Strike Hard, Strike Sure - Operation Musketeer : British Military Planning during the Suez Crisis, 1956

This study analyses British military planning and actions during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It seeks to find military reasons for the change of concepts during the planning and compares these reasons with the tactical doctrines of the time. The thesis takes extensive advantage of military documents preserved in the National Archives, London. In order to expand the understanding of the exchange of views during the planning process, the private papers of high ranking military officials have also been consulted. French military documents preserved in the Service Historique de la Defence, Paris, have provided an important point of comparison. The Suez Crisis caught the British armed forces in the middle of a transition phase. The main objective of the armed forces was to establish a credible deterrence against the Soviet Union. However, due to overseas commitments the Middle East playing a paramount role because of its economic importance the armed forces were compelled to also prepare for Limited War and the Cold War. The armed forces were not fully prepared to meet this demand. The Middle Eastern garrison was being re-organised after the withdrawal from the Canal Base and the concept for a strategic reserve was unimplemented. The tactical doctrines of the time were based on experiences from the Second World War. As a result, the British view of amphibious operations and the subsequent campaigns emphasised careful planning, mastery of the sea and the air, sufficient superiority in numbers and firepower, centralised command and extensive administrative preparations. The British military had realized that Nasser could nationalise the Suez Canal and prepared an outline plan to meet this contingency. Although the plan was nothing more than a concept, it was accepted as a basis for further planning when the Canal was nationalised at the end of July. This plan was short-lived. The nominated Task Force Commanders shifted the landing site from Port Said to Alexandria because it enabled faster expansion of the bridgehead. In addition, further operations towards Cairo the hub of Nasser s power would be easier to conduct. The operational concept can be described as being traditional and was in accordance with the amphibious warfare doctrine. This plan was completely changed at the beginning of September. Apparently, General Charles Keightley, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee developed the idea of prolonged aerial operations. The essence of the concept was to break the Egyptian will to resist by attacking the oil facilities, the transportation system and the armed forces. This victory through air concept would be supported by carefully planned psychological operations. This concept was in accordance with the Royal Air Force doctrine, which promoted a bomber offensive against selected target categories. General Keightley s plan was accepted despite suspicions at every planning level. The Joint Planning Staff and the Task Force Commanders opposed the concept from the beginning to the end because of its unpredictability. There was no information that suggested the bombing would persuade the Egyptians to submit. This problem was worsened by the fact that British intelligence was unable to provide reliable strategic information. The Task Force Commanders, who were responsible for the tactical plans, were not able to change Keightley s mind, but the concept was expanded to include a traditional amphibious assault on Port Said due to their resistance. The bombing campaign was never tested as the Royal Air Force was denied authorisation to destroy the transportation and oil targets. The Chiefs of Staff and General Keightley were too slow to realise that the execution of the plan depended on the determination of the Prime Minister. However, poor health, a lack of American and domestic support and the indecisiveness of the military had ruined Eden s resolve. In the end, a very traditional amphibious assault, which was bound to succeed at the tactical level but fail at the strategic level, was launched against Port Said.

The story of … the military jacket

Fashion and war don’t seem an obvious pairing, but the military jacket is a fashion staple. It may take the form of a double-breasted dress uniform with brass buttons and epaulettes, trimmed in rock star braid, or it may be a khaki combat jacket, worn with Doc Martens and a scowl. Here I explore how these two forms of the military jacket were frogmarched into fashion...

Fatigued driving : prevalence, risk factors and groups, and the law

Fatigue and sleepiness are major causes of road traffic accidents. However, precise data is often lacking because a validated and reliable device for detecting the level of sleepiness (cf. the breathalyzer for alcohol levels) does not exist, nor does criteria for the unambiguous detection of fatigue/sleepiness as a contributing factor in accident causation. Therefore, identification of risk factors and groups might not always be easy. Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to incorporate fatigue in operationalized terms into either traffic or criminal law. The main aims of this thesis were to estimate the prevalence of fatigue problems while driving among the Finnish driving population, to explore how VALT multidisciplinary investigation teams, Finnish police, and courts recognize (and prosecute) fatigue in traffic, to identify risk factors and groups, and finally to explore the application of the Finnish Road Traffic Act (RTA), which explicitly forbids driving while tired in Article 63. Several different sources of data were used: a computerized database and the original folders of multidisciplinary teams investigating fatal accidents (VALT), the driver records database (AKE), prosecutor and court decisions, a survey of young male military conscripts, and a survey of a representative sample of the Finnish active driving population. The results show that 8-15% of fatal accidents during 1991-2001 were fatigue related, that every fifth Finnish driver has fallen asleep while driving at some point during his/her driving career, and that the Finnish police and courts punish on average one driver per day on the basis of fatigued driving (based on the data from the years 2004-2005). The main finding regarding risk factors and risk groups is that during the summer months, especially in the afternoon, the risk of falling asleep while driving is increased. Furthermore, the results indicate that those with a higher risk of falling asleep while driving are men in general, but especially young male drivers including military conscripts and the elderly during the afternoon hours and the summer in particular; professional drivers breaking the rules about duty and rest hours; and drivers with a tendency to fall asleep easily. A time-of-day pattern of sleep-related incidents was repeatedly found. It was found that VALT teams can be considered relatively reliable when assessing the role of fatigue and sleepiness in accident causation; thus, similar experts might be valuable in the court process as expert witnesses when fatigue or sleepiness are suspected to have a role in an accident’s origins. However, the application of Article 63 of the RTA that forbids, among other things, fatigued driving will continue to be an issue that deserves further attention. This should be done in the context of a needed attitude change towards driving while in a state of extreme tiredness (e.g., after being awake for more than 24 hours), which produces performance deterioration comparable to illegal intoxication (BAC around 0.1%). Regarding the well-known interactive effect of increased sleepiness and even small alcohol levels, the relatively high proportion (up to 14.5%) of Finnish drivers owning and using a breathalyzer raises some concern. This concern exists because these drivers are obviously more focused on not breaking the “magic” line of 0.05% BAC than being concerned about driving impairment, which might be much worse than they realize because of the interactive effects of increased sleepiness and even low alcohol consumption. In conclusion, there is no doubt that fatigue and sleepiness problems while driving are common among the Finnish driving population. While we wait for the invention of reliable devices for fatigue/sleepiness detection, we should invest more effort in raising public awareness about the dangerousness of fatigued driving and educate drivers about how to recognize and deal with fatigue and sleepiness when they ultimately occur.

Stress and Resilience in Combat-Related PTSD: Integration of Psychological Theory and Biological Mechanisms

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a debilitating psychiatric disorder that has a major impact on the ability to function effectively in daily life. PTSD may develop as a response to exposure to an event or events perceived as potentially harmful or life-threatening. It has high prevalence rates in the community, especially among vulnerable groups such as military personnel or those in emergency services. Despite extensive research in this field, the underlying mechanisms of the disorder remain largely unknown. The identification of risk factors for PTSD has posed a particular challenge as there can be delays in onset of the disorder, and most people who are exposed to traumatic events will not meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD. With the advent of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM V), the classification for PTSD has changed from an anxiety disorder into the category of stress- and trauma-related disorders. This has the potential to refocus PTSD research on the nature of stress and the stress response relationship. This review focuses on some of the important findings from psychological and biological research based on early models of stress and resilience. Improving our understanding of PTSD by investigating both genetic and psychological risk and coping factors that influence stress response, as well as their interaction, may provide a basis for more effective and earlier intervention.

Personality in sport and exercise psychology: Integrating a whole person perspective

This paper draws on contemporary views in personality psychology as a means for understanding people participating in sport and physical activity. Specifically, we focus on McAdams’ integrative framework [McAdams (2013). The psychological self as actor, agent, and author. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 272–295; McAdams & Pals (2006). A new big five: Fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality. American Psychologist, 61, 204–217] and suggest this framework as potentially generative in the field of sport and exercise psychology. McAdams indicates that people can be defined through three layers of understanding, incorporating (a) dispositional traits, (b) characteristic adaptations, and (c) narrative identities. Together these layers provide a vision of the whole person – a perspective of personality rarely adopted by the sport and exercise community. The aim of this paper is to introduce scholars and practitioners to the potential benefits of embracing this whole person outlook, and to discuss the opportunities and challenges McAdams’ framework may have for advancing scholarship in sport and exercise psychology.

Portrait of Surgeon Major Dr. Meyer of Dueren (Rhineland) in military uniform Portraits Men

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Portrait of Surgeon Major Dr. Bing of Nuernberg in his military uniform Portraits Men

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Reproduction of portrait of field chaplain Rabbi Dr. Sali Levi Military; World War I; Portraits

Feldrabbiner Dr. Sali Lewi, Breslau

Portrait of Ernst Gottschalk (seated second row center) with eight unidentified soldiers; Rendsburg, Germany. Military Portraits groups

Morgen hat Reserve Ruh / Auf Wiedersehen / Beste Gruesse; postcard signer Gottschalk; addressee: L Nurzinsky, Altona-Othmarschen, Aidikes Str.

Portrait of Leopold Meyerhof in his World War I officer's uniform Military; World War I; Portraits

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Portrait of Leo Baeck as military chaplain Military; World War I; Portraits

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Leo Baeck with unidentified soldiers Military; World War I; Portraits Groups

Center May 2000