Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Endogenous capacity utilization and the asymmetric effects of monetary policy

This paper investigates the role of variable capacity utilization as a source of asymmetries in the relationship between monetary policy and economic activity within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. The source of the asymmetry is directly linked to the bottlenecks and stock-outs that emerge from the existence of capacity constraints in the real side of the economy. Money has real effects due to the presence of rigidities in households' portfolio decisions in the form of a Luces-Fuerst 'limited participation' constraint. The model features variable capacity utilization rates across firms due to demand uncertainty. A monopolistic competitive structure provides additional effects through optimal mark-up changes. The overall message of this paper for monetary policy is that the same actions may have different effects depending on the capacity utilization rate of the economy.

Bifurcations of homoclinic tangency in two-dimensional area-preserving and reversible maps

Report for the scientific sojourn at the Research Institute for Applied Mathematics and Cybernetics, Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, from July to September 2006. Within the project, bifurcations of orbit behavior in area-preserving and reversible maps with a homoclinic tangency were studied. Finitely smooth normal forms for such maps near saddle fixed points were constructed and it was shown that they coincide in the main order with the analytical Birkhoff-Moser normal form. Bifurcations of single-round periodic orbits for two-dimensional symplectic maps close to a map with a quadratic homoclinic tangency were studied. The existence of one- and two-parameter cascades of elliptic periodic orbits was proved.

Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of weak-link games. The treatment variable is the distribution of high and low effort cost across subjects. We present data for one, two and three low-cost subjects as well as control sessions with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination improvements depend on the distribution of high and low effort costs across subjects, but these differences disappear with time. We find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the most frequent cost. This conformity effect can be due to a kind of group identity or to the cognitive simplicity of acting with identical others.

Internship report: improving asymmetric term extraction from bilingual text

Estudi elaborat a partir d’una estada a Xerox Research Centre Europe a Grenoble, França,entre juny i desembre del 2006. El projecte tradueïx termes tècnics anglesos a noruec. És asimètric perquè no tenim recursos lingüístics per a la llengua noruega, però solament per a l'anglès. S’ha desenvolupat i posat en pràctica mètodes que comprovaven contigüitat ("local reordering" i permutació selectiva) per a millorar el funcionament d’una eina anterior. Contigüitat és quan una paraula es traduïx en paraules múltiples, aquestes paraules han de ser adjacents en l'oració. A més, s’ha construït una taula de les operacions de recerca per als termes tècnics i s’ha integrat aquesta taula en un programa de demostració.

Renormalization and α-limit set for expanding Lorenz maps

We establish a one-to-one correspondence between the renormalizations and proper totally invariant closed sets (i.e., α-limit sets) of expanding Lorenz map, which enable us to distinguish periodic and non-periodic renormalizations. We describe the minimal renormalization by constructing the minimal totally invariant closed set, so that we can define the renormalization operator. Using consecutive renormalizations, we obtain complete topological characteriza- tion of α-limit sets and nonwandering set decomposition. For piecewise linear Lorenz map with slopes ≥ 1, we show that each renormalization is periodic and every proper α-limit set is countable.

Technical Appendix-3-Regime asymmetric STAR modeling and exchange rate reversion

The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and the adoption of generalized oating exchange rates ushered in a new era of exchange rate volatility and uncer- tainty. This increased volatility lead economists to search for economic models able to describe observed exchange rate behavior. The present is a technical Appendix to Cerrato et al. (2009) and presents detailed simulations of the proposed methodology and additional empirical results.

Continuity of set-valued maps revisited in the light of tame geometry

Continuity of set-valued maps is hereby revisited: after recalling some basic concepts of variational analysis and a short description of the State-of-the-Art, we obtain as by-product two Sard type results concerning local minima of scalar and vector valued functions. Our main result though, is inscribed in the framework of tame geometry, stating that a closed-valued semialgebraic set-valued map is almost everywhere continuous (in both topological and measure-theoretic sense). The result –depending on stratification techniques– holds true in a more general setting of o-minimal (or tame) set-valued maps. Some applications are briefly discussed at the end.

Modeling Dependence Structure and Forecasting Market Risk with Dynamic Asymmetric Copula

We investigate the dynamic and asymmetric dependence structure between equity portfolios from the US and UK. We demonstrate the statistical significance of dynamic asymmetric copula models in modelling and forecasting market risk. First, we construct “high-minus-low" equity portfolios sorted on beta, coskewness, and cokurtosis. We find substantial evidence of dynamic and asymmetric dependence between characteristic-sorted portfolios. Second, we consider a dynamic asymmetric copula model by combining the generalized hyperbolic skewed t copula with the generalized autoregressive score (GAS) model to capture both the multivariate non-normality and the dynamic and asymmetric dependence between equity portfolios. We demonstrate its usefulness by evaluating the forecasting performance of Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall for the high-minus-low portfolios. From back-testing, e find consistent and robust evidence that our dynamic asymmetric copula model provides the most accurate forecasts, indicating the importance of incorporating the dynamic and asymmetric dependence structure in risk management.

Quasiconformal maps, analytic capacity, and non linear potentials

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Aplicación con Google Maps

El principal objetivo de este proyecto es realizar un aplicativo web que utilice API’s para que, a partir de un conjunto de rutas almacenadas en el sistema, éste sea capaz de generar nuevas rutas a partir de éstas, de modo que dicho sistema no se comporte como un mero "almacén" de rutas introducidas por los usuarios para poder ser utilizadas por los demás posteriormente, sino que podamos ser nosotros mismos los que decidamos ciertos aspectos de la ruta que deseamos que el sistema nos proporcione. Así, el aplicativo desarrollado, partiendo de un conjunto previo de rutas, será capaz de generar nuevas rutas pasando lo más cerca posible de un conjunto de puntos definidos por el usuario, pudiendo ser calculadas siguiendo diferentes parámetros de optimización tales como el menor número de rutas utilizadas en el cálculo o el menor número de intersecciones entre ellas. Estas rutas, posteriormente, pueden visualizarse en la aplicación mediante el API de Google Maps, o pueden ser descargadas para utilizarlas en nuestro dispositivo GPS portátil.

Asymmetric standing facilities: an unexploited monetary policy tool

This paper analyzes the role of standing facilities in the determination of the demand for reserves in the overnight money market. In particular, we study how the asymmetric nature of the deposit and lending facilities could be used as a powerful policy tool for the simultaneous control of prices and quantities in the market for daily funds.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.