The economy of the Beijing Olympic Games: An analysis of first impacts and prospects

This paper was presented at the International Sport Business Symposium, held by the Capital University of Economics and Business in Beijing, in 2008. The speakers, Ferran Brunet, as a professor at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and Zuo Xinwen, as a member of Beijing Development and Reform Commission, both set out to analyze changes in the economic and social development of the city which were undertaken with the aim to celebrate the 2008 Olympic Games. They discuss aspects as a transformation in the mode of economic growth, resources of the Organizing Committee, investments related to the Games, transport and communications, industries, the balance of urban and rural development, urban construction and management service and operations into a well-off society.

Dominance Solvable Games with Multiple Payoff Criteria.

Two logically distinct and permissive extensions of iterative weak dominance are introduced for games with possibly vector-valued payoffs. The first, iterative partial dominance, builds on an easy-to check condition but may lead to solutions that do not include any (generalized) Nash equilibria. However, the second and intuitively more demanding extension, iterative essential dominance, is shown to be an equilibrium refinement. The latter result includes Moulin’s (1979) classic theorem as a special case when all players’ payoffs are real-valued. Therefore, essential dominance solvability can be a useful solution concept for making sharper predictions in multicriteria games that feature a plethora of equilibria.

International Institutions as Solutions to Underlying Games of Cooperation

This Working Paper was presented at the international workshop "Game Theory in International Relations at 50", organized and coordinated by Professor Jacint Jordana and Dr. Yannis Karagiannis at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals on May 22, 2009. The day-long Workshop was inspired by the desire to honour the ground-breaking work of Professor Thomas Schelling in 1959-1960, and to understand where the discipline International Relations lies today vis-à-vis game theory.

Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games.

In this paper we unify, simplify, and extend previous work on the evolutionary dynamics of symmetric N-player matrix games with two pure strategies. In such games, gains from switching strategies depend, in general, on how many other individuals in the group play a given strategy. As a consequence, the gain function determining the gradient of selection can be a polynomial of degree N-1. In order to deal with the intricacy of the resulting evolutionary dynamics, we make use of the theory of polynomials in Bernstein form. This theory implies a tight link between the sign pattern of the gains from switching on the one hand and the number and stability of the rest points of the replicator dynamics on the other hand. While this relationship is a general one, it is most informative if gains from switching have at most two sign changes, as is the case for most multi-player matrix games considered in the literature. We demonstrate that previous results for public goods games are easily recovered and extended using this observation. Further examples illustrate how focusing on the sign pattern of the gains from switching obviates the need for a more involved analysis.

Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

Mean-payoff games and propositional proofs

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.

A Folk Theorem for Games when Frequent Monitoring Decreases Noise

This paper studies frequent monitoring in an infinitely repeated game with imperfect public information and discounting, where players observe the state of a continuous time Brownian process at moments in time of length _. It shows that a limit folk theorem can be achieved with imperfect public monitoring when players monitor each other at the highest frequency, i.e., _. The approach assumes that the expected joint output depends exclusively on the action profile simultaneously and privately decided by the players at the beginning of each period of the game, but not on _. The strong decreasing effect on the expected immediate gains from deviation when the interval between actions shrinks, and the associated increase precision of the public signals, make the result possible in the limit. JEL: C72/73, D82, L20. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Public Monitoring, Brownian Motion.

Managing the size of the Olympic Games

The last two decades have seen dramatic increases in the size and scope of the Summer Olympic Games. In many ways, London 2012 reached even higher summits than the Beijing Games in 2008. This growth is a major challenge for the Olympics and its future organizers, as it is making the Games increasingly difficult to stage and has greatly reduced the number of cities capable of hosting them. This study shows how various participation and organization indicators have expanded over six Olympiads, from Barcelona 1992 to London 2012, and examines the reasons for this growth. It suggests ways of reducing the size of the Summer Olympic Games in order to make them more manageable and to encourage candidatures from smaller cities and countries.

Sistema de monitorització vital portable amb System on Chip i interfície SD Card

Aquesta memòria descriu el procés de desenvolupament del projecte de fi de carrera “Sistema de monitorització vital portable amb System on Chip i interfície SD Card”. Aquest es tracta d’un dispositiu de dimensions reduïdes, baix consum i portable amb capacitat d’enregistrar els biopotencials cardíacs dins d’una targeta de memòria flash SD Card. En temps real es mostra una representació d’aquests biopotencials mitjançant una pantalla LCD gràfica. El projecte, a més, inclou el desenvolupament d’un software de visualització per PC que permet l’anàlisi posterior més detallada dels registres emmagatzemats a la targeta SD Card.

Medical Card for Over 70s: Fees payable to General Practitioners (Sullivan Report)

Medical Card for Over 70s: Fees payable to General Practitioners (Sullivan Report) In the context of the Government decision to end the arrangements whereby medical cards are issued automatically, without a means test, to all those aged 70 and over, a new income threshold was set and the Government decided to introduce a new single capitation rate payable in respect of patients aged 70 and over. I was asked to recommend a new rate for consideration by the Minister for Health & Children and the Government. Click here to download PDF 58kb

"Michael's Game," a card game for the treatment of psychotic symptoms.

Objective: "Michael's Game" is a card game which aims at familiarizing healthcare professionals and patients with cognitive therapy of psychotic symptoms. The present study tests the feasibility and the impact of the intervention in naturalistic settings.Methods: 135 patients were recruited in 11 centres. They were assessed pre- and post-tests with the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) and the Peters Delusion Inventory-21 items (PDI-21).Results: Data about 107 patients were included in the entire analyses. Significant improvements were observed on BCIS subscales as well as a reduction of severity of conviction and preoccupation scores on the PDI-21. The intervention has a moderate effect on the PDI-21 preoccupation and conviction as well as the BCIS subscales. Patients who benefit the most from the program are patients who have a low degree of self-reflectiveness and patients who are concomitantly preoccupied by their symptoms.Conclusion: The present study supports the feasibility and effectiveness of "Michael's Game" in naturalistic settings.Practical implications: The game seems to be a useful tool for patients with psychotic disorders. (C) 2010 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.