Discussions in Europe on Variable Compensation in the Financial Sector. EU Centre Singapore Working Paper no. 20, February 2014

Bonuses – which are often used to mitigate principal-agent problems and to encourage employees to work harder – have increased tremendously in the financial sector during the last decade, and have often been seen as a contributing factor to the financial crisis of 2008. The recent European Union (EU) action to adopt a policy that restricts bonuses paid to bankers may seem promising at first, but this does not address the real issues behind variable rewards. Compensation policies should be changed to encourage responsible risk-taking and decision-making through the implementation of broader performance metrics, forfeitable holdbacks and hybrid bonds. Furthermore, a change in organisational culture is needed to improve ethical behaviour leading to a re-balancing of stakeholders’ interests in the financial sector.

Sm-Nd isotope and Mn/Ca ratios for cleaned Neogloboquadrina pachyderma from ODP Hole 105-647A (Table 1)

The neodymium (Nd) isotope composition of ancient seawater is a potentially useful tracer of changes in continental inputs and ocean circulation on timescales of a few ka. Here we present the first Nd isotope record for seawater using sedimentary foraminifera cleaned using standard oxidative-reductive techniques. The data, along with Mn/Ca ratios, suggest that cleaned foraminifera provide a reliable record of Nd in seawater and hold out the prospect of using Nd in foraminifera to examine changes in seawater that accompany glacial-interglacial climatic cycles. The principal potential problem to be overcome with the use of forams as records of trace elements in ancient seawater is their diagenetic Fe-Mn coatings. These contain large amounts of Nd and other trace elements but can be cleaned off using highly reducing reagents. Mn(Ca ratios for the majority of the cleaned sedimentary foraminifera analysed here lie within the range (10-100 µmol/mol) that has yielded success in studies of transition elements in forams. Mass-balance modelling suggests that for residual Mn/Ca ratios <100 µmol/mol, Nd added to the foram in the coating will never shift the measured Nd isotope composition significantly away from the seawater value acquired by the foram test in the water column. Additionally, Nd concentrations measured in cleaned sedimentary foraminifera are comparable with those for a modern sample that has never encountered diagenetic fluids. Finally, core-top planktonic foraminifera for two sites have Nd isotope compositions that are identical to local surface seawater. The data we present here for Labrador Sea forams over the past 2.5 m.y. are interpreted in terms of changes in the seawater isotopic composition. The data show a pronounced shift from epsilon-Nd values of ~-12 to ~-19 in the period 2.5-1.5 Ma. This change is interpreted to result from the initiation of Northern Hemisphere glaciation and the increased derivation of Labrador Sea Nd via ice-rafting from Archaean terranes in central Canada. In combination with stable isotope and foraminiferal relative species abundance data, the new Nd data are consistent with the surface hydrography of the Labrador Sea being dominated by a fluctuating balance between cold, polar waters containing unradiogenic Nd and warm, subtropical waters containing more radiogenic Nd. The major change in Labrador Sea Nd that is observed in the past 2.5 Ma can, on its own, account for the change in the Nd isotope composition of North Atlantic Deep Water over the same time period.

Local Actors in Donor-Funded Rule of Law Assistance in Indonesia: Owners, Partners, Agents?

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

The state-contingent approach to production under uncertainty

The central claim of this paper is that the state-contingent approach provides the best way to think about all problems in the economics of uncertainty, including problems of consumer choice, the theory of the firm, and principal-agent relationships. This claim is illustrated by recent developments in, and applications of, the state-contingent approach.

The role of management incentives in successful information systems development and implementation

Because organizations are making large investments in Information systems (IS), efficient IS project management has been found critical to success. This study examines how the use of incentives can improve the project success. Agency theory is used to: identify motivational factors of project success, help the IS owners to understand to what extent management incentives can improve IS development and implementation (ISD/I). The outcomes will help practitioners and researchers to build on theoretical model of project management elements which lead to project success. Given the principal-agent nature of most significant scale of IS development, insights that will allow for greater alignment of the agent’s goals with those of the principal through incentive contracts, will serve to make ISD/I both more efficient and more effective, leading to more successful IS projects.

The missing ingredient:inter-municipal cooperation and central-local relations in the UK

The thrust of the argument presented in this chapter is that inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in the United Kingdom reflects local government's constitutional position and its exposure to the exigencies of Westminster (elected central government) and Whitehall (centre of the professional civil service that services central government). For the most part councils are without general powers of competence and are restricted in what they can do by Parliament. This suggests that the capacity for locally driven IMC is restricted and operates principally within a framework constructed by central government's policy objectives and legislation and the political expediencies of the governing political party. In practice, however, recent examples of IMC demonstrate that the practices are more complex than this initial analysis suggests. Central government may exert top-down pressures and impose hierarchical directives, but there are important countervailing forces. Constitutional changes in Scotland and Wales have shifted the locus of central- local relations away from Westminster and Whitehall. In England, the seeding of English government regional offices in 1994 has evolved into an important structural arrangement that encourages councils to work together. Within the local government community there is now widespread acknowledgement that to achieve the ambitious targets set by central government, councils are, by necessity, bound to cooperate and work with other agencies. In recent years, the fragmentation of public service delivery has affected the scope of IMC. Elected local government in the UK is now only one piece of a complex jigsaw of agencies that provides services to the public; whether it is with non-elected bodies, such as health authorities, public protection authorities (police and fire), voluntary nonprofit organisations or for-profit bodies, councils are expected to cooperate widely with agencies in their localities. Indeed, for projects such as regeneration and community renewal, councils may act as the coordinating agency but the success of such projects is measured by collaboration and partnership working (Davies 2002). To place these developments in context, IMC is an example of how, in spite of the fragmentation of traditional forms of government, councils work with other public service agencies and other councils through the medium of interagency partnerships, collaboration between organisations and a mixed economy of service providers. Such an analysis suggests that, following changes to the system of local government, contemporary forms of IMC are less dependent on vertical arrangements (top-down direction from central government) as they are replaced by horizontal modes (expansion of networks and partnership arrangements). Evidence suggests, however that central government continues to steer local authorities through the agency of inspectorates and regulatory bodies, and through policy initiatives, such as local strategic partnerships and local area agreements (Kelly 2006), thus questioning whether, in the case of UK local government, the shift from hierarchy to network and market solutions is less differentiated and transformation less complete than some literature suggests. Vertical or horizontal pressures may promote IMC, yet similar drivers may deter collaboration between local authorities. An example of negative vertical pressure was central government's change of the systems of local taxation during the 1980s. The new taxation regime replaced a tax on property with a tax on individual residency. Although the community charge lasted only a few years, it was a highpoint of the then Conservative government policy that encouraged councils to compete with each other on the basis of the level of local taxation. In practice, however, the complexity of local government funding in the UK rendered worthless any meaningful ambition of councils competing with each other, especially as central government granting to local authorities is predicated (however imperfectly) on at least notional equalisation between those areas with lower tax yields and the more prosperous locations. Horizontal pressures comprise factors such as planning decisions. Over the last quarter century, councils have competed on the granting of permission to out-of-town retail and leisure complexes, now recognised as detrimental to neighbouring authorities because economic forces prevail and local, independent shops are unable to compete with multiple companies. These examples illustrate tensions at the core of the UK polity of whether IMC is feasible when competition between local authorities heightened by local differences reduces opportunities for collaboration. An alternative perspective on IMC is to explore whether specific purposes or functions promote or restrict it. Whether in the principle areas of local government responsibilities relating to social welfare, development and maintenance of the local infrastructure or environmental matters, there are examples of IMC. But opportunities have diminished considerably as councils lost responsibility for services provision as a result of privatisation and transfer of powers to new government agencies or to central government. Over the last twenty years councils have lost their role in the provision of further-or higher-education, public transport and water/sewage. Councils have commissioning power but only a limited presence in providing housing needs, social care and waste management. In other words, as a result of central government policy, there are, in practice, currently far fewer opportunities for councils to cooperate. Since 1997, the New Labour government has promoted IMC through vertical drivers and the development; the operation of these policy initiatives is discussed following the framework of the editors. Current examples of IMC are notable for being driven by higher tiers of government, working with subordinate authorities in principal-agent relations. Collaboration between local authorities and intra-interand cross-sectoral partnerships are initiated by central government. In other words, IMC is shaped by hierarchical drivers from higher levels of government but, in practice, is locally varied and determined less by formula than by necessity and function. © 2007 Springer.

The curious absence of inter-municipal co-operation in England

In Europe local authorities often work with their neighbouring municipalities, whether to address a specific task or goal or through the course of regular policy making and implementation. In England, however, inter-municipal co-operation (IMC) is less common. Councils may work with service providers from the private and non-profit sectors but less often with neighbouring local authorities. Why this is the case may be explained by a number of historical and policy factors that often encourage councils to compete, rather than to work collaboratively with each other. The present government has encouraged councils to work in partnership with other organizations but there are few examples of increased horizontal cooperation between local authorities. Instead the prevailing model remains fixed on vertical co-working predicated on a principal-agent relationship between higher and lower tiers of government.

A korrupció társadalmi és intézményi szerkezete

A tanulmány első részében a megbízó-megbízott-kliens modellt fogalmi keretként alkalmazva a korrupció négy ideáltípusát mutatjuk be: míg a vesztegetést és zsarolást a megbízott és kliens közti, addig a hűtlen kezelést és csalást a megbízó és megbízott közti tranzakcióként definiáljuk. A korrupció ezen alaptípusait irányított gráfok segítségével ábrázoljuk. Ezt követően a korrupciós ügyletek szereplőinek lehetséges (pl. a tranzakciós költségek és a lebukási kockázatok csökkentésére irányuló) motivációit vizsgáljuk, vagyis azt, hogy mely tényezők ösztönzik leginkább a korrupciós helyzetek szereplőit arra, hogy tranzakcióikat különböző típusú személyes, üzleti, politikai és egyéb intézményes kapcsolathálókba ágyazzák. A második részben – támaszkodva korábbi kutatásaink eredményeire – néhány tipikus magyarországi korrupciós tranzakció társadalmi és intézményi beágyazottságát mutatjuk be. Négy esettanulmányt elemzünk részletesen, a bemutatott tipikus (pl. pártfinanszírozáshoz, vagy engedélyek megszerzéséhez kapcsolódó) korrupciós hálózatokat pedig többszereplős, bonyolult és multiplex gráfokkal ábrázoljuk. Végül a komplex hálózatok evolúciós vonatkozásait a szereplők számának, a kapcsolatok komplexitásának, valamint a személyi és/vagy intézményi beágyazottság mértékének tükrében vizsgáljuk. ______ In the first part of the paper four idealtypical corruption transactions are explicated in terms of the principal-agent-client model: bribery and extortion are described as two different types of agent-client relationship, while embezzlement and fraud as two different types of principal-agent relationship. The main idea is to describe these elementary corruption transactions as simple directed graphs. The next section of the paper takes into consideration different kinds of possible motivations (such as the reduction of risks or transaction costs) of the principals, agents and clients, in order to embed their corruption transactions in various kinds of personal, business, political and other institutional networks. In the second part of the paper some typical and stable network configurations are presented, based on a recent empirical corruption research carried out in Hungary. Certain corruption cases (such as party financing or granting of permit) are analyzed in details, and are described as complex and multiple networks. The paper concludes in showing some signs of the evolution of corruption networks in Hungary in terms of the number of actors, of the complexity of network configurations, of the level of personal or institutional embeddedness, and of the multiplexity of relationships.

Speciális kockázatok és kockázatkezelés a kockázatitőke-finanszírozásban (The special risks and risk management of venture capital)

A tanulmányban a szerzők arra a kérdésre keresik a választ, hogy az aszimmetrikus információk hatására a vállalkozók és a befektetők között kialakuló megbízó-ügynök viszonynak melyek a speciális vetületei a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás vonatkozásában. A szerzők arra a következtetésre jutottak, hogy a hiányos információk, a megbízó-ügynök viszony, illetve az ügyletek speciális jellege miatt fokozottan jelentkező ügynökprobléma kezelésére a kockázatitőke-finanszírozás szereplői speciális kockázatkezelési technikákat alkalmaznak. Ilyenek a magas elvárt hozamok, a szigorú kiválasztási kritériumok, a speciális befektetési vagy szindikátusi szerződések, a befektetést követő monitoring tevékenység, a több lépcsőben történő finanszírozás és a portfólióvállalatok hálózatba szervezése. A speciális kockázati megközelítés következtében a befektetéseket opciós szemlélet is áthatja. _____ This paper focuses on the special aspects of imperfect information in case of venture capital financing including principal-agent relationship between entrepreneurs and investors as well as adverse selection that evolves as a result of information asymmetries. The authors’ finding is that venture capital is able to manage the problems caused by imperfect information via applying divers risk management techniques such as high profit expectations, scrutiny of portfolio-companies, the use of special contracting stipulations and syndicate agreements, the monitoring of investments, multi-staged financing of companies and the integration of portfolio-companies into networks. In addition to the risk management techniques the authors also give the interpretation of the unique attitude of venture capital toward uncertainty and its special real option-like risk valuation approach that makes venture capitalists capable of handling high uncertainty under imperfect information.

Essays on Corruption and Enforcement

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-08

Three essays in labor economics and applied econometrics

Méthodologie:Cadre conceptuel: Principal-agent

Standardized environmental management systems as an internal management tool

In a principal-agent model we analyze the firm’s decision to adopt an informal or a standardized Environmental Management System (EMS). Our results are consistent with empirical evidence in several respects. A standardized EMS increases the internal control at the cost of introducing some degree of rigidity that entails an endogenous setup cost. Standardized systems are more prone to be adopted by big and well established firms and under tougher environmental policies. Firms with standardized EMS tend to devote more effort to abatement although this effort results in lower pollution only if public incentives are strong enough, suggesting a complementarity relationship between standardized EMS and public policies. Emission charges have both a marginal effect on abatement and a qualitative effect on the adoption decision that may induce a conflict between private and public interests. As a result of the combination of these two effects it can be optimal for the government to distort the tax in a specific way in order to push the firm to choose the socially optimal EMS. The introduction of standardized systems can result in win-win situations where firms, society and the environment get better off.

Capital structure, risk and asymmetric information : theory and evidence

This paper proposes a principal-agent model between banks and firms with risk and asymmetric information. A mixed form of finance to firms is assumed. The capital structure of firms is a relevant cause for the final aggregate level of investment in the economy. In the model analyzed, there may be a separating equilibrium, which is not economically efficient, because aggregate investments fall short of the first-best level. Based on European firm-level data, an empirical model is presented which validates the result of the relevance of the capital structure of firms. The relative magnitude of equity in the capital structure makes a real difference to the profits obtained by firms in the economy.

Critical pedagogy theory and the family business

In contemporary times family business research has been dominated by three theoretical perspectives; principal-agent theory, stewardship theory, and resource-based view theory (Siebels 2012) but at the same time scholars argue that what still needs further attention is how underlying processes and phenomena can be explained (Melin, Nordqvist & Sharma  2014). In order to understand themes such as repression or relations of asymmetry the suggestion in this chapter is to move towards a critical stance of thinking which involves problematizing the obvious issues in family firms (Alvesson & Deetz 2000) and moreover allowing the critical perspective to destabilize assumptions made within earlier research (Freire, 1974). By discussing critical theory in general but foremost the Freirean  (1970, 1974) critical pedagogy specifically, the arguments in the chapter revolves around how critical pedagogy can open up for a more novel view on family business. The purpose is via critical pedagogy discuss family business from a limited situation perspective, and to argue for a Freirean (1970) dialogue as means of developing a critical consciousness for family members in the family business context. The chapter concludes with some recommendations on platforms or common grounds in which dialogue and raising of consciousness can occur in which the concept can open up possibilities for interesting learning transfer and bring multidimensional knowledge into the family firm.

L’interface politico-administrative au Québec : champ de bataille? Transmission stratégique de l’information dans les affaires d’État

En vertu de l’expertise qu’il détient, l’agent public contribue à la réflexion du politique. L’acteur public est en quelque sorte un outil d’aide à la décision. Le paradigme classique en théorie des organisations assume que le bureaucrate est un acteur programmé dont les actions sont guidées par la règlementation et la codification juridico-légale entourant sa pratique. Quant à elle, l’École de la nouvelle gestion publique suppose que l’agent public doit opérer librement selon les indicateurs de la sphère privée ; il doit viser l’efficacité au moindre coût et prioriser la culture du résultat. De plus, dans des conditions respectant l’environnement où se dessine le partage de renseignements, les chercheurs ne s’entendent pas sur le principe de l’allié qui postule conventionnellement que des préférences similaires favorisent la transmission optimale de l’information entre le politique et la fonction publique. Quel modèle prévaut au Québec ? Sous quelles formes s’opérationnalise-t-il en contexte de transfert ? La thèse d’une compatibilité préférentielle est-elle garante d’une translation informationnelle améliorée ? En usant du modèle canonique principal-agent, ce mémoire confronte la croyance répandue voulant que l’État québécois soit foncièrement webérien en adressant certaines des plus importantes conclusions théoriques dans la discipline. Les résultats démontrent que l’appareil d’État est issu d’un croisement entre les deux principaux paradigmes reconnus dans la littérature. Aussi, le mémoire fait état d’une similarité entre l’interprétation traditionnelle de l’ally principle et la réalité empirique retrouvée dans la relation entre le haut fonctionnaire et le législateur québécois. Ultimement, l’étude démontre que l’administrateur d’État est stratégique dans certaines situations qu’il sait instrumentaliser et où il peut occuper un espace discrétionnaire suffisant pour valoriser ses intérêts professionnels et ceux de son organisation.