Limitations and implications The empirical work covers the private finance initiative (PFI) type of PPP arrangements and therefore the risk diffusion mechanisms may not be generalisable to other forms of PPP, especially those that do not involve the use of high leverage or private finance. Moreover, the scope of this research is limited to exploring the diffusion of risk in the private sector. Further research is needed on how risk is diffused in other settings and on the value for money implication of risk diffusion in PPP contracts. Originality/value The expectation inherent in PPP is that the private sector will better manage those risks allocated to it and because private capital is at risk, financiers will perform due diligence with the ultimate outcome that only viable projects will proceed. This paper presents empirical evidence that raises questions about these expectations. Key words: public private partnership, risk management, diffusion, private finance initiative, financiers

Olfactory discrimination in the western lowland gorilla, Gorilla gorilla gorilla

The olfactory abilities of great apes have been subject to little empirical investigation, save for a few observational reports. This study, using an habituation/dishabituation task, provides experimental evidence for a core olfactory ability, namely, olfactory discrimination, in the gorilla. In Experiment 1, six zoo-housed western lowland gorillas were individually presented with the same odour on four trials, and with a novel odour on the fifth trial. Odours (almond and vanilla) were presented on plastic balls, and behavioural responses of sniffing and chewing/licking the balls were recorded. A second experiment presented the same odour on four trials and no odour on the fifth to examine whether any dishabituation was due to the presence of a new odour or the absence of the familiar odour. Gorillas habituated their behaviour with repeated presentation of the same odour, but dishabituated, i. e. increased sniffing and chewing/licking, when presented with the novel odour. No dishabituation was noted when using water as the stimulus across all trials or when used as the novel odour. Overall, results show that gorillas are able to discriminate between odours. © 2012 Japan Monkey Centre and Springer.

The role of operations management in public sector policy and practice alignment: a local government analysis

In responding to the demand for change and improvement, local government has applied a plethora of operations management-based methods, tools and techniques. This article explores how these methods, specifically in the form of performance management models, are used to improve alignment between central government policy and local government practice, an area which has thus far been neglected in the literature. Using multiple case studies from Environmental Waste Management Services, this research reports that models derived in the private sector are often directly ‘implanted’ into the public sector. This has challenged the efficacy of all performance management models. However, those organisations which used models most effectively did so by embedding (contextualisation) and extending (reconceptualisation) them beyond their original scope. Moreover, success with these models created a cumulative effect whereby other operations management approaches were probed, adapted and used.

Use of the impedance cardiogram in public access defibrillators as an indicator of cardiopulmonary resuscitation effectiveness

An algorithm has been developed for a Public Access Defibrillator which utilizes distinctive features from the impedance cardiogram (ICG) recorded via defibrillator pads to advise both lay users and minimally trained bystanders to ensure CPR effectiveness. Following ethical approval, data were collected and marked. CPR was administered by trained personnel. 211 cases were gathered and the training set included 106 cases. A retrospective analysis was carried out of simultaneously recorded ECG and ICG. The speed of compressions was calculated by counting the outstanding waves in the ICG during CPR. Also if the base-to-peak amplitude of the ICG is greater than a minimum threshold, the corresponding compressions were classified as being applied with adequate force. For the validation set, adequate speed was detected with 91.45% sensitivity and 96.27% specificity (79826s) and adequate force with 99.94% sensitivity and 97.91% specificity (91973s). © 2011 CCAL.

Analyzing longitudinal continuity and change in public sector organizations

This article provides the introduction to a special edition that presents for the first time a series of detailed country case studies concerned with the matter of organizational life cycles. Building on some recent scholarship, it begins by surveying the development of the field, before setting out some of the key methodological and theoretical issues and challenges involved in adopting a longitudinal perspective to the study of organizational change. It proposes that by capturing the variety of ways in which public sector organizations emerge, survive, and terminate, new perspectives on how administrative systems evolve can be presented and compared. © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

Exploring the use of physical activity loyalty cards for behaviour change in public health: randomised controlled trial

Abstract
Background Physical inactivity is a major public health concern, and more innovative approaches are urgently needed to address it. The UK Government supports the use of incentives and so-called nudges to encourage healthy behaviour changes, and has encouraged business sector involvement in public health through the Public Health Responsibility Deal. To test the effectiveness of provision of incentives to encourage adults to increase their physical activity, we
recruited 406 adults from a workplace setting (office-based) to take part in an assessor-blind randomised controlled trial.
Methods
We developed the physical activity loyalty card scheme, which integrates a novel physical activity tracking system with web-based monitoring (palcard). Participants were recruited from two buildings at Northern Ireland’s main
government offices and were randomly allocated (grouped by building [n=2] to reduce contamination) to either incentive group (n=199) or no incentive group (n=207). We included participants aged 16–65 years, based at the worksite 4 days or more per week and for 6 h or more per day, and able to complete 15 min of moderate-paced walking (self-report). Exclusion criteria included having received specific advice by a general practitioner not to exercise. A statistician not involved in administration of the trial prepared a computer-generated random allocation sequence. Random assignments were placed in individually numbered, sealed envelopes by the statistician to ensure concealment of allocation. Only the assessor was masked to assignment. Sensors were placed along footpaths and the gym in the workplace. Participants scanned their loyalty card at the sensor when undertaking physical activity (eg, walking), which logged activity. Participants in the incentive group monitored their physical activity, collected points, and received rewards (retail vouchers) for minutes of physical activity completed over the 12-week intervention. Rewards were vouchers sponsored by local retailers. Participants in the no incentive group used their loyalty card to self-monitor their physical activity but were not able to earn points or receive rewards. The primary outcome was change in minutes of moderate to vigorous physical activity with the Global Physical Activity Questionnaire, measured at baseline, week 12, and 6 months. Activity was objectively measured with the tracking system over the 12-week intervention. Mann Whitney U tests were done to assess change between groups.
Findings
The mean age of participants was 43·32 years (SD 9·37), and 272 (67%) were women. We obtained follow-up data from 353 (87%) participants at week 12 and 341 (84%) at 6 months. At week 12, participants in the incentive group increased moderate to vigorous physical activity by a median of 60 min per week (IQR –10 to 120) compared with 30 min per week (–60 to 90) in the no incentive group (p=0·05). At 6 months, participants in the incentive group had
increased their moderate to vigorous physical activity by 30 min per week (–60 to 100) from baseline compared with 0 min per week (–115 to 1110) in the no incentive group (p=0·099). We noted no significant differences between groups
for use of loyalty card (p=0·18). Participants in the incentive group recorded a mean of 60·22 min (95% CI 50·90–69·55) of physical activity per week with their loyalty card on week 1 and 23·56 min (17·06–30·06) at week 12, which was similar to that for those in the no incentive group (59·74 min, 51·24–68·23, at week 1; 20·25 min, 14·45–26·06, at week 12; p=0·94 for differences between groups at week 1; p=0·45 for differences between groups at week 12).
Interpretation:
Financial incentives showed a short-term behaviour change in physical activity. This innovative study contributes to the necessary evidence base, and has important implications for physical activity promotion and business engagement in health. The optimum incentive-based approach needs to be established. Results should be interpreted with some caution as the analyses of secondary outcomes were not adjusted for multiple comparisons.

Price Discrimination in Quantity Setting Oligopoly

We analyze a two-stage quantity setting oligopolistic price discrimination game. In the first stage firms choose capacities and in the second stage they simultaneously choose the share that they assign to each segment. At the equilibrium the firms focus more on the high-valuation customers. When the capacities in the first stage are endogenous, the deadweight loss does not vanish with the level of price discrimination, as it does in one-stage games and monopoly. Moreover, the quantity-weighted average price increases with the level of price discrimination as opposed to established results in the literature for one-stage games.