878 resultados para Advertising cards


Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Comparative advertising by one brand against another showcases its merits versus the demerits of the other. In a two-stage game with finitely many firms, firms decide first how much to advertise against whom. In the second stage, given the advertising configuration, firms compete as Cournot oligopolists. In the symmetric case, equilibrium advertising constitutes a clear welfare loss. In the asymmetric case, depending on parameter values, a variety of outcomes are possible in equilibrium. An a priori disadvantaged firm (in terms of advertising costs or advertising effectiveness) may advertise more. Advertising can affect firms that are not advertisers or targets themselves.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Abstract
Background Physical inactivity is a major public health concern, and more innovative approaches are urgently needed to address it. The UK Government supports the use of incentives and so-called nudges to encourage healthy behaviour changes, and has encouraged business sector involvement in public health through the Public Health Responsibility Deal. To test the effectiveness of provision of incentives to encourage adults to increase their physical activity, we
recruited 406 adults from a workplace setting (office-based) to take part in an assessor-blind randomised controlled trial.
Methods
We developed the physical activity loyalty card scheme, which integrates a novel physical activity tracking system with web-based monitoring (palcard). Participants were recruited from two buildings at Northern Ireland’s main
government offices and were randomly allocated (grouped by building [n=2] to reduce contamination) to either incentive group (n=199) or no incentive group (n=207). We included participants aged 16–65 years, based at the worksite 4 days or more per week and for 6 h or more per day, and able to complete 15 min of moderate-paced walking (self-report). Exclusion criteria included having received specific advice by a general practitioner not to exercise. A statistician not involved in administration of the trial prepared a computer-generated random allocation sequence. Random assignments were placed in individually numbered, sealed envelopes by the statistician to ensure concealment of allocation. Only the assessor was masked to assignment. Sensors were placed along footpaths and the gym in the workplace. Participants scanned their loyalty card at the sensor when undertaking physical activity (eg, walking), which logged activity. Participants in the incentive group monitored their physical activity, collected points, and received rewards (retail vouchers) for minutes of physical activity completed over the 12-week intervention. Rewards were vouchers sponsored by local retailers. Participants in the no incentive group used their loyalty card to self-monitor their physical activity but were not able to earn points or receive rewards. The primary outcome was change in minutes of moderate to vigorous physical activity with the Global Physical Activity Questionnaire, measured at baseline, week 12, and 6 months. Activity was objectively measured with the tracking system over the 12-week intervention. Mann Whitney U tests were done to assess change between groups.
Findings
The mean age of participants was 43·32 years (SD 9·37), and 272 (67%) were women. We obtained follow-up data from 353 (87%) participants at week 12 and 341 (84%) at 6 months. At week 12, participants in the incentive group increased moderate to vigorous physical activity by a median of 60 min per week (IQR –10 to 120) compared with 30 min per week (–60 to 90) in the no incentive group (p=0·05). At 6 months, participants in the incentive group had
increased their moderate to vigorous physical activity by 30 min per week (–60 to 100) from baseline compared with 0 min per week (–115 to 1110) in the no incentive group (p=0·099). We noted no significant differences between groups
for use of loyalty card (p=0·18). Participants in the incentive group recorded a mean of 60·22 min (95% CI 50·90–69·55) of physical activity per week with their loyalty card on week 1 and 23·56 min (17·06–30·06) at week 12, which was similar to that for those in the no incentive group (59·74 min, 51·24–68·23, at week 1; 20·25 min, 14·45–26·06, at week 12; p=0·94 for differences between groups at week 1; p=0·45 for differences between groups at week 12).
Interpretation:
Financial incentives showed a short-term behaviour change in physical activity. This innovative study contributes to the necessary evidence base, and has important implications for physical activity promotion and business engagement in health. The optimum incentive-based approach needs to be established. Results should be interpreted with some caution as the analyses of secondary outcomes were not adjusted for multiple comparisons.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

The medicalisation of life problems has been occurring for well over a century and has increased over the past 30 years, with the engines of medicalisation shifting to biotechnology, managed care, and consumers. This paper examines one strand of medicalisation during the last century: direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of pharmaceuticals. In particular, it examines the roles that physicians and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have played in regulating DTCA in the US. Two advertising exemplars, the late 19 century Lydia E. Pinkham's Vegetable Compound (for 'women's complaints') and contemporary Levitra (for erectile dysfunction) are used to examine the parallels between the patent medicine era and the DTCA era. DTCA re-establishes the direct and independent relationship between drug companies and consumers that existed in the late 19 century, encouraging self-diagnosis and requests for specific drugs. The extravagant claims of Lydia Pinkham's day are constrained by laws, but modern-day advertising is more subtle and sophisticated. DTCA has facilitated the impact of the pharmaceutical industry and consumers in becoming more important forces in medicalisation. © 2008 The Authors.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

This article explores the relation between humour and control, drawing on participant observation in an organization in which humour was central to daily life. Keys is a leading advertising agency whose staff spent an unusually large amount of time sending humorous e-mails. Examining these e-mails in some depth, we unpack the role of humour in subverting various forms of control, including gender norms and managerial authority. We find the relation between humour, control and subversion to be ambiguous. Building upon current debates in organization studies, we develop the concept of humour based on our observations at Keys. Specifically, we argue that humour is always in excess of both control and subversion, a 'nicely impossible' object that cannot be captured. This article thus contributes to theoretical approaches on organizational humour, conceptualizing the concept of 'newness' through Judith Butler's re-reading of Derridean différance and the Lacanian Real. In addition, we contribute a novel empirical account of the study of e-mail list humour in a contemporary advertising firm. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Background: Financial incentives have been advocated by the UK and U.S. governments to encourage adoption of healthy lifestyles. However, evidence to support the use of incentives for changing physical activity (PA) behavior is sparse.
Purpose:To investigate the effectiveness of?nancial incentives to increase PA in adults in the workplace.
Design: Two-arm quasi-experimental design.
Setting/participants: Employees (n¼406) in a workplace setting in Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK.
Intervention: Using a loyalty card to collect points and earn rewards, participants (n¼199) in the Incentive Group monitored their PA levels and received ?nancial incentives (retail vouchers) for minutes of PA completed over the course of a 12-week intervention period. Participants (n¼207) in the comparison group used their loyalty card to self-monitor their PA levels but were not able to earn points or obtain incentives (No Incentive Group).
Main outcome measures:The primary outcome was minutes of PA objectively measured using a novel PA tracking system at baseline (April 2011); Week 6 (June 2011); and Week 12 (July 2011).
Other outcomes, including a self-report measure of PA, were collected at baseline, Week 12, and 6 months (October 2011). Data were analyzed in June 2012.
Results: No signi?cant differences between groups were found for primary or secondary outcomes at the 12-week and 6-month assessments. Participants in the Incentive Group recorded 17.52 minutes of PA/week (95% CI¼12.49, 22.56) compared to 16.63 minutes/week (95% CI¼11.76, 21.51) in the No Incentive Group at Week 12 (p¼0.59). At 6 months, participants in the Incentive Group recorded 26.18 minutes of PA/week (95% CI¼20.06, 32.29) compared to 24.00 minutes/week (95% CI¼17.45, 30.54) in the No Incentive Group (p¼0.45).
Conclusions: Financial incentives did not encourage participants to undertake more PA than selfmonitoring PA. This study contributes to the evidence base and has important implications for increasing participation in physical activity and fostering links with the business sector. (Am J Prev Med 2013;45(1):56–63) © 2013 American Journal of Preventive Medicine

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

We consider a model of an on-line software market, where an intermediary distributes products from sellers to buyers. When products of sellers are vertically differentiated, an intermediary, earning a proportion of sales, has an incentive to hide the worse product on the second page, and only keep the better product on the front page: that weakens the competition, allowing the seller with the better product to charge a higher price. With heterogeneous visiting costs to the second page, the platform's revenue might improve, but the outcome will become socially suboptimal.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Abstract Purpose of Paper: The market for beer in the UK is now mature and sales have been stable at around £16bn for about ten years (Mintel 2014). More recently, there have been changes in the market as consumers have switched from bigger mainstream brands to a growing number of smaller craft beers. However, in order to grow further significantly, the industry needs to explore new market segments and find new consumers for beer. So far, it is estimated that only 1.3m women in the UK drink beer (O'Reilly, 2014; Mail Online, 2015). Women are therefore an underexplored segment and present the main growth opportunity for beer drinking in the UK. However, most beer television advertising has traditionally been aimed at the male audience and there have been suggestions that some of this advertising has been seen as unpopular with or even insulting to women (Jackson, 2013; Zwarun et al., 2006). The Chief Executive of major brewer SAB Miller, which owns the Foster's brand, has recently written that, 'We have to acknowledge that core lager advertising, for many years, was either dismissive of, or insulting to, women.' (Shubber, 2015). If women are to be the new consumers and the future target for beer advertising, there is therefore a significant gap in the knowledge and literature concerned with how women differ from men in responding to the television advertising produced by beer brands and it is important that this gap in knowledge is addressed. The purpose of this paper is therefore to explore the effect of the television advertising of the three top selling UK beer brands on women's attitudes and purchase intentions towards those brands. More specifically, the objectives are: 1) To gain an understanding of how female consumers respond to existing beer television advertising, specifically in terms of the ‘likeability’ of the content of TV commercials produced by the three leading UK beer brands among female consumers. 2) To examine the effect of the rational and emotional content, including the use of humour, in television commercials produced by the three leading UK beer brands on the attitudes of female consumers towards those brands. 3) To explore in-depth female consumer attitudes towards the content (message cues and symbolism) of the television commercials produced by the three leading beer brands in the UK and their effect on subsequent purchase intentions for each brand.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Highlights from the creative presentation made to Lightning Fastener for the 1969 campaign.