Combinatorial peptide ligand libraries and plant proteomics: a winning strategy at a price

The mechanism of action and properties of a solid-phase ligand library made of hexapeptides (combinatorial peptide ligand libraries or CPLL, for capturing the "hidden proteome", i.e. the low- and very low-abundance proteins Constituting the vast majority of species in any proteome. as applied to plant tissues, are reviewed here. Plant tissues are notoriously recalcitrant to protein extraction and to proteome analysis, Firstly, rigid plant cell walls need to be mechanically disrupted to release the cell content and, in addition to their poor protein yield, plant tissues are rich in proteases and oxidative enzymes, contain phenolic Compounds, starches, oils, pigments and secondary metabolites that massively contaminate protein extracts. In addition, complex matrices of polysaccharides, including large amount of anionic pectins, are present. All these species compete with the binding of proteins to the CPLL beads, impeding proper capture and identification I detection of low-abundance species. When properly pre-treated, plant tissue extracts are amenable to capture by the CPLL beads revealing thus many new species among them low-abundance proteins. Examples are given on the treatment of leaf proteins, of corn seed extracts and of exudate proteins (latex from Hevea brasiliensis). In all cases, the detection of unique gene products via CPLL Capture is at least twice that of control, untreated sample. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

The role of undisclosed reserves in English open outcry auctions

This study considers the role that reserve prices may play in residential property auctions. In comparison to much of the previous empirical work, this study has access to undisclosed reserve prices from English auctions. Consistent with theoretical arguments in the auction literature, the results obtained illustrate that whilst higher reserve prices increase the revenue obtained for the seller, they also reduce the probability of sale. The findings also highlight the importance of auction participation, with the number of individual bidders and the number of bids significant in most specifications.

Symmorphosis through dietary regulation: a combinatorial role for proteolysis, autophagy and protein synthesis in normalising muscle metabolism and function of hypertrophic mice after acute starvation

Animals are imbued with adaptive mechanisms spanning from the tissue/organ to the cellular scale which insure that processes of homeostasis are preserved in the landscape of size change. However we and others have postulated that the degree of adaptation is limited and that once outside the normal levels of size fluctuations, cells and tissues function in an aberant manner. In this study we examine the function of muscle in the myostatin null mouse which is an excellent model for hypertrophy beyond levels of normal growth and consequeces of acute starvation to restore mass. We show that muscle growth is sustained through protein synthesis driven by Serum/Glucocorticoid Kinase 1 (SGK1) rather than Akt1. Furthermore our metabonomic profiling of hypertrophic muscle shows that carbon from nutrient sources is being channelled for the production of biomass rather than ATP production. However the muscle displays elevated levels of autophagy and decreased levels of muscle tension. We demonstrate the myostatin null muscle is acutely sensitive to changes in diet and activates both the proteolytic and autophagy programmes and shutting down protein synthesis more extensively than is the case for wild-types. Poignantly we show that acute starvation which is detrimental to wild-type animals is beneficial in terms of metabolism and muscle function in the myostatin null mice by normalising tension production.

The role of undisclosed reserves in English open outcry auctions

This study considers the role that reserve prices may play in residential property auctions. In comparison to much of the previous empirical work, this study has access to undisclosed reserve prices from English auctions. Consistent with theoretical arguments in the auction literature, the results obtained illustrate that whilst higher reserve prices increase the revenue obtained for the seller, they also reduce the probability of sale. The findings also highlight the importance of auction participation, with the number of individual bidders and the number of bids significant in most specifications.

Modeling bidding competitiveness and position performance in multi-attribute construction auctions

Currently, multi-attribute auctions are becoming widespread awarding mechanisms for contracts in construction, and in these auctions, criteria other than price are taken into account for ranking bidder proposals. Therefore, being the lowest-price bidder is no longer a guarantee of being awarded, thus increasing the importance of measuring any bidder’s performance when not only the first position (lowest price) matters. Modeling position performance allows a tender manager to calculate the probability curves related to the more likely positions to be occupied by any bidder who enters a competitive auction irrespective of the actual number of future participating bidders. This paper details a practical methodology based on simple statistical calculations for modeling the performance of a single bidder or a group of bidders, constituting a useful resource for analyzing one’s own success while benchmarking potential bidding competitors.

Quick abnormal-bid-detection method for construction contract auctions

Noncompetitive bids have recently become a major concern in both public and private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German Tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data, and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This paper contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices.

Analysis of the distribution of the number of bidders in construction contract auctions

The number of bidders, N, involved in a construction procurement auction is known to have an important effect on the value of the lowest bid and the mark-up applied by bidders. In practice, for example, it is important for a bidder to have a good estimate of N when bidding for a current contract. One approach, instigated by Friedman in 1956, is to make such an estimate by statistical analysis and modelling. Since then, however, finding a suitable model for N has been an enduring problem for researchers and, despite intensive research activity in the subsequent 30 years, little progress has been made, due principally to the absence of new ideas and perspectives. The debate is resumed by checking old assumptions, providing new evidence relating to concomitant variables and proposing a new model. In doing this and in order to ensure universality, a novel approach is developed and tested by using a unique set of 12 construction tender databases from four continents. This shows the new model provides a significant advancement on previous versions. Several new research questions are also posed and other approaches identified for future study.

Improving the estimation of probability of bidder participation in procurement auctions

Anticipating the number and identity of bidders has significant influence in many theoretical results of the auction itself and bidders' bidding behaviour. This is because when a bidder knows in advance which specific bidders are likely competitors, this knowledge gives a company a head start when setting the bid price. However, despite these competitive implications, most previous studies have focused almost entirely on forecasting the number of bidders and only a few authors have dealt with the identity dimension qualitatively. Using a case study with immediate real-life applications, this paper develops a method for estimating every potential bidder's probability of participating in a future auction as a function of the tender economic size removing the bias caused by the contract size opportunities distribution. This way, a bidder or auctioner will be able to estimate the likelihood of a specific group of key, previously identified bidders in a future tender.

Scoring rules and competitive behavior in best value construction auctions

This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of bidders in Best Value or multi-attribute construction auctions, where both the (dollar) bid and technical non-price criteria are scored according to a scoring rule. From a sample of Spanish construction auctions with a variety of bid scoring rules, it is found that bidders are influenced by the auction rules in significant and predictable ways. The bid score weighting, bid scoring formula and abnormally low bid criterion are variables likely to influence the competitiveness of bidders in terms of both their aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/dispersion of bids. Revealing the influence of the bid scoring rules and their magnitude on bidders’ competitive behavior opens the door for the engineer to condition bidder competitive behavior in such a way as to provide the balance needed to achieve the owner’s desired strategic outcomes.

Approximating a class of combinatorial problems with rational objective function

In the late seventies, Megiddo proposed a way to use an algorithm for the problem of minimizing a linear function a(0) + a(1)x(1) + ... + a(n)x(n) subject to certain constraints to solve the problem of minimizing a rational function of the form (a(0) + a(1)x(1) + ... + a(n)x(n))/(b(0) + b(1)x(1) + ... + b(n)x(n)) subject to the same set of constraints, assuming that the denominator is always positive. Using a rather strong assumption, Hashizume et al. extended Megiddo`s result to include approximation algorithms. Their assumption essentially asks for the existence of good approximation algorithms for optimization problems with possibly negative coefficients in the (linear) objective function, which is rather unusual for most combinatorial problems. In this paper, we present an alternative extension of Megiddo`s result for approximations that avoids this issue and applies to a large class of optimization problems. Specifically, we show that, if there is an alpha-approximation for the problem of minimizing a nonnegative linear function subject to constraints satisfying a certain increasing property then there is an alpha-approximation (1 1/alpha-approximation) for the problem of minimizing (maximizing) a nonnegative rational function subject to the same constraints. Our framework applies to covering problems and network design problems, among others.

Combinatorial aspects of jump codes

We develop an approach to jump codes concentrating on their combinatorial and symmetry properties. The main result is a generalization of a theorem previously proved in the context of isodual codes. We show that several previously constructed jump codes are instances of this theorem.