Attitudes towards American brands and brand America

A study of 556 students at colleges and universities in Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore explored the relationship between attitude towards the United States and brand attitudes and preferences. Singaporean student attitudes towards both the US Government and US people were higher than were those of the Australian and Hong Kong students. Coke, Nike and McDonald's were among both the most-liked and disliked US brands among the international students, a finding suggesting that brands may possess both a 'lovemark' status, as described in the literature, and its opposite — 'loathemark' status — within the same demographic group. US brand preference scores did not offer support for the belief that international consumers 'vote with their pocketbooks' by refusing to purchase US brands if they have a negative attitude towards the United States. Among Hong Kong and Singaporean students, favourable attitudes towards the purchase of US brands was found to be positively related to favourability towards the US Government.

Re-imagining China's future : soft power, cultural presence and the East Asian media market

As various contributors to this volume suggest, the term soft power is multifaceted. In 2002 Joseph Nye, the political scientist who coined the term more than a decade previously, noted that the soft power of a country rests on three resources: a country’s culture, its political values, and its foreign policies (Nye 2002). However, several factors can be drawn together to explain China’s adoption of this concept. First, China’s economic influence has precipitated a groundswell of nationalism, which reached its apex at the Opening Ceremony of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. This global media event provided an international platform to demonstrate China’s new found self-confidence. Second, cultural diplomacy and foreign aid, particularly through Third World channels is seen by the Chinese Communist Party leadership as an appropriate way to extend Chinese influence globally (Kurlantzick 2007). Third, education in Chinese culture through globally dispersed Confucius Institutes is charged with improving international understanding of Chinese culture and values, and in the process renovating negative images of China. Fourth, the influence of Japanese and Korean popular culture on China’s youth cultures in recent years has caused acute discomfit to cultural nationalists. Many contend it is time to stem the tide. Fifth, the past few years have witnessed a series of lively debates about the importance of industries such as design, advertising, animation and fashion, resulting in the construction of hundreds of creative clusters, animation centres, film backlots, cultural precincts, design centres and artist lofts.

Globally networked public spheres? The Australian media reaction to WikiLeaks

The global release of 250,000 US Embassy diplomatic cables to selected media sites worldwide through the WikiLeaks website, was arguably the major global media event of 2010. As well as the implications of the content of the cables for international politics and diplomacy, the actions of WikiLeaks and its controversial editor-in-chief, the Australian Julian Assange, bring together a range of arguments about how the media, news and journalism are being transformed in the 21st century. This paper will focus on the reactions of Australian online news media sites to the release of the diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks, including both the online sites of established news outlets such as The Australian, Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, the ABC’s The Drum site, and online-only sites such as Crikey, New Matilda and On Line Opinion. The study focuses on opinion and commentary rather than straight news reportage, and analysis is framed around three issues: WikiLeaks and international diplomacy; implications of WikiLeaks for journalism; and WikiLeaks and democracy, including debates about the organisation and the ethics of its own practice. It also whether a “WikiLeaks Effect” has wider implications for how journalism is conducted in the future, particularly the method of ‘redaction’ of large amounts of computational data.

Wikileaks and the challenge of the “Fifth Estate”

The Time magazine ‘Person of theYear’ award is a venerable institution. Established by Time’s founder Henry Luce in 1927 as ‘Man of the Year’, it is an annual award given to ‘a person, couple, group, idea, place, or machine that ‘for better or for worse ... has done the most to influence the events of the year’ (Time 2002, p. 1). In 2010, the award was given to Mark Zuckerberg, the founder and CEO of the social networking site Facebook.There was, however, a strong campaign for the ‘People’s Choice’ award to be given to Julian Assange, the founder and editor-in-chief of Wikileaks, the online whistleblowing site. Earlier in the year Wikileaks had released more than 250 000 US government diplomatic cables through the internet, and the subsequent controver- sies around the actions of Wikileaks and Assange came to be known worldwide as ‘Cablegate’. The focus of this chapter is not on the implications of ‘Cablegate’ for international diplomacy, which continue to have great significance, but rather upon what the emergence of Wikileaks has meant for journalism, and whether it provides insights into the future of journalism. Both Facebook and Wikileaks, as well as social media platforms such as Twitter and YouTube, and independent media practices such as blogging, citizen journalism and crowdsourcing, are manifestations of the rise of social media, or what has also been termed web 2.0.The term ‘web 2.0’ was coined by Tim O’Reilly, and captures the rise of online social media platforms and services, that better realise the collaborative potential of digitally networked media. They do this by moving from the relatively static, top-down notions of interactivity that informed early internet development, towards more open and evolutionary models that better harness collective intelligence by enabling users to become the creators and collaborators in the development of online media content (Musser and O’Reilly 2007; Bruns 2008).

Confucius institutes and the rise of china

Abstract: Since 2004 China has set up over 700 Confucius Institutes and Confucius Classrooms around the world to promote its language and culture and thereby to shape its image. Despite this impressive number Confucius Institutes are surprisingly understudied, especially in terms of their actual structure, operation mode and activities. This paper uses German Confucius Institutes as a case study to bridge this gap. It first discusses the concepts of public and cultural diplomacy and culture institutes as a conceptual tool to analyze Confucius Institutes. It then turns to the case study to provide empirical data to better understand this instrument of China’s image shaping efforts. It argues that Confucius Institutes are connected to the rise of China and a unique member of the family of national culture institutes.

The global creative economy and the new development debate

This paper explores the renewed interest in the creative economy as a possible development pathway for developing nations. Noting the extent to which discussions of creative industries frequently merge into the concept of a creative economy, the paper considers the institutional and public policy settings required to capture economic value associated with creative practice. It is also argued that knowledge economy and creative economy discourses are increasingly merging, particularly in their focus upon design, innovation, software development and convergent media. The paper draws attention to ambiguities in policy discourse, particularly in relation to copyright and intellectual property.

Confucius Institutes and the rise of China: How the People's Republic of China uses its cultural institutions abroad to communicate with the world

This thesis examines the role of Confucius Institutes in China's cultural diplomacy. It analyses Confucius Institutes in Australia and Germany and explains the differences between Confucius Institutes and their international counterparts such as the British Council or the Goethe Institute. China's unique approach to establish these institutes as joint ventures has multiple implications not only for individual institutes and their partners involved, but more generally for the Chinese understanding of cultural diplomacy. The case of Confucius Institutes shows China's willingness to cooperate with foreigners in the context of cultural diplomacy, which, as with all such diplomatic endeavours, eventually serves national interests.

A place in the sun : the politics of place, identity and branding

There is no doubt that place branding is a powerful and ubiquitous practice deployed around the globe. Parallel to its acceptance and development as a distinct discipline is an understanding that place branding as responsible practice offers the means to achieve widespread economic, social and cultural benefits. Drawing on work around place and identity in cultural geography and cultural studies, this paper engages critically with this vision. Specifically, it challenges the widely-held assumption that the relationship between place branding and place identity is fundamentally reflective, arguing instead that this relationship is inherently generative. This shift in perspective, explored in relation to current responsible place branding practice, is central to the realisation of place branding as a force for good.

Scrapping the Australia network affects more than the ABC

The termination in the 2014 budget of the ABC’s international television broadcasting contract to run the federal government’s Australia Network service, barely a year into its ten-year term, was hardly a surprise. “Soft power” or “soft diplomacy” initiatives such as the Australia Network and international aid schemes have been hit especially hard in this budget. If, as Treasurer Hockey has repeatedly claimed, this was a budget for the nation, then what do these decisions say about the value this government places on Australia’s international cultural image and internationalism more generally?

The Healthy Trends of International Relations Research

As the end of the Cold War approached in 1989, Caroline Thomas argued: “It is important that the discipline [International Relations, IR] should address the issue of disease and more broadly, health, not simply to facilitate containment of disease transmission across international borders but also because central notions of justice, equity, efficiency and order are involved” (1989:273).1 Ten years later, Craig Murphy echoed these sentiments. Murphy (2001: 352) proposed that IR had yet to grapple with the political consequences of growing inequality between the world’s rich and poor, and areas such as health—where these inequalities were most stark—should become the field’s core business. How IR’s theories and methods would approach these issues was less clear. Bettcher and Yach (1998) cautioned that IR would be unable to develop progressive research projects that explored global health diplomacy as a global public good without adopting new perspectives and methods. Others warned that the expansion of security studies into areas such as global health would weaken the intellectual coherency of the field (Walt 1991:213). Taking its cue from the recent Ng and Prah Ruger (2011) study, this paper returns to these concerns to briefly explore key trends and potential future concerns of research in IR on health...

Wipert von Blücher und Finnland : Alternativpolitik und Diplomatie im 'Dritten Reich'

This dissertation explores the role of the German minister to Helsinki, Wipert von Blücher (1883-1963), within the German-Finnish relations of the late 1930s and the Second World War. Blücher was a key figure – and certainly one of the constants – within German Finland policy and the complex international diplomacy surrounding Finland. Despite representing Hitler’s Germany, he was not a National Socialist in the narrower sense of the term, but a conservative civil servant in the Wilhelmine tradition of the German foreign service. Along with a significant number of career diplomats, Blücher attempted to restrict National Socialist influence on the exercise of German foreign policy, whilst successfully negotiating a modus vivendi with the new regime. The study of his political biography in the Third Reich hence provides a highly representative example of how the traditional élites of Germany were caught in an cycle of conformity and, albeit tacit, opposition. Above all, however, the biographical study of Blücher and his behaviour offers an hitherto unexplored approach to the history of the German-Finnish relations. His unusually long tenure in Helsinki covered the period leading up to the so-called Winter War, which left Blücher severely distraught by Berlin’s effectively pro-Soviet neutrality and brought him close to resigning his post. It further extended to the German-Finnish rapprochement of 1940/41 and the military cooperation of both countries from mid-1941 to 1944. Throughout, Blücher developed a diverse and ambitious set of policy schemes, largely rooted in the tradition of Wilhelmine foreign policy. In their moderation and commonsensical realism, his designs – indeed his entire conception of foreign policy – clashed with the foreign political and ideological premises of the National Socialist regime. In its theoretical grounding, the analysis of Blücher’s political schemes is built on the concept of alternative policy and indebted to A.J.P. Taylor’s definition of dissent in foreign policy. It furthermore rests upon the assumption, introduced by Wolfgang Michalka, that National Socialist foreign policy was dominated by a plurality of rival conceptions, players, and institutions competing for Hitler’s favour (‘Konzeptionen-Pluralismus’). Although primarily a study in the history of international relations, my research has substantially benefited from more recent developments within cultural history, particularly research on nobility and élites, and the renewed focus on autobiography and conceptions of the self. On an abstract level, the thesis touches upon some of the basic components of German politics, political culture, and foreign policy in the first half of the 20th century: national belonging and conflicting loyalties, self-perception and representation, élites and their management of power, the modern history of German conservatism, the nature and practice of diplomacy, and, finally, the intricate relationship between the ethics of the professional civil service and absolute moral principles. Against this backdrop, the examination of Blücher’s role both within Finnish politics and the foreign policy of the Third Reich highlights the biographical dimension of the German-Finnish relationships, while fathoming the determinants of individual human agency in the process.

Bysanttilaisten ja Akhaian ruhtinaskunnan väliset sotatoimet vuosina 1259-83 : Tapaustutkimus myöhäis-bysanttilaisesta sodankäynnistä

In my master thesis I analyse Byzantine warfare in the late period of the empire. I use military operations between Byzantines and crusader Principality of Achaia (1259–83) as a case study. Byzantine strategy was based (in “oriental manner”) on using ambushes, diplomacy, surprise attacks, deception etc. Open field battles that were risky in comparison with their benefits were usually avoided, but the Byzantines were sometimes forced to seek open encounter because their limited ability to keep strong armies in field for long periods of time. Foreign mercenaries had important place in Byzantine armies and they could simply change sides if their paymasters ran out of resources. The use of mercenaries with short contracts made it possible that the composition of an army was flexible but on the other hand heterogeneous – in result Byzantine armies were sometimes ineffective and prone to confusion. In open field battles Byzantines used formation that was made out from several lines placed one after another. This formation was especially suitable for cavalry battles. Byzantines might have also used other kinds of formations. The Byzantines were not considered equal to Latins in close combat. West-Europeans saw mainly horse archers and Latin mercenaries on Byzantine service as threats to themselves in battle. The legitimacy of rulers surrounding the Aegean sea was weak and in many cases political intrigues and personal relationships can have resolved the battles. Especially in sieges the loyalty of population was decisive. In sieges the Byzantines used plenty of siege machines and archers. This made fast conquests possible, but it was expensive. The Byzantines protected their frontiers by building castles. Military operations against the Principality of Achaia were mostly small scale raids following an intensive beginning. Byzantine raids were mostly made by privateers and mountaineers. This does not fit to the traditional picture that warfare belonged to the imperial professional army. It’s unlikely that military operations in war against the Principality of Achaia caused great demographic or economic catastrophe and some regions in the warzone might even have flourished. On the other hand people started to concentrate into villages which (with growing risks for trade) probably caused disturbance in economic development and in result birth rates might have decreased. Both sides of war sought to exchange their prisoners of war. These were treated according to conventional manners that were accepted by both sides. It was possible to sell prisoners, especially women and children, to slavery, but the scale of this trade does not seem to be great in military operations treated in this theses.

Evaluating China’s aspirations for cultural soft power in a post-globalisation era

‘Soft power’ has been a concept that has generated great political and scholarly interest in China, as it raises the question of how to achieve cultural standing commensurate with the nation’s growing economic significance. But from the perspectives of communication and cultural studies, we can identify limits with both ‘soft power’ as a concept and how it understands culture and communication, and the assumptions made about the capacities of state cultural promotion through media to appeal to global audiences. Drawing upon case studies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, India, Japan and South Korea, this article identified challenges and opportunities for China in growing its international cultural soft power in a ‘post-globalisation’ era.

Disarming identities : Ethnic identities in conflict resolution: Hindrance or helpful resource?

This thesis proposes that national or ethnic identity is an important and overlooked resource in conflict resolution. Usually ethnic identity is seen both in international relations and in social psychology as something that fuels the conflict. Using grounded theory to analyze data from interactive problem-solving workshops between Palestinians and Israelis a theory about the role of national identity in turning conflict into protracted conflict is developed. Drawing upon research from, among others, social identity theory, just world theory and prejudice it is argued that national identity is a prime candidate to provide the justification of a conflict party’s goals and the dehumanization of the other necessary to make a conflict protracted. It is not the nature of national identity itself that lets it perform this role but rather the ability to mobilize a constituency for social action (see Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jörger, 2003). Reicher & Hopkins (1996) have demonstrated that national identity is constructed by political entrepreneurs to further their cause, even if this construction is not a conscious one. Data from interactive problem-solving workshops suggest that the possibility of conflict resolution is actually seen by participants as a direct threat of annihilation. Understanding the investment necessary to make conflict protracted this reaction seems plausible. The justification for ones actions provided by national identity makes the conflict an integral part of a conflict party’s identity. Conflict resolution, it is argued, is therefore a threat to the very core of the current national identity. This may explain why so many peace agreements have failed to provide the hoped for resolution of conflict. But if national identity is being used in a constructionist way to attain political goals, a political project of conflict resolution, if it is conscious of the constructionist process, needs to develop a national identity that is independent of conflict and therefore able to accommodate conflict resolution. From this understanding it becomes clear why national identity needs to change, i.e. be disarmed, if conflict resolution is to be successful. This process of disarmament is theorized to be similar to the process of creating and sustaining protracted conflict. What shape and function this change should have is explored from the understanding of the role of national identity in supporting conflict. Ideas how track-two diplomacy efforts, such as the interactive problem-solving workshop, could integrate a process by both conflict parties to disarm their respective identities are developed.

Da exclusão a participação internacional na área espacial: o programa de satélites sino-brasileiro como instrumento de poder e desenvolvimento (1999-2009)

A presente dissertação tem como objetivo analisar os ganhos geopolíticos do programa sino-brasileiro de satélites de recursos terrestres (CBERS). O codesenvolvimento pelo Brasil e pela China de uma série de satélites de sensoriamento remoto elevou a capacidade de ambos os países de ampliar os meios para zelar pela soberania sobre seus territórios nacionais. Esse programa de cooperação Sul-Sul também impactou positivamente no desenvolvimento desses países, à medida que possibilitou a execução de políticas públicas mais eficazes para áreas de difícil acesso como o deserto de Gobi na China e a floresta amazônica no Brasil. Além disso, o desenvolvimento e lançamento exitoso dos satélites da família CBERS também auferiu ganhos políticos no âmbito internacional. De fato, a aquisição dessa tecnologia permitiu ao Brasil e a China uma atuação mais proativa nos regimes internacionais relacionados ao espaço exterior, como COPUOS, CEOS e GEO/GEOSS. Ela também ensejou a realização de uma política de vanguarda de distribuição de imagens, baseada na premissa de que os dados geoespaciais são bens públicos globais. Esse entendimento levou, enfim, à realização de uma política de distribuição gratuita de imagens CBERS, primeiramente para os territórios nacionais do Brasil e da China e, posteriormente para países da América do Sul e para todo continente africano, culminando, em 2010, com sua globalização. Desse modo, o presente trabalho visa analisar se a aquisição da tecnologia de sensoriamento remoto via satélite efetivamente facultou ao Brasil e a China uma maior capacidade de influência no sistema internacional de poder e, igualmente, se há relação entre o programa CBERS e as políticas externas do Brasil e da China, principalmente no que tange à promoção da cooperação Sul-Sul na política externa solidária do governo Lula e ao conceito de mundo harmonioso da diplomacia chinesa.