Debating the centre : the theory of principal qualificand (mukhyavisesya) in classical Indian philosophy

The theory of language has occupied a special place in the history of Indian thought. Indian philosophers give particular attention to the analysis of the cognition obtained from language, known under the generic name of śābdabodha. This term is used to denote, among other things, the cognition episode of the hearer, the content of which is described in the form of a paraphrase of a sentence represented as a hierarchical structure. Philosophers submit the meaning of the component items of a sentence and their relationship to a thorough examination, and represent the content of the resulting cognition as a paraphrase centred on a meaning element, that is taken as principal qualificand (mukhyaviśesya) which is qualified by the other meaning elements. This analysis is the object of continuous debate over a period of more than a thousand years between the philosophers of the schools of Mimāmsā, Nyāya (mainly in its Navya form) and Vyākarana. While these philosophers are in complete agreement on the idea that the cognition of sentence meaning has a hierarchical structure and share the concept of a single principal qualificand (qualified by other meaning elements), they strongly disagree on the question which meaning element has this role and by which morphological item it is expressed. This disagreement is the central point of their debate and gives rise to competing versions of this theory. The Mïmāmsakas argue that the principal qualificand is what they call bhāvanā ̒bringing into being̒, ̒efficient force̒ or ̒productive operation̒, expressed by the verbal affix, and distinct from the specific procedures signified by the verbal root; the Naiyāyikas generally take it to be the meaning of the word with the first case ending, while the Vaiyākaranas take it to be the operation expressed by the verbal root. All the participants rely on the Pāninian grammar, insofar as the Mimāmsakas and Naiyāyikas do not compose a new grammar of Sanskrit, but use different interpretive strategies in order to justify their views, that are often in overt contradiction with the interpretation of the Pāninian rules accepted by the Vaiyākaranas. In each of the three positions, weakness in one area is compensated by strength in another, and the cumulative force of the total argumentation shows that no position can be declared as correct or overall superior to the others. This book is an attempt to understand this debate, and to show that, to make full sense of the irreconcilable positions of the three schools, one must go beyond linguistic factors and consider the very beginnings of each school's concern with the issue under scrutiny. The texts, and particularly the late texts of each school present very complex versions of the theory, yet the key to understanding why these positions remain irreconcilable seems to lie elsewhere, this in spite of extensive argumentation involving a great deal of linguistic and logical technicalities. Historically, this theory arises in Mimāmsā (with Sabara and Kumārila), then in Nyāya (with Udayana), in a doctrinal and theological context, as a byproduct of the debate over Vedic authority. The Navya-Vaiyākaranas enter this debate last (with Bhattoji Dïksita and Kaunda Bhatta), with the declared aim of refuting the arguments of the Mïmāmsakas and Naiyāyikas by bringing to light the shortcomings in their understanding of Pāninian grammar. The central argument has focused on the capacity of the initial contexts, with the network of issues to which the principal qualificand theory is connected, to render intelligible the presuppositions and aims behind the complex linguistic justification of the classical and late stages of this debate. Reading the debate in this light not only reveals the rationality and internal coherence of each position beyond the linguistic arguments, but makes it possible to understand why the thinkers of the three schools have continued to hold on to three mutually exclusive positions. They are defending not only their version of the principal qualificand theory, but (though not openly acknowledged) the entire network of arguments, linguistic and/or extra-linguistic, to which this theory is connected, as well as the presuppositions and aims underlying these arguments.

Determinants of the effect of existential behavioral therapy for bereaved partners: a qualitative study.

BACKGROUND: Informal caregivers of palliative patients took part in existential behavioral therapy (EBT), a group intervention comprising mindfulness exercises to reduce psychological distress and improve quality of life. OBJECTIVES: This study examined what the participants perceived as helpful to cope with their loss during the first year of bereavement, particularly with regard to the EBT intervention. DESIGN: Sixteen problem-centered, semi-structured interviews were evaluated with content analysis. RESULTS: Two main categories were found: social support and self-regulation. Social support includes sense of belonging as well as emotional, cognitive, and practical help experienced from others. Mindfulness and acceptance, a clear focus on the positive, and orientation toward the future were helpful strategies of self-regulation; these were also part of the EBT intervention. Mindfulness was understood as permitting emotions and acceptance of one's inner processes, even if they were not pleasant, and was found to be helpful to stop ruminative thinking. CONCLUSIONS: The categories considered as being helpful parallel core elements of EBT and recent grief theories. The intervention was found to be supportive and met the needs of the participants. The interviewees appreciated the continuity of EBT support from palliative care into bereavement.

Political philosophy, ethnology, and time: a study of the notion of historical handicap

This article starts by identifying the crucial importance of the notion of historical handicap for the present-day social sciences of Latin America. Such notion is not an original invention made by Latinamericanists. On the contrary, I demonstrate that the genealogy of the notion of historical handicap must be sought in the tradition of Western political philosophy. Such genealogy must take into account the way it was integrated into ethnological descriptions. When and how did the Other become the backward, the primitive? While this relation was secondary for ancient Greek thought, theories of historical development became the main source of ethnological categories in the modern era. Interestingly enough, this modern synthesis suited the practical purpose of justifying two successive waves of European imperialistic: the era of discoveries, and 19th century colonialism. The article concludes by raising questions about the present role and application of the social sciences.

THE SKEPTICAL CARTESIAN BACKGROUND OF HUME'S "OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY" (FIRST INQUIRY, SECTION 12)

ABSTRACT In section XII of the First Inquiry, Hume refers to the two Hellenistic schools of skepticism (Academic and Pyrrhonian) to present his own view of skepticism, which, however, depends on the ancient skeptics mainly indirectly. Hume's view of skepticism depends crucially on Descartes and post-Cartesian philosophers such as Pascal, Huet, Foucher and Bayle, who reacted skeptically to major Cartesian doctrines but followed one version or other of Descartes's methodical doubt. Although all these post-Cartesian philosophers are relevant in section XII, I focus on the topics in which Descartes himself-besides his skeptical followers-seems directly relevant. After an introductory section (I) on Julia Annas' and Richard Popkin's views of Hume's relation to, respectively, ancient and modern skepticism, I turn to section XII and examine what Hume calls (II) "consequent skepticism about the senses," (III) "antecedent skepticism," and (IV) "Academic skepticism."

Dialogue in the crisis of representation : realism and antirealism in the context of the conversation between theologians and quantum physicists in Göttingen 1949-1961

The aim of this study is to analyse the content of the interdisciplinary conversations in Göttingen between 1949 and 1961. The task is to compare models for describing reality presented by quantum physicists and theologians. Descriptions of reality indifferent disciplines are conditioned by the development of the concept of reality in philosophy, physics and theology. Our basic problem is stated in the question: How is it possible for the intramental image to match the external object?Cartesian knowledge presupposes clear and distinct ideas in the mind prior to observation resulting in a true correspondence between the observed object and the cogitative observing subject. The Kantian synthesis between rationalism and empiricism emphasises an extended character of representation. The human mind is not a passive receiver of external information, but is actively construing intramental representations of external reality in the epistemological process. Heidegger's aim was to reach a more primordial mode of understanding reality than what is possible in the Cartesian Subject-Object distinction. In Heidegger's philosophy, ontology as being-in-the-world is prior to knowledge concerning being. Ontology can be grasped only in the totality of being (Dasein), not only as an object of reflection and perception. According to Bohr, quantum mechanics introduces an irreducible loss in representation, which classically understood is a deficiency in knowledge. The conflicting aspects (particle and wave pictures) in our comprehension of physical reality, cannot be completely accommodated into an entire and coherent model of reality. What Bohr rejects is not realism, but the classical Einsteinian version of it. By the use of complementary descriptions, Bohr tries to save a fundamentally realistic position. The fundamental question in Barthian theology is the problem of God as an object of theological discourse. Dialectics is Barth¿s way to express knowledge of God avoiding a speculative theology and a human-centred religious self-consciousness. In Barthian theology, the human capacity for knowledge, independently of revelation, is insufficient to comprehend the being of God. Our knowledge of God is real knowledge in revelation and our words are made to correspond with the divine reality in an analogy of faith. The point of the Bultmannian demythologising programme was to claim the real existence of God beyond our faculties. We cannot simply define God as a human ideal of existence or a focus of values. The theological programme of Bultmann emphasised the notion that we can talk meaningfully of God only insofar as we have existential experience of his intervention. Common to all these twentieth century philosophical, physical and theological positions, is a form of anti-Cartesianism. Consequently, in regard to their epistemology, they can be labelled antirealist. This common insight also made it possible to find a common meeting point between the different disciplines. In this study, the different standpoints from all three areas and the conversations in Göttingen are analysed in the frameworkof realism/antirealism. One of the first tasks in the Göttingen conversations was to analyse the nature of the likeness between the complementary structures inquantum physics introduced by Niels Bohr and the dialectical forms in the Barthian doctrine of God. The reaction against epistemological Cartesianism, metaphysics of substance and deterministic description of reality was the common point of departure for theologians and physicists in the Göttingen discussions. In his complementarity, Bohr anticipated the crossing of traditional epistemic boundaries and the generalisation of epistemological strategies by introducing interpretative procedures across various disciplines.

PASSIONS AND EVIL IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY

In this paper, I aim at relating passions to evil in Kant's philosophy. I begin by explaining the difference between affects and passions in the textAnthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Kant claims that both affects and passions are illnesses of the mind, because both affect and passion hinder the sovereignty of reason. I show that passions are worse than affects for the purpose of pure reason. Second, I relate affects and passions to the degrees of the propensity to evil in theReligion. I analyze the idea of an ethical community as a way to overcome the evil, which goes beyond political and anthropological solutions suggested by Kant.

Kallet til livets embete : mødre i helse og lidelse

Mothers represent the natural caring. Natural caring is the object of caring science and of research interest because it establishes the central core of professional caring. In this study, we encounter patients who are mothers in need of care in a psychiatric context. Motherhood involves taking responsibility that extends beyond one's own life, because the child represents possibilities in a yet unknown future. Understanding and knowledge about the mothers' struggle in health and suffering are of crucial importance to enable clinical practice to make provisions for and adapt to the individual patient. The overall purpose of this dissertation is to illuminate how the innermost essence of caring emerges in health and suffering in patients who are mothers in psychiatric care. The purpose of the study in a clinical sense is to seek to understand and illuminate the patient's inner world in health and suffering in terms of contextual, existential, ontological and ethical dimensions. The dissertation is exploratory and descriptive in nature and encompasses induction, deduction and abduction as logics tools of reasoning. A theoretical model of natural caring and a universal theoretical model of the innermost essence of caring is developed as seen from the patient's world in a psychiatric context. The dissertation is anchored in human science's view of the human being and the world and in caring science's perspective. Caring science's view of the human being as a unity comprising body, soul and spirit is central in the study's concept of the patient. This multi-dimensional conception of the human being encompasses the dissertation's basic values and is decisive for choice of methodology. Hermeneutic epistemology guided the interpretation of the empirical data, the paradigmatic theses and assumptions. The dialectical movement in interpretation moves back and forth between empirical data, caring science theory and philosophical theory and reveals deeper insight into meaningful content in the clinical context. The interpretation process comprises four levels of abstraction: rational, contextual, existential and ontological. Hermeneutic philosophy guides the inductive and deductive approach to interpretation, as well as the movement between the clinical context and the caring science paradigm. In this encounter between the visible and invisible reality, the image of natural caring – motherliness emerged. The dissertation consists of four studies. The first study is a systematic review of nineteen research articles. The three other studies are hermeneutical interpretations based on text materials from open interviews. Fifteen participants were interviewed, all of whom are mothers of children between 0 and 18 years of age. All were outpatients in the psychiatric specialist health service. In the interpretation process, the mothers' struggle in health and suffering emerges as a struggle between the inner and outer world. Being a mother and patient in health and suffering in a psychiatric context means to struggle to be oneself, to create oneself, to live and realize one's good deeds as a mother and human being. To be oneself, to possess oneself as a mother is not only a question of tending, playing and learning in order to master a practical situation or to survive. It involves constituting a deep, inner desire to courageously create oneself so that the child is able to realize his or her potential in health and suffering. Motherliness manifests itself in caring as a call to ministering humanity and life. The voice of motherliness is understood as the voice of life—the eternal, inner call of love and freedom. The inner call craves fulfilment. Motherliness in natural caring does not retreat. Motherliness defines the Other as freedom and proceeds without regard for all other exterior requirements to realizing wellbeing. The inner essence of caring is attentive, aware and heeds the call of the heart. The innermost essence of caring is to be and to make oneself responsible for the Other. Responsibility cannot be relinquished; free choice consists in whether or not to follow the call. To renounce the inner call to responsibility is to deny oneself and one's dignity as a human being. The theoretical models provide clinical and systematic caring science with knowledge and understanding based on the natural caring spirit inherent in the human being. The study elucidates and strengthens the ontological basic assumptions about the human being as a unity of body, soul and spirit, the sanctity of the human being and the core of caring, ethos. The results of the dissertation will provide clinical practice with knowledge about the inner movements of the mothers' souls in relation to their responsibility as mothers and human beings. Being able to understand the basic conditions for responsibility is crucial for developing care that encompasses mother and child and the mutual relationship between them. This is basic knowledge for developing attitudes and actions that meet and provide for the needs of the patient as mother and as a whole, suffering human being.

The demonism of creation in Goethe's philosophy

Goethe's philosophy of creativity revolves around what he called das Dämonische. This essay is not meant as a definition or an explanation of demonic creation, but instead presents a demonic work par excellence, as the term "demonic" is defined by Goethe in the Elegy from Marienbad. The process of the creation of this work, as it is described by Goethe, also represents a strange exorcism, as the entire daemonic creative force of the author is transposed in this lyrical masterpiece of German and universal literature. After writing the Elegy Goethe, it is no longer demonic.

Animal Experience in Kant’s Philosophy

The role of animals in the philosophy of mind is primarily to help understand the human mind by serving as practical examples of cognition that differs from ours either in kind or in degree. Kant regarded animals as beings that only have the faculty of sensibility. By examining what Kant writes about animal experience we gain knowledge concerning the role of sensibility in experience, free from the influence of understanding and reason. I look at Kant’s view of animals in the historical context of alternative views presented by Descartes’ and Hume’s views. Kant’s view can be seen as a counterargument against Descartes’ doctrine of animal machines according to which animals do not have minds and they do not think. I suggest that while it can be argued that some kind of elementary experience could be possible in the physiological level, this only makes sense when it is possible to become conscious of the unconscious sensation, and this requires a mind. A further option is to claim that there is only a difference in degree between human and animal cognitive capacities. This is Hume’s view. I argue that even though Kant’s and Hume’s view on the cognitive capacities of animals seems to depart from each other to a considerable extent, the differences between them diminish when the focus is on the experience these capacities enable. I also briefly discuss the relation of the metaphysics of animal minds to animal ethics.

The Literary relations between La Fontaine and the "Astrée" of Honoré d'Urfé : a dissertation presented to the faculty of the department of philosophy of the university of Pennsylvania in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy / by Walther P. Fischer

Collection : Publications of the University of Pennsylvania ; n° 6