Three essays on bankruptcy risk

Abstract Market prices of corporate bond spreads and of credit default swap (CDS) rates do not match each other. In this paper, we argue that the liquidity premium, the cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) option and actual market segmentation explain the pricing differences. Using the European transaction data from Reuters and Bloomberg, we estimate the liquidity premium that is time- varying and firm-specific. We show that when time-dependent liquidity premiums are considered, corporate bond spreads and CDS rates behave in a much closer way than previous studies have shown. We find that high equity volatility drives pricing differences that can be explained by the CTD option.

An axiomatic justification of mediation in bankruptcy problems.

This paper provides a natural way of reaching an agreement between two prominent proposals in a bankruptcy problem. Particularly, using the fact that such problems can be faced from two different points of views, awards and losses, we justify the average of any pair of dual bankruptcy rules through the definition a double recursive process. Finally, by considering three posible sets of equity principles that a particular society may agree on, we retrieve the average of old and well known bankruptcy rules, the Constrained Equal Awards and the Constrained Equal Losses rules, Piniles’ rule and its dual rule, and the Constrained Egalitarian rule and its dual rule. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Midpoint, Bounds, Duality, Recursivity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

A way to play bankruptcy problems.

The commitment among agents has always been a difficult task, especially when they have to decide how to distribute the available amount of a scarce resource among all. On the one hand, there are a multiplicity of possible ways for assigning the available amount; and, on the other hand, each agent is going to propose that distribution which provides her the highest possible award. In this paper, with the purpose of making this agreement easier, firstly we use two different sets of basic properties, called Commonly Accepted Equity Principles, to delimit what agents can propose as reasonable allocations. Secondly, we extend the results obtained by Chun (1989) and Herrero (2003), obtaining new characterizations of old and well known bankruptcy rules. Finally, using the fact that bankruptcy problems can be analyzed from awards and losses, we define a mechanism which provides a new justification of the convex combinations of bankruptcy rules. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Unanimous Concessions procedure, Diminishing Claims mechanism, Piniles’ rule, Constrained Egalitarian rule. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

A Proportional Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with a guaranteed minimum

In a distribution problem, and specfii cally in bankruptcy issues, the Proportional (P) and the Egalitarian (EA) divisions are two of the most popular ways to resolve the conflict. The Constrained Equal Awards rule (CEA) is introduced in bankruptcy literature to ensure that no agent receives more than her claim, a problem that can arise when using the egalitarian division. We propose an alternative modi cation, by using a convex combination of P and EA. The recursive application of this new rule finishes at the CEA rule. Our solution concept ensures a minimum amount to each agent, and distributes the remaining estate in a proportional way. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Proportional rule, Equal Awards, Convex combination of rules, Lorenz dominance. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

A New Approach for Bounding Awards in Bankruptcy Problems

The solution for the ‘Contested Garment Problem’, proposed in the Babylonic Talmud, suggests that each agent should receive at least some part of the resources whenever the demand overcomes the available amount. In this context, we propose a new method to define lower bounds on awards, an idea that has underlied the theoretical analysis of bankruptcy problems from its beginning (O’Neill, 1982) to present day (Dominguez and Thomson, 2006). Specifically, starting from the fact that a society establishes its own set of ‘Commonly Accepted Equity Principles’, our proposal ensures to each agent the smallest amount she gets according to all the admissible rules. As in general this new bound will not exhaust the estate, we analyze its recursive application for different sets of equity principles. Keywords: Bankruptcy problems, Bankruptcy rules, Lower bounds, Recursive process

Discrimination in Bankruptcy Situations

In a bankruptcy situation, not all claimants are affected in the same way. In particular, some depositors may enter into a situation of personal bankruptcy if they lose part of their investments. Events of this kind may lead to a social catastrophe. We propose discrimination among the claimants as a possible solution. A fact considered in the American bankruptcy law (among others) that establishes some discrimination on the claimants, or the Santander Bank that in the Madoff’s case reimbursed only the deposits to its particular customers. Moreover, the necessity of discriminating has already been mentioned in different contexts by Young (1988), Bossert (1995), Thomson (2003) and Pulido et al. (2002, 2007), for instance. In this paper, we take a bankruptcy solution as the reference point. Given this initial allocation, we make transfers from richer to poorer with the purpose of distributing not only the personal incurred losses as evenly as possible but also the transfers in a progressive way. The agents are divided into two groups depending on their personal monetary value (wealth, net-income, GDP or any other characteristic). Then, we impose a set of Axioms that bound the maximal transfer that each net-contributor can make and each net-receiver can obtain. Finally, we define a value discriminant solution, and we characterize it by means of the Lorenz criterion. Endogenous convex combinations between solutions are also considered. Keywords: Bankruptcy, Discrimination, Compensation, Rules JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

Financial Markets and Real Ecinomy: Four Essays in International Trade

Financial markets play an important role in an economy performing various functions like mobilizing and pooling savings, producing information about investment opportunities, screening and monitoring investments, implementation of corporate governance, diversification and management of risk. These functions influence saving rates, investment decisions, technological innovation and, therefore, have important implications for welfare. In my PhD dissertation I examine the interplay of financial and product markets by looking at different channels through which financial markets may influence an economy.My dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter is a co-authored work with Martin Strieborny, a PhD student from the University of Lausanne. The second chapter is a co-authored work with Melise Jaud, a PhD student from the Paris School of Economics. The third chapter is co-authored with both Melise Jaud and Martin Strieborny. The last chapter of my PhD dissertation is a single author paper.Chapter 1 of my PhD thesis analyzes the effect of financial development on growth of contract intensive industries. These industries intensively use intermediate inputs that neither can be sold on organized exchange, nor are reference-priced (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). A typical example of a contract intensive industry would be an industry where an upstream supplier has to make investments in order to customize a product for needs of a downstream buyer. After the investment is made and the product is adjusted, the buyer may refuse to meet a commitment and trigger ex post renegotiation. Since the product is customized to the buyer's needs, the supplier cannot sell the product to a different buyer at the original price. This is referred in the literature as the holdup problem. As a consequence, the individually rational suppliers will underinvest into relationship-specific assets, hurting the downstream firms with negative consequences for aggregate growth. The standard way to mitigate the hold up problem is to write a binding contract and to rely on the legal enforcement by the state. However, even the most effective contract enforcement might fail to protect the supplier in tough times when the buyer lacks a reliable source of external financing. This suggests the potential role of financial intermediaries, banks in particular, in mitigating the incomplete contract problem. First, financial products like letters of credit and letters of guarantee can substantially decrease a risk and transaction costs of parties. Second, a bank loan can serve as a signal about a buyer's true financial situation, an upstream firm will be more willing undertake relationship-specific investment knowing that the business partner is creditworthy and will abstain from myopic behavior (Fama, 1985; von Thadden, 1995). Therefore, a well-developed financial (especially banking) system should disproportionately benefit contract intensive industries.The empirical test confirms this hypothesis. Indeed, contract intensive industries seem to grow faster in countries with a well developed financial system. Furthermore, this effect comes from a more developed banking sector rather than from a deeper stock market. These results are reaffirmed examining the effect of US bank deregulation on the growth of contract intensive industries in different states. Beyond an overall pro-growth effect, the bank deregulation seems to disproportionately benefit the industries requiring relationship-specific investments from their suppliers.Chapter 2 of my PhD focuses on the role of the financial sector in promoting exports of developing countries. In particular, it investigates how credit constraints affect the ability of firms operating in agri-food sectors of developing countries to keep exporting to foreign markets.Trade in high-value agri-food products from developing countries has expanded enormously over the last two decades offering opportunities for development. However, trade in agri-food is governed by a growing array of standards. Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards (SPS) and technical regulations impose additional sunk, fixed and operating costs along the firms' export life. Such costs may be detrimental to firms' survival, "pricing out" producers that cannot comply. The existence of these costs suggests a potential role of credit constraints in shaping the duration of trade relationships on foreign markets. A well-developed financial system provides the funds to exporters necessary to adjust production processes in order to meet quality and quantity requirements in foreign markets and to maintain long-standing trade relationships. The products with higher needs for financing should benefit the most from a well functioning financial system. This differential effect calls for a difference-in-difference approach initially proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). As a proxy for demand for financing of agri-food products, the sanitary risk index developed by Jaud et al. (2009) is used. The empirical literature on standards and norms show high costs of compliance, both variable and fixed, for high-value food products (Garcia-Martinez and Poole, 2004; Maskus et al., 2005). The sanitary risk index reflects the propensity of products to fail health and safety controls on the European Union (EU) market. Given the high costs of compliance, the sanitary risk index captures the demand for external financing to comply with such regulations.The prediction is empirically tested examining the export survival of different agri-food products from firms operating in Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Senegal and Tanzania. The results suggest that agri-food products that require more financing to keep up with food safety regulation of the destination market, indeed sustain longer in foreign market, when they are exported from countries with better developed financial markets.Chapter 3 analyzes the link between financial markets and efficiency of resource allocation in an economy. Producing and exporting products inconsistent with a country's factor endowments constitutes a serious misallocation of funds, which undermines competitiveness of the economy and inhibits its long term growth. In this chapter, inefficient exporting patterns are analyzed through the lens of the agency theories from the corporate finance literature. Managers may pursue projects with negative net present values because their perquisites or even their job might depend on them. Exporting activities are particularly prone to this problem. Business related to foreign markets involves both high levels of additional spending and strong incentives for managers to overinvest. Rational managers might have incentives to push for exports that use country's scarce factors which is suboptimal from a social point of view. Export subsidies might further skew the incentives towards inefficient exporting. Management can divert the export subsidies into investments promoting inefficient exporting.Corporate finance literature stresses the disciplining role of outside debt in counteracting the internal pressures to divert such "free cash flow" into unprofitable investments. Managers can lose both their reputation and the control of "their" firm if the unpaid external debt triggers a bankruptcy procedure. The threat of possible failure to satisfy debt service payments pushes the managers toward an efficient use of available resources (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995). The main sources of debt financing in the most countries are banks. The disciplining role of banks might be especially important in the countries suffering from insufficient judicial quality. Banks, in pursuing their rights, rely on comparatively simple legal interventions that can be implemented even by mediocre courts. In addition to their disciplining role, banks can promote efficient exporting patterns in a more direct way by relaxing credit constraints of producers, through screening, identifying and investing in the most profitable investment projects. Therefore, a well-developed domestic financial system, and particular banking system, would help to push a country's exports towards products congruent with its comparative advantage.This prediction is tested looking at the survival of different product categories exported to US market. Products are identified according to the Euclidian distance between their revealed factor intensity and the country's factor endowments. The results suggest that products suffering from a comparative disadvantage (labour-intensive products from capital-abundant countries) survive less on the competitive US market. This pattern is stronger if the exporting country has a well-developed banking system. Thus, a strong banking sector promotes exports consistent with a country comparative advantage.Chapter 4 of my PhD thesis further examines the role of financial markets in fostering efficient resource allocation in an economy. In particular, the allocative efficiency hypothesis is investigated in the context of equity market liberalization.Many empirical studies document a positive and significant effect of financial liberalization on growth (Levchenko et al. 2009; Quinn and Toyoda 2009; Bekaert et al., 2005). However, the decrease in the cost of capital and the associated growth in investment appears rather modest in comparison to the large GDP growth effect (Bekaert and Harvey, 2005; Henry, 2000, 2003). Therefore, financial liberalization may have a positive impact on growth through its effect on the allocation of funds across firms and sectors.Free access to international capital markets allows the largest and most profitable domestic firms to borrow funds in foreign markets (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). As domestic banks loose some of their best clients, they reoptimize their lending practices seeking new clients among small and younger industrial firms. These firms are likely to be more risky than large and established companies. Screening of customers becomes prevalent as the return to screening rises. Banks, ceteris paribus, tend to focus on firms operating in comparative-advantage sectors because they are better risks. Firms in comparative-disadvantage sectors finding it harder to finance their entry into or survival in export markets either exit or refrain from entering export markets. On aggregate, one should therefore expect to see less entry, more exit, and shorter survival on export markets in those sectors after financial liberalization.The paper investigates the effect of financial liberalization on a country's export pattern by comparing the dynamics of entry and exit of different products in a country export portfolio before and after financial liberalization.The results suggest that products that lie far from the country's comparative advantage set tend to disappear relatively faster from the country's export portfolio following the liberalization of financial markets. In other words, financial liberalization tends to rebalance the composition of a country's export portfolio towards the products that intensively use the economy's abundant factors.

The Simple Economics of Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs: Separate or Joint Financing?

Which projects should be financed through separate non-recourse loans (or limited- liability companies) and which should be bundled into a single loan? In the pres- ence of bankruptcy costs, this conglomeration decision trades off the benefit of co- insurance with the cost of risk contamination. This paper characterize this tradeoff for projects with binary returns, depending on the mean, variability, and skewness of returns, the bankruptcy recovery rate, the correlation across projects, the number of projects, and their heterogeneous characteristics. In some cases, separate financing dominates joint financing, even though it increases the interest rate or the probability of bankruptcy.

A dilution cost approach to financial intermediation and securities markets

This paper proposes a model of financial markets and corporate finance,with asymmetric information and no taxes, where equity issues, Bankdebt and Bond financing may all co-exist in equilibrium. The paperemphasizes the relationship Banking aspect of financial intermediation:firms turn to banks as a source of investment mainly because banks aregood at helping them through times of financial distress. The debtrestructuring service that banks may offer, however, is costly. Therefore,the firms which do not expect to be financially distressed prefer toobtain a cheaper market source of funding through bond or equity issues.This explains why bank lending and bond financing may co-exist inequilibrium. The reason why firms or banks also issue equity in our modelis simply to avoid bankruptcy. Banks have the additional motive that theyneed to satisfy minimum capital adequacy requeriments. Several types ofequilibria are possible, one of which has all the main characteristics ofa "credit crunch". This multiplicity implies that the channels of monetarypolicy may depend on the type of equilibrium that prevails, leadingsometimes to support a "credit view" and other times the classical "moneyview".

Optimal bail out policy, conditionality and constructive ambiguity

This paper addresses the issue of the optimal behaviour of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) in its microeconomic role regarding individual financial institutions in distress. It has been argued that the LOLR should not intervene at the microeconomic level and let any defaulting institution face the market discipline, as it will be confronted with the consequences of the risks it has taken. By considering a simple costbenefit analysis we show that this position may lack a sufficient foundation. We establish that, instead, uder reasonable assumptions, the optimal policy has to be conditional on the amount of uninsured debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the LOLR will not rescue all the banks that fulfill the uninsured debt requirement condition, but will follow a mixed strategy. This we interpret as the confirmation of the "creative ambiguity" principle, perfectly in line with the central bankers claim that it is efficient for them to have discretion in lending to individual institutions. Alternatively, in other cases, when the social cost of a bank's bankruptcy is too high, it is optimal for the LOLR to bail out the insititution, and this gives support to the "too big to fail" policy.

Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank

We model systemic risk in an interbank market. Banks face liquidityneeds as consumers are uncertain about where they need to consume. Interbank credit lines allow to cope with these liquidity shocks while reducing the cost of maintaining reserves. However, the interbank market exposes the system to a coordination failure(gridlock equilibrium) even if all banks are solvent. When one bankis insolvent, the stability of the banking system is affected in various ways depending on the patterns of payments across locations. We investigate the ability of the banking industry to withstand the insolvency of one bank and whether the closure ofone bank generates a chain reaction on the rest of the system. Weanalyze the coordinating role of the Central Bank in preventing payments systemic repercussions and we examine the justification ofthe Too-big-to-fail-policy.

Conglomeration with bankruptcy costs: Separate or joint financing?

The paper analyzes the determinants of the optimal scope of incorporation in the presenceof bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy costs alone generate a non-trivial tradeoff between thebenefit of coinsurance and the cost of risk contamination associated to joint financing corporate projects through debt. This tradeoff is characterized for projects with binary returns,depending on the distributional characteristics of returns (mean, variability, skewness, heterogeneity, correlation, and number of projects), the bankruptcy recovery rate, and the taxrate advantage of debt relative to equity. Our testable predictions are broadly consistentwith existing empirical evidence on conglomerate mergers, spin-offs, project finance, andsecuritization.

Una comparación de la selección de los ratios contables en los modelos contable-financieros de predicción de la insolvencia empresarial : la literatura previa frente al analisis factorial

En los últimos 30 años la proliferación de modelos cuantitativos de predicción de la insolvencia empresarial en la literatura contable y financiera ha despertado un gran interés entre los especialistas e investigadores de lamateria. Lo que en un principio fueron unos modelos elaborados con un único objetivo, han derivado en una fuente de investigación constante.En este documento se formula un modelo de predicción de la insolvencia a través de la combinación de diferentes variables cuantitativas extraídas de los estados contables de una muestra de empresas para los años 1994-1997. A través de un procedimiento por etapas se selecciona e interpreta cuáles son las más relevantes en cuanto a aportación de información.Una vez formulado este primer tipo de modelos se busca una alternativa a las variables anteriores a través de la técnica factorial del análisis de componentes principales. Con ella se hace una selección de variables y se aplica, junto conlos ratios anteriores, el análisis univariante. Por último, se comparan los modelos obtenidos y se concluye que aunque la literatura previa ofrece mejores porcentajes de clasificación, los modelos obtenidos a través del análisis decomponentes principales no deben ser rechazados por la claridad en la explicación de las causas que conducen a una empresa a la insolvencia.

Una comparación de la selección de los ratios contables en los modelos contable-financieros de predicción de la insolvencia empresarial : la literatura previa frente al analisis factorial

En los últimos 30 años la proliferación de modelos cuantitativos de predicción de la insolvencia empresarial en la literatura contable y financiera ha despertado un gran interés entre los especialistas e investigadores de lamateria. Lo que en un principio fueron unos modelos elaborados con un único objetivo, han derivado en una fuente de investigación constante.En este documento se formula un modelo de predicción de la insolvencia a través de la combinación de diferentes variables cuantitativas extraídas de los estados contables de una muestra de empresas para los años 1994-1997. A través de un procedimiento por etapas se selecciona e interpreta cuáles son las más relevantes en cuanto a aportación de información.Una vez formulado este primer tipo de modelos se busca una alternativa a las variables anteriores a través de la técnica factorial del análisis de componentes principales. Con ella se hace una selección de variables y se aplica, junto conlos ratios anteriores, el análisis univariante. Por último, se comparan los modelos obtenidos y se concluye que aunque la literatura previa ofrece mejores porcentajes de clasificación, los modelos obtenidos a través del análisis decomponentes principales no deben ser rechazados por la claridad en la explicación de las causas que conducen a una empresa a la insolvencia.

Five essays on bankruptcy

Chapter 2 Bankruptcy Initiation In The New Era of Chapter 11 2.1 Abstract The bankruptcy act of 1978 placed corporate managers (as debtor in possession) in control of the bankruptcy process. Between 2000 and 2001 managers apparently lost this control to secured creditors. This study examines financial ratios of firms filing for bankruptcy between 1993 and 2004 and tests the hypothesis that the change from manager to creditor control created or exacerbated the managerial (and dominant creditor) incentive to delay bankruptcy filing. We find a clear deterioration in the financial conditions of firms filing after 2001. This is consistent with managers (or creditors who control them) delaying filing for bankruptcy. We also observe patterns of operating losses and liquidations that suggest adverse economic consequences from such delay. Chapter 3 Bankruptcy Resolution: Priority of Claims with the Secured Creditor in Control 3.1 Abstract We present new evidence on the violation of priority of claims in bankruptcy using a sample of 222 firms that tiled for Chapter 11 bankruptcy over the 1993-2004 period. Our study reveals a dramatic reduction in the violations of priority of claims compared to research on prior periods. These results are consistent with changes in both court practices and laws transferring power to the secured creditors over our sample period. We also find an increase in the time from the date of a bankruptcy filing to reaching plan confirmation where priority is not violated. Chapter 4 Bankruptcy Resolution: Speed, APR Violations and Delaware 4.1 Abstract We analyze speed of bankruptcy resolution on a sample of 294 US firms filing for bankruptcy in the 1993-2004 period. We find strong association between type of Chapter II filing and speed of bankruptcy resolution. We also find that violations to the absolute priority rule reduce the time from bankruptcy filing to plan confirmation. This is consistent with the hypothesis that creditors are willing to grant concessions in exchange for faster bankruptcy resolution. Furthermore, after controlling for the type of filing and violations to the absolute priority rule, we do not find any difference in the duration of the bankruptcy process for firms filing in Delaware, New York, or other bankruptcy districts. Chapter 5 Financial Distress and Corporate Control 5.1 Abstract We examine the replacement rates of directors and executives in 63 firms filing for bank ruptcy during the 1995-2002 period. We find that over 76% of directors and executives are replaced in the four year period from the year prior to the bankruptcy filing through three years after. These rates are higher than those found in prior research and is consistent with changes in bankruptcy procedures and practice (i.e. the increased secured creditors control over the process due to both DIP financing and changes in the Uniform Commercial Code) having a significant impact on the corporate governance of firms in financial distress. Chapter 6 Financial Statement Restatements: Decision to File for Bankruptcy 6.1 Abstract On a sample of 201 firms that restated their financial statements we analyze the process of regaining investor trust in a two year period after the restatement. We find that 20% of firms that restate their financial statements tile for bankruptcy or restructure out of court. Our results also indicate that the decisions to change auditor or management is correlated with a higher probability of failure. Increased media attention appears to partly explain the decision of firms to restructure their debt or tile for bankruptcy.