The Analogical Peacock Hypothesis: The Sexual Selection of Mind-Reading and Relational Cognition in Human Communication

This integrative review presents a novel hypothesis as a basis for integrating two evolutionary viewpoints on the origins of human cognition and communication, the sexual selection of human mental capacities, and the social brain hypothesis. This new account suggests that mind-reading social skills increased reproductive success and consequently became targets for sexual selection. The hypothesis proposes that human communication has three purposes: displaying mind-reading abilities, aligning and maintaining representational parity between individuals to enable displays, and the exchange of propositional information. Intelligence, creativity, language, and humor are mental fitness indicators that signal an individual’s quality to potential mates, rivals, and allies. Five features central to the proposed display mechanism unify these indicators, the relational combination of concepts, large conceptual knowledge networks, processing speed, contextualization, and receiver knowledge. Sufficient between-mind alignment of conceptual networks allows displays based upon within-mind conceptual mappings. Creative displays communicate previously unnoticed relational connections and novel conceptual combinations demonstrating an ability to read a receiver’s mind. Displays are costly signals of mate quality with costs incurred in the developmental production of the neural apparatus required to engage in complex displays and opportunity costs incurred through time spent acquiring cultural knowledge. Displays that are fast, novel, spontaneous, contextual, topical, and relevant are hard-to-fake for lower quality individuals. Successful displays result in elevated social status and increased mating options. The review addresses literatures on costly signaling, sexual selection, mental fitness indicators, and the social brain hypothesis; drawing implications for nonverbal and verbal communication.

Attention during social interaction in children with autism: Comparison to specific language impairment, typical development, and links to cognition

Eye-tracking studies have shown how people with autism spend significantly less time looking at socially relevant information on-screen compared to those developing typically. This has been suggested to impact on the development of socio-cognitive skills in autism. We present novel evidence of how attention atypicalities in children with autism extend to real-life interaction, in comparison to typically developing (TD) children and children with specific language impairment (SLI). We explored the allocation of attention during social interaction with an interlocutor, and how aspects of attention (awareness checking) related to traditional measures of social cognition (false belief attribution). We found divergent attention allocation patterns across the groups in relation to social cognition ability. Even though children with autism and SLI performed similarly on the socio- cognitive tasks, there were syndrome-specific atypicalities of their attention patterns. Children with SLI were most similar to TD children in terms of prioritising attention to socially pertinent information (eyes, face, awareness checking). Children with autism showed reduced attention to the eyes and face, and slower awareness checking. This study provides unique and timely insight into real-world social gaze (a)typicality in autism, SLI and typical development, its relationship to socio-cognitive ability, and raises important issues for intervention.

The development of Temporal Cognition

Time features in two key ways in cognition, each of which is discussed in turn in this chapter: time is processed as a dimension of stimuli or events, and time is represented as a framework in which events can be located. Section 1 examines the first of these from a developmental perspective, by reviewing research on age-related changes in the accuracy of duration processing. The Piagetian approach linked changes in duration processing to the development of a concept of time as a dimension of events separable from other event dimensions. This is contrasted with recent research conducted within the framework of Scalar Expectancy Theory, which models development in terms of changes in components of specialized timing mechanisms. Section 2 discusses developmental changes in the temporal frameworks that children use to represent the locations of events. Although as adults, we represent times as locations on a linear framework stretching from the past, to the present, and into the future, this way of representing time is not developmentally basic. A model is proposed of developmental stages in the acquisition of a mature temporal framework. The chapter concludes by considering two themes that cut across Section 1 and 2: the issue of whether there are both qualitative and quantitative change in children’s temporal abilities, and the link between temporal and spatial cognition.

Parent ratings of child cognition and language compared with Bayley-III in preterm 3-year-olds

Background
Parent ratings on questionnaires may provide valid and cost-effective tools for screening cognitive development of children at risk of developmental delay.

Aims
In this study, we examined the convergent validity of combining parent-based reports of non-verbal cognitive abilities (PARCA3) and verbal abilities (CDI-III) in relation to the Bayley-III cognitive scale in 3-year-olds born late pre-term.

Methods
Mothers of 185 late-preterm children were asked to complete the PARCA3 and the CDI-III shortly before children reached age three; children were then assessed using the Bayley-III close to their third birthday.

Results
The two maternal questionnaires were significantly and moderately correlated with the Bayley-III cognitive scores. Together the maternal ratings accounted for 15% of the variance in the Bayley-III cognitive scores, after controlling for other covariates in regression analysis. In particular, the PARCA3 contributed significantly to explain variance in the Bayley-III cognitive scores when controlling for the CDI-III. However, the CDI-III was also independently associated with the Bayley-III cognitive scores.

Conclusions
Parent ratings of child cognition and language together may provide cost-effective screening of development in “at risk” preschoolers.

On the Complexity of Strong and Epistemic Credal Networks

Credal networks are graph-based statistical models whose parameters take values on a set, instead of being sharply specified as in traditional statistical models (e.g., Bayesian networks). The result of inferences with such models depends on the irrelevance/independence concept adopted. In this paper, we study the computational complexity of inferences under the concepts of epistemic irrelevance and strong independence. We strengthen complexity results by showing that inferences with strong independence are NP-hard even in credal trees with ternary variables, which indicates that tractable algorithms, including the existing one for epistemic trees, cannot be used for strong independence. We prove that the polynomial time of inferences in credal trees under epistemic irrelevance is not likely to extend to more general models, because the problem becomes NP-hard even in simple polytrees. These results draw a definite line between networks with efficient inferences and those where inferences are hard, and close several open questions regarding the computational complexity of such models.

Computing lower and upper expectations under epistemic independence

This paper investigates the computation of lower/upper expectations that must cohere with a collection of probabilistic assessments and a collection of judgements of epistemic independence. New algorithms, based on multilinear programming, are presented, both for independence among events and among random variables. Separation properties of graphical models are also investigated.

A Syntactic Approach to Revising Epistemic States with Uncertain Inputs

Revising its beliefs when receiving new information is an important ability of any intelligent system. However, in realistic settings the new input is not always certain. A compelling way of dealing with uncertain input in an agent-based setting is to treat it as unreliable input, which may strengthen or weaken the beliefs of the agent. Recent work focused on the postulates associated with this form of belief change and on finding semantical operators that satisfy these postulates. In this paper we propose a new syntactic approach for this form of belief change and show that it agrees with the semantical definition. This makes it feasible to develop complex agent systems capable of efficiently dealing with unreliable input in a semantically meaningful way. Additionally, we show that imposing restrictions on the input and the beliefs that are entailed allows us to devise a tractable approach suitable for resource-bounded agents or agents where reactiveness is of paramount importance.

A belief revision framework for revising epistemic states with partial epistemic states

Belief revision performs belief change on an agent’s beliefs when new evidence (either of the form of a propositional formula or of the form of a total pre-order on a set of interpretations) is received. Jeffrey’s rule is commonly used for revising probabilistic epistemic states when new information is probabilistically uncertain. In this paper, we propose a general epistemic revision framework where new evidence is of the form of a partial epistemic state. Our framework extends Jeffrey’s rule with uncertain inputs and covers well-known existing frameworks such as ordinal conditional function (OCF) or possibility theory. We then define a set of postulates that such revision operators shall satisfy and establish representation theorems to characterize those postulates. We show that these postulates reveal common characteristics of various existing revision strategies and are satisfied by OCF conditionalization, Jeffrey’s rule of conditioning and possibility conditionalization. Furthermore, when reducing to the belief revision situation, our postulates can induce Darwiche and Pearl’s postulates C1 and C2.