Designing a successful adaptive agent for TAC Ad auction

This paper describes the design and evaluation of Aston-TAC, the runner-up in the Ad Auction Game of 2009 International Trading Agent Competition. In particular, we focus on how Aston-TAC generates adaptive bid prices according to the Market-based Value Per Click and how it selects a set of keyword queries to bid on to maximise the expected profit under limited conversion capacity. Through evaluation experiments, we show that AstonTAC performs well and stably not only in the competition but also across a broad range of environments. © 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

Spectrum redistribution for cognitive radios using discriminatory spectrum double auction

With the reformation of spectrum policy and the development of cognitive radio, secondary users will be allowed to access spectrums licensed to primary users. Spectrum auctions can facilitate this secondary spectrum access in a market-driven way. To design an efficient auction framework, we first study the supply and demand pressures and the competitive equilibrium of the secondary spectrum market, considering the spectrum reusability. In well-designed auctions, competition among participants should lead to the competitive equilibrium according to the traditional economic point of view. Then, a discriminatory price spectrum double auction framework is proposed for this market. In this framework, rational participants compete with each other by using bidding prices, and their profits are guaranteed to be non-negative. A near-optimal heuristic algorithm is also proposed to solve the auction clearing problem of the proposed framework efficiently. Experimental results verify the efficiency of the proposed auction clearing algorithm and demonstrate that competition among secondary users and primary users can lead to the competitive equilibrium during auction iterations using the proposed auction framework. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Congestion pricing by priority auction

This paper analyzes a communication network facing users with a continuous distribution of delay cost per unit time. Priority queueing is often used as a way to provide differential services for users with different delay sensitivities. Delay is a key dimension of network service quality, so priority is a valuable resource which is limited and should to be optimally allocated. We investigate the allocation of priority in queues via a simple bidding mechanism. In our mechanism, arriving users can decide not to enter the network at all or submit an announced delay sensitive value. User entering the network obtains priority over all users who make lower bids, and is charged by a payment function which is designed following an exclusion compensation principle. The payment function is proved to be incentive compatible, so the equilibrium bidding behavior leads to the implementation of "cµ-rule". Social warfare or revenue maximizing by appropriately setting the reserve payment is also analyzed.

Price synchronicity:the closing call auction and the London Stock Market

In this paper, we consider the impact of the introduction of a closing call auction on market quality of the London Stock Exchange. We employ the market model, RDD and MEC metrics of market quality. These signify substantial improvements to market quality at both the close and open for migrating stocks.We note that these improvements are larger at the open than the close. An important contribution of our paper is that we show that changes to market quality are stronger in those securities that have the lowest liquidity in the pre-call period. In contrast, market quality changes following the introduction of a closing call auction are approximately neutral for high-liquidity securities. We conclude that the implementation of a closing call auction, for high-liquidity securities may not enhance market quality.

The impact of the closing call auction:an examination of effects in London

This article examines the impact on market quality that the introduction of a closing call auction had at the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Using the market model approach of Cohen et al. (1983a, b) OpenURL Aston University, b) we show that opening and closing market quality improved for those Financial Times and Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE 100) securities participating in the closing call. A control sample of stocks is not characterized by discernable changes to market quality.

How many contracts in an auction sale

Making sense of auction sales, in terms of English contract law, is no easy task. Despite the common perception of hammers hitting blocks, signifying the creation of the basic sale contract,1 a typical auction sale necessarily involves the making of several forms of contract other than the obvious primary sale agreement. The purpose of this article, therefore, is threefold, namely, to (1) examine these various forms of contractual relationship2 which may come into existence as a result of a traditional (face to face) auction sale; (2) consider specifically the selling of land at public auction with a view to advocating a change in the law requiring the formality of writing for sales contracts of land for both private and public auctions, and (3) compare briefly the contractual elements of an online ascending model of auction sale typified by the eBay phenomenon.

Optimal Choice of a Firm in Conducting Auction

Силвия К. Баева, Цветана Хр. Недева - Важен аспект в системата на Министерството на регионалното развитие и благоустройство е работата по Оперативна програма “Регионално развитие” с приоритетна ос “Устойчиво и интегрирано градско развитие” по операция “Подобряване на физическата среда и превенция на риска”. По тази програма са включени 86 общини. Финансовият ресурс на тази операция е на стойност 238 589 939 евро, от които 202 801 448 евро са европейско финансиране [1]. Всяка от тези 86 общини трябва да реши задачата за възлагане на обществена поръчка на определена фирма по тази операция. Всъщност, тази задача е задача за провеждане на общински търг за избор на фирма-изпълнител. Оптималният избор на фирма-изпълнител е много важен. Задачата за провеждане на търг ще формулираме като задача на многокритериалното вземане на решения, като чрез подходящо изграждане на критерии и методи може да се трансформира до задача на еднокритериалната оптимизация.

Bi-directional double auction for financial market simulation

Typical Double Auction (DA) models assume that trading agents are one-way traders. With this limitation, they cannot directly reflect the fact individual traders in financial markets (the most popular application of double auction) choose their trading directions dynamically. To address this issue, we introduce the Bi-directional Double Auction (BDA) market which is populated by two-way traders. Based on experiments under both static and dynamic settings, we find that the allocative efficiency of a static continuous BDA market comes from rational selection of trading directions and is negatively related to the intelligence of trading strategies. Moreover, we introduce Kernel trading strategy designed based on probability density estimation for general DA market. Our experiments show it outperforms some intelligent DA market trading strategies. Copyright © 2013, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.

An incentivized auction based group-selling approach for demand response management in V2G systems

Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) system with efficient Demand Response Management (DRM) is critical to solve the problem of supplying electricity by utilizing surplus electricity available at EVs. An incentivilized DRM approach is studied to reduce the system cost and maintain the system stability. EVs are motivated with dynamic pricing determined by the group-selling based auction. In the proposed approach, a number of aggregators sit on the first level auction responsible to communicate with a group of EVs. EVs as bidders consider Quality of Energy (QoE) requirements and report interests and decisions on the bidding process coordinated by the associated aggregator. Auction winners are determined based on the bidding prices and the amount of electricity sold by the EV bidders. We investigate the impact of the proposed mechanism on the system performance with maximum feedback power constraints of aggregators. The designed mechanism is proven to have essential economic properties. Simulation results indicate the proposed mechanism can reduce the system cost and offer EVs significant incentives to participate in the V2G DRM operation.

Agency services for the management of distributed energy networks using parallel auction markets

[ES]En las próximas décadas, el sistema de generación, transmisión y distribución de energía eléctrica afrontará los retos más importantes de su historia. La escasez de los recursos energéticos tradicionales, los efectos de los gases invernadero y el aumento imparable ,de la demanda llaman a transitar hacia un nuevo tipo de infraestructura capaz de explotar el potencial que ofrecen las nuevas fuentes de energía renovable, y de conceder autonomía y capacidad de decisión a los usuarios. Este nuevo modelo de red eléctrica es conocido como Smart Grid, y es habitualmente propuesto como una red distribuida, reactiva e inteligente.

Uncertainty and Speculators in an Auction for Emissions Permits

Auctions have become popular as means of allocating emissions permits in the emissions trading schemes developed around the world. Mostly, only a subset of the regulated polluters participate in these auctions along with speculators, creating a market with relatively few participants and, thus, incentive for strategic bidding. I characterize the bidding behavior of the polluters and the speculators, examining the effect of the latter on the profits of the former and on the auction outcome. It turns out that in addition to bidding for compliance, polluters also bid for speculation in the aftermarket. While the presence of the speculators forces the polluters to bid closer to their true valuations, it also creates a trade-off between increasing the revenue accrued to the regulator and reducing the profits of the auction-participating polluters. Nevertheless, the profits of the latter increase in the speculators' risk aversion.

Auction sale to close estate of Mary P. Chrystie, dec'd, 23 building plots, also Harlem River water front, near Morris Heights stations, N.Y. Central and N.Y. & Northern railroads : Wednesday, November 22d, 1893, at 12 o'clock noon at no. 111 Broadway, New York Real Estate salesroom : by order of Morris & Steele, attorneys ... New York City /

Street map showing properties to be sold, existing buildings (some with owners' names), and railroad stations.

Dutch Auctions: The case of fish auction in Bermeo

In this work I will analyze fish auctions focusing on a particular case: fish auctions in Bermeo. The purpose is to explain if at present the Dutch auction is the appropriate mechanism in the field of fish auctions or there are better alternatives for the sale of fish. For the fulfillment of this essay, I will first introduce some general notions on auctions and more particularly on Dutch auctions describing their properties and limitations.

Compliant cryptologic protocols

Literally, the word compliance suggests conformity in fulfilling official requirements. The thesis presents the results of the analysis and design of a class of protocols called compliant cryptologic protocols (CCP). The thesis presents a notion for compliance in cryptosystems that is conducive as a cryptologic goal. CCP are employed in security systems used by at least two mutually mistrusting sets of entities. The individuals in the sets of entities only trust the design of the security system and any trusted third party the security system may include. Such a security system can be thought of as a broker between the mistrusting sets of entities. In order to provide confidence in operation for the mistrusting sets of entities, CCP must provide compliance verification mechanisms. These mechanisms are employed either by all the entities or a set of authorised entities in the system to verify the compliance of the behaviour of various participating entities with the rules of the system. It is often stated that confidentiality, integrity and authentication are the primary interests of cryptology. It is evident from the literature that authentication mechanisms employ confidentiality and integrity services to achieve their goal. Therefore, the fundamental services that any cryptographic algorithm may provide are confidentiality and integrity only. Since controlling the behaviour of the entities is not a feasible cryptologic goal,the verification of the confidentiality of any data is a futile cryptologic exercise. For example, there exists no cryptologic mechanism that would prevent an entity from willingly or unwillingly exposing its private key corresponding to a certified public key. The confidentiality of the data can only be assumed. Therefore, any verification in cryptologic protocols must take the form of integrity verification mechanisms. Thus, compliance verification must take the form of integrity verification in cryptologic protocols. A definition of compliance that is conducive as a cryptologic goal is presented as a guarantee on the confidentiality and integrity services. The definitions are employed to provide a classification mechanism for various message formats in a cryptologic protocol. The classification assists in the characterisation of protocols, which assists in providing a focus for the goals of the research. The resulting concrete goal of the research is the study of those protocols that employ message formats to provide restricted confidentiality and universal integrity services to selected data. The thesis proposes an informal technique to understand, analyse and synthesise the integrity goals of a protocol system. The thesis contains a study of key recovery,electronic cash, peer-review, electronic auction, and electronic voting protocols. All these protocols contain message format that provide restricted confidentiality and universal integrity services to selected data. The study of key recovery systems aims to achieve robust key recovery relying only on the certification procedure and without the need for tamper-resistant system modules. The result of this study is a new technique for the design of key recovery systems called hybrid key escrow. The thesis identifies a class of compliant cryptologic protocols called secure selection protocols (SSP). The uniqueness of this class of protocols is the similarity in the goals of the member protocols, namely peer-review, electronic auction and electronic voting. The problem statement describing the goals of these protocols contain a tuple,(I, D), where I usually refers to an identity of a participant and D usually refers to the data selected by the participant. SSP are interested in providing confidentiality service to the tuple for hiding the relationship between I and D, and integrity service to the tuple after its formation to prevent the modification of the tuple. The thesis provides a schema to solve the instances of SSP by employing the electronic cash technology. The thesis makes a distinction between electronic cash technology and electronic payment technology. It will treat electronic cash technology to be a certification mechanism that allows the participants to obtain a certificate on their public key, without revealing the certificate or the public key to the certifier. The thesis abstracts the certificate and the public key as the data structure called anonymous token. It proposes design schemes for the peer-review, e-auction and e-voting protocols by employing the schema with the anonymous token abstraction. The thesis concludes by providing a variety of problem statements for future research that would further enrich the literature.

Perceptions of fairness and allocation systems

This paper explores the conditions of acceptability of differing allocation systems under scarcity and evaluates what makes a price system more or less fair. We find that fairness in an allocation arrangement depend on the institutional settings inherent in the situation, such as information, transparency and competition and the perceived institutional quality e.g., fiscal exchange and institutional trust). Results also indicate that the solution “weak people first” is seen as the fairest approach to an excess demand situation, followed by “first come, first serve”, the price system and an auction system. On the other hand, a random procedure or an allocation through the government is not perceived to be fair. Moreover, economics students seemed to be less sceptical towards the price system than other subjects although we observe that female students are more sceptical than male students.