How do global born companies ignite their internationalization and survive in international markets?

Over the last decades, the born global firms or the international new ventures (“INVs”) have assumed a growing role in international business, including in Portugal. The rise of this new type of multinational has challenged several theories concerning the development of multinational companies and the origin of companies’ competitive advantage. This qualitative, case-based research explores the most relevant traits shown by some Portuguese born-global firms. More concretely, the aim of this work is to compare some Portuguese international new ventures in order to understand the role of leadership, culture and strategy in their rapid internationalization and the source of their lasting competitive advantage. It was noticed that these firms’ lasting competitive advantage results from a singular combination of resources and dynamic capabilities that evolves over time. Moreover, it was found that these firms’ foreign subsidiaries and local networks may be essential to enhance the firms competitive advantage as it provides each firm a distinctive source of knowledge and capabilities. As a consequence, the effective assimilation of such resources and capabilities in these firms’ may become crucial for their lasting success. In addition, the leadership, strategy and culture in these firms seem to be quite aligned and form a quite virtuous cycle that contributed to the firms rapid internationalization and for the way the firms developed their own resources and dynamic capabilities and adapted to external environment.

Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods

We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. When preferences are strict, Gale's top trading cycle algorithm finds the unique core allocation. When preferences are not necessarily strict, we use an exogenous profile of tie-breakers to resolve any ties in individuals' preferences and apply Gale's top trading cycle algorithm for the resulting profile of strict preferences. We provide a foundation of these simple extensions of Gale's top trading cycle algorithm from strict preferences to weak preferences. We show that Gale's top trading cycle algorithm with fixed tie-breaking is characterized by individual rationality, strategy-proofness, weak efficiency, non-bossiness, and consistency. Our result supports the common practice in applications to break ties in weak preferences using some fixed exogenous criteria and then to use a 'good and simple' rule for the resulting strict preferences. This reinforces the market-based approach even in the presence of indifferences because always competitive allocations are chosen.

Exporting Culture: a Requirement for Competitive Internationalization*

his paper proposes a concept of “culture for internationalization” and “exporting culture” –a highly relevant concept for developing countries’ firms that are likely to follow a gradualinternationalization process– based on the strong relationship binding the concept proposed to strategy and systemic competitiveness. These three items are paramount to Understand the conditions underlying internationalizationas it is characterized by particular traits that make it a key alternative for a firm’s growth and successful perdurability based on competitiveness. “Culture for internationalization” and its variation, “exporting culture”, overflow the conceptsof organizational or corporate culture and involve some major interaction among the micro, meso and macro levels of a national economy in order to operationalize strategies thatpromote such culture and assure successful firm and economy internationalization. Discussion remains open as to the concept and its applicability with the hope that it contributesto the understanding and creation of appropriate conditions for firms to be able to access international markets with greater advantage and generate as much benefit as possible totheir nations, particularly in developing countries. 

Investment in transport capacity and regulation of regional monopolies in natural gas commodity markets

This paper develops a model of the regulator-regulated firm relationship in a regional natural gas commodity market which can be linked to a competitive market by a pipeline. We characterize normative policies under which the regulator, in addition to setting the level of the capacity of the pipeline, regulates the price of gas, under asymmetric information on the firm’s technology, and may (or may not) operate (two-way) transfers between consumers and the firm. We then focus on capacity and investigate how its level responds to the regulator’s taking account of the firm’s incentive compatibility constraints. The analysis yields some insights on the role that transport capacity investments may play as an instrument to improve the efficiency of geographically isolated markets.

The Farm-Retail Price Spread in an Imperfectly Competitive Food Industry

Gardner's popular model of perfect competition in the marketing sector is extended to a conjectural-variations oligopoly with endogenous entry. Revising Gardner's comparative statics on the "farm-retail price ratio," tests of hypotheses about food industry conduct are derived. Using data from a recent article by Wohlgenant, which employs Gardner's framework, tests are made of the validity of his maintained hypothesis-that the food industries are perfectly competitive. No evidence is found of departures from competition in the output markets of the food industries of eight commodity groups: (a) beef and veal, (b) pork, (c) poultry, (d) eggs, (e) dairy, (f) processed fruits and vegetables, (g) fresh fruit, and (h) fresh vegetables.

Non-existence of competitive equilibria with dynamically inconsistent preferences

This paper shows the robust non-existence of competitive equilibria even in a simple three period representative agent economy with dynamically inconsistent preferences. We distinguish between a sophisticated and naive representative agent. Even when underlying preferences are monotone and convex, at given prices, we show by example that the induced preference of the sophisticated representative agent over choices in first-period markets is both non-convex and satiated. Even allowing for negative prices, the market-clearing allocation is not contained in the convex hull of demand. Finally, with a naive representative agent, we show that perfect foresight is incompatible with market clearing and individual optimization at given prices.

The determinants of competitive success in the interwar British radio industry

This article discusses the sources of competitive advantage in the interwar British radio industry. Specifically, it examines why sections of the industry that reaped substantial monopoly rents from the downstream value chain failed to dominate the industry. During the 1920s Marconi (which controlled the fundamental UK patents) had a key cost advantage, as had other members of the ‘Big Six’ electrical engineering firms which formed the BBC and were granted preferential royalties. Meanwhile the valve manufacturers' cartel was also able to extract high rents from set manufacturers. The vertical integration literature suggests that input monopolists have incentives to control downstream production. Yet—in contrast to the gramophone industry, which became concentrated into two huge companies following market saturation in the 1930s—radio retained a much more competitive structure. The Big Six failed to capitalize fully on their initial cost advantages owing to logistical weaknesses in supplying markets subject to rapid technical and design obsolescence. Subsequently, during the 1930s, marketing innovations are shown to have played a key role in allowing several independents to establish successful brands. This gave them sufficient scale to provide strong bargaining positions with input suppliers, negating most of their initial cost disadvantage.

On the evolution of monopoly pricing in Internet-assisted search markets

This study examines the evolution of prices in markets with Internet price-comparison search engines. The empirical study analyzes laboratory data of prices available to informed consumers, for two industry sizes and two conditions on the sample (complete and incomplete). Distributions are typically bimodal. One of the two modes of distribution, corresponding to monopoly pricing, tends to attract such pricing strategies increasingly over time. The second one, corresponding to interior pricing, follows a decreasing trend. Monopoly pricing can serve as a means of insurance against more competitive (but riskier) behavior. In fact, experimental subjects who initially earn low profits due to interior pricing are more likely to switch to monopoly pricing than subjects who experience good returns from the start.

Equilibria in security markets with a continuum of agents

We prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium for exchange economies with a measure space of agents and for which the commodity space is ` p, 1 < p < +∞. A vector x = (xn) in ` p may be interpreted as a security which promises to deliver xn units of numeraire at state (or date) n. Under assumptions imposing uniform bounds on marginal rates of substitution, positive results on core-Walras equivalence were established in Rustichini–Yannelis [21] and Podczeck [20]. In this paper we prove that under similar assumptions on marginal rates of substitution, the set of competitive equilibria (and thus the core) is non-empty.

Competitive equilibrium hyperinflation under rational expectations

This paper shows that a competitive equilibrium model, where a representative agent maximizes welfare, expectations are rational and markets are in equilibrium can account for several hyperinflation stylized facts. The theory is built by combining two hypotheses, namely, a fiscal crisis that requires printing money to finance an increasing public deficit and a predicted change in an unsustainable fiscal regime.

Competitive equilibria in infinite-horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araújo, Páscoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) have shown that, without imposing either debt constraints or transversality conditions, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with default when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2008) subsequently show that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. They also claim that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is ensured. The objective of this paper is two fold. First, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2008), we show that moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme. Second, we provide an alternative condition on default penalties that is sufficient to rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium.

Advertising new product categories to new geographical markets

Em um ambiente global dinâmico e competitivo, muitas empresas notam que constante desenvolvimento e lançamento de novos produtos são atividades-chave para seu crescimento e sobrevivência. Hoje, um dos maiores desafios enfrentados por tais empresas envolve saber como agir em um mundo em que tanto o escopo como a estrutura do ambiente competitivo estão em constante mudança, e em que reestruturações e mudanças de portfólio são centrais para as companhias que visam capitalizar com o crescimento global. Tanto o rápido ritmo de inovação tecnológica quando a crescente afluência de economias emergentes apresentam riscos e oportunidades para as empresas, o que torna importante não apenas que estas estejam atentas ao lançamento de produtos de última geração para mercados desenvolvidos: faz-se também necessário que saibam como lançar produtos antigos para novos mercados. Usando o mercado brasileiro como um exemplo, esta dissertação procurou estudar como multinacionais têm utilizado anúncios publicitários no lançamento, para novos mercados, de categorias e subcategorias de produtos já vendidas em outros países. Após uma revisão da literatura disponível, do desenvolvimento de proposições, e da avaliação destas através de três estudos de caso, foi possível verificar a existência de alguma linearidade entre os casos e a literatura estudada, incluindo: uma busca pela legitimação da categoria que precede àquela pela da marca; o uso de “especialistas” para a legitimação da categoria; o uso de apelos baseados em argumentos; e a divulgação de mais de uma característica de produto por anúncio. No entanto, dadas algumas discrepâncias entre o que foi observado nos casos e aquilo descrito na literatura consultada, também foi possível verificar que a maneira como os anúncios são feitos em diferentes lugares depende igualmente do cenário competitivo enfrentado pela empresa, bem como de variantes econômicas e culturais específicas da localidade em questão.

Bertrand, Cournot and monopolistically competitive equilibria

Using an example, we study the analogs, for the differentiated product case, of the Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. These equilibria can be shown to exist and be uni que if we impose a sim pie and natural restriction on the elasticities of the demand functions for the differentiated products. Our characterizations of these equilibria make it possible to compare them and to determine how they are affected by the size of the market and the number of firms. We are also able to prove the existence of Cournot free-entry equilibria in which the number of firms is determined endogenously. In addition, we are able to prove that, in a large market, the Cournot free-entry equilibria approximate the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistically competitive equilibria. The free-entry equilibrium concept we study is an analog of the one studied by Novshek for the case of firms selling products that are perfect substitutes. Our results are extensions of Novshek's. While we were unable to establish a general existence result for Bertrand free-entry equilibria, we were able to prove that, when these equilibria exist, they are unique and that in large markets they also approximate the Dixit-Stiglitz equilibria.