Contágio no modelo de Allen e Gale com infraestrutura bancária endógena

Neste trabalho investigamos a formação de network considerando agentes cautelosos. O modelo consiste em duas regiões com (n/2) bancos em cada, onde a interligação entre eles ocorre através e depósitos interbancários. Cada banco está sujeito a corrida bancária, ou devido a um choque negativo de agentes impacientes, ou devido a contaminação da corrida de um banco pertencente a infraestrutura bancária. Os bancos podem tentar eliminar a possibilidade de contágio ao fazer um número alto de inter-ligações. Para isso, é necessário uma coordenação entre todos os bancos. Se um banco não se prevenir de um contágio, ele impõe a todos os outros a possibilidade de contágio no pior cenário. Há duas regiões bem definidas de equilíbrio de nash simétrico com network estável, uma na qual todos os bancos se previnem do cenário de contágio no pior cenário e a outra na qual nenhum banco se previne. Devido ao problema de coordenação, o equilíbrio com contágio no pior cenário pode ocorrer mesmo sendo pareto dominado pelo equilíbrio sem contágio. Sob certas condições, o equilíbrio com contágio ocorre com um network pareto eficiente. Neste caso o network eficiente é diferente do network mais resiliente ao contágio.

A further note on the college admission game

When a stable matching rule is used for a college admission market, questions on incentives facing agents of both sides of the market naturally emerge. This note states and proves four important results which fill a gap in the theory of incentives for the college admission model. Two of them have never been demonstrated but have been used along the years and are responsible for the success that this theory has had in explaining empirical economic phenomena.

Location-price competition with externality: an application to the Tenerife tram

[EN] This paper presents a location–price equilibrium problem on a tree. A sufficient condition for having a Nash equilibrium in a spatial competition model that incorporates price, transport, and externality costs is given. This condition implies both competitors are located at the same point, a vertex that is the unique median of the tree. However, this is not an equilibrium necessary condition. Some examples show that not all medians are equilibria. Finally, an application to the Tenerife tram is presented.

Spatio-temporal credit assignment in population learning

Learning by reinforcement is important in shaping animal behavior, and in particular in behavioral decision making. Such decision making is likely to involve the integration of many synaptic events in space and time. However, using a single reinforcement signal to modulate synaptic plasticity, as suggested in classical reinforcement learning algorithms, a twofold problem arises. Different synapses will have contributed differently to the behavioral decision, and even for one and the same synapse, releases at different times may have had different effects. Here we present a plasticity rule which solves this spatio-temporal credit assignment problem in a population of spiking neurons. The learning rule is spike-time dependent and maximizes the expected reward by following its stochastic gradient. Synaptic plasticity is modulated not only by the reward, but also by a population feedback signal. While this additional signal solves the spatial component of the problem, the temporal one is solved by means of synaptic eligibility traces. In contrast to temporal difference (TD) based approaches to reinforcement learning, our rule is explicit with regard to the assumed biophysical mechanisms. Neurotransmitter concentrations determine plasticity and learning occurs fully online. Further, it works even if the task to be learned is non-Markovian, i.e. when reinforcement is not determined by the current state of the system but may also depend on past events. The performance of the model is assessed by studying three non-Markovian tasks. In the first task, the reward is delayed beyond the last action with non-related stimuli and actions appearing in between. The second task involves an action sequence which is itself extended in time and reward is only delivered at the last action, as it is the case in any type of board-game. The third task is the inspection game that has been studied in neuroeconomics, where an inspector tries to prevent a worker from shirking. Applying our algorithm to this game yields a learning behavior which is consistent with behavioral data from humans and monkeys, revealing themselves properties of a mixed Nash equilibrium. The examples show that our neuronal implementation of reward based learning copes with delayed and stochastic reward delivery, and also with the learning of mixed strategies in two-opponent games.

Spatio-temporal credit assignment in population learning

Learning by reinforcement is important in shaping animal behavior. But behavioral decision making is likely to involve the integration of many synaptic events in space and time. So in using a single reinforcement signal to modulate synaptic plasticity a twofold problem arises. Different synapses will have contributed differently to the behavioral decision and, even for one and the same synapse, releases at different times may have had different effects. Here we present a plasticity rule which solves this spatio-temporal credit assignment problem in a population of spiking neurons. The learning rule is spike time dependent and maximizes the expected reward by following its stochastic gradient. Synaptic plasticity is modulated not only by the reward but by a population feedback signal as well. While this additional signal solves the spatial component of the problem, the temporal one is solved by means of synaptic eligibility traces. In contrast to temporal difference based approaches to reinforcement learning, our rule is explicit with regard to the assumed biophysical mechanisms. Neurotransmitter concentrations determine plasticity and learning occurs fully online. Further, it works even if the task to be learned is non-Markovian, i.e. when reinforcement is not determined by the current state of the system but may also depend on past events. The performance of the model is assessed by studying three non-Markovian tasks. In the first task the reward is delayed beyond the last action with non-related stimuli and actions appearing in between. The second one involves an action sequence which is itself extended in time and reward is only delivered at the last action, as is the case in any type of board-game. The third is the inspection game that has been studied in neuroeconomics. It only has a mixed Nash equilibrium and exemplifies that the model also copes with stochastic reward delivery and the learning of mixed strategies.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Optimal game theoretic distributed control methodologies in small scale power systems

This dissertation presents the competitive control methodologies for small-scale power system (SSPS). A SSPS is a collection of sources and loads that shares a common network which can be isolated during terrestrial disturbances. Micro-grids, naval ship electric power systems (NSEPS), aircraft power systems and telecommunication system power systems are typical examples of SSPS. The analysis and development of control systems for small-scale power systems (SSPS) lacks a defined slack bus. In addition, a change of a load or source will influence the real time system parameters of the system. Therefore, the control system should provide the required flexibility, to ensure operation as a single aggregated system. In most of the cases of a SSPS the sources and loads must be equipped with power electronic interfaces which can be modeled as a dynamic controllable quantity. The mathematical formulation of the micro-grid is carried out with the help of game theory, optimal control and fundamental theory of electrical power systems. Then the micro-grid can be viewed as a dynamical multi-objective optimization problem with nonlinear objectives and variables. Basically detailed analysis was done with optimal solutions with regards to start up transient modeling, bus selection modeling and level of communication within the micro-grids. In each approach a detail mathematical model is formed to observe the system response. The differential game theoretic approach was also used for modeling and optimization of startup transients. The startup transient controller was implemented with open loop, PI and feedback control methodologies. Then the hardware implementation was carried out to validate the theoretical results. The proposed game theoretic controller shows higher performances over traditional the PI controller during startup. In addition, the optimal transient surface is necessary while implementing the feedback controller for startup transient. Further, the experimental results are in agreement with the theoretical simulation. The bus selection and team communication was modeled with discrete and continuous game theory models. Although players have multiple choices, this controller is capable of choosing the optimum bus. Next the team communication structures are able to optimize the players’ Nash equilibrium point. All mathematical models are based on the local information of the load or source. As a result, these models are the keys to developing accurate distributed controllers.

Game Theoretic Bidding Strategies for Auctions in Green Electricity Markets

Electricity markets in the United States presently employ an auction mechanism to determine the dispatch of power generation units. In this market design, generators submit bid prices to a regulation agency for review, and the regulator conducts an auction selection in such a way that satisfies electricity demand. Most regulators currently use an auction selection method that minimizes total offer costs ["bid cost minimization" (BCM)] to determine electric dispatch. However, recent literature has shown that this method may not minimize consumer payments, and it has been shown that an alternative selection method that directly minimizes total consumer payments ["payment cost minimization" (PCM)] may benefit social welfare in the long term. The objective of this project is to further investigate the long term benefit of PCM implementation and determine whether it can provide lower costs to consumers. The two auction selection methods are expressed as linear constraint programs and are implemented in an optimization software package. Methodology for game theoretic bidding simulation is developed using EMCAS, a real-time market simulator. Results of a 30-day simulation showed that PCM reduced energy costs for consumers by 12%. However, this result will be cross-checked in the future with two other methods of bid simulation as proposed in this paper.

A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics

We analyze a model of 'postelection politics', in which (unlike in the more common Downsian models of 'preelection politics') politicians cannot make binding commitments prior to elections. The game begins with an incumbent politician in office, and voters adopt reelection strategies that are contingent on the policies implemented by the incumbent. We generalize previous models of this type by introducing heterogeneity in voters' ideological preferences, and analyze how voters' reelection strategies constrain the policies chosen by a rent-maximizing incumbent. We first show that virtually any policy (and any feasible level of rent for the incumbent) can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive a 'median voter theorem': the ideal point of the median voter, and the minimum feasible level of rent, are the unique outcomes in any strong Nash equilibrium. We then introduce alternative refinements that are less restrictive. In particular, Ideologically Loyal Coalition-proof equilibrium also leads uniquely to the median outcome.

Nonpoint Pollution Control: Inducing First-best Outcomes through the Use of Threats

In this paper we develop a simple economic model to analyze the use of a policy that combines a voluntary approach to controlling nonpoint-source pollution with a background threat of an ambient tax if the voluntary approach is unsuccessful in meeting a pre-specified environmental goal. We first consider the case where the policy is applied to a single farmer, and then extend the analysis to the case where the policy is applied to a group of farmers. We show that in either case such a policy can induce cost-minimizing abatement without the need for farm-specific information. In this sense, the combined policy approach is not only more effective in protecting environmental quality than a pure voluntary approach (which does not ensure that water quality goals are met) but also less costly than a pure ambient tax approach (since it entails lower information costs). However, when the policy is applied to a group of farmers, we show that there is a potential tradeoff in the design of the policy. In this context, lowering the cutoff level of pollution used for determining total tax payments increases the likely effectiveness of the combined approach but also increases the potential for free riding. By setting the cutoff level equal to the target level of pollution, the regulator can eliminate free riding and ensure that cost-minimizing abatement is the unique Nash equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily. However, this cutoff level also ensures that zero voluntary abatement is a Nash equilibrium. In addition, with this cutoff level the equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily will not strictly dominate the equilibrium under which it is not. We show that all results still hold if the background threat instead takes the form of reducing government subsidies if a pre-specified environmental goal is not met.

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

On Labor Complementarity, Cultural Frictions and Strategic Immigration Policies

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries that face a flow of immigration from the "rest of the world." The countries differ in three characteristics: the labor complementarity between the "native" population and immigrants, the population size, and the magnitude of the cultural friction between the natives and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game between two countries' when their strategic instrument is the choice of an immigration quota and the world immigrant wages introduce the spill-over effect between two countries. We first show that the quota game admits unique pure strategies Nash equilibrium. We then compare the equilibrium choices of two countries and show that even though the larger country attracts more immigrants, it chooses lower quota than its smaller counterpart. It also turns out that higher degree of labor complementarity between natives and immigrants and a lower degree of cultural friction between two groups yield higher immigration quota. We also examine the welfare implications of countries choices' and argue that coordinated and harmonized immigration policies may improve the welfare of both countries.

Financial Policies and Dynamic Game Simulation in Poland and Hungary

Recently, steady economic growth rates have been kept in Poland and Hungary. Money supplies are growing rather rapidly in these economies. In large, exchange rates have trends of depreciation. Then, exports and prices show the steady growth rates. It can be thought that per capita GDPs are in the same level and development stages are similar in these two countries. It is assumed that these two economies have the same export market and export goods are competing in it. If one country has an expansion of monetary policy, price increase and interest rate decrease. Then, exchange rate decrease. Exports and GDP will increase through this phenomenon. At the same time, this expanded monetary policy affects another country through the trade. This mutual relationship between two countries can be expressed by the Nash-equilibrium in the Game theory. In this paper, macro-econometric models of Polish and Hungarian economies are built and the Nash- equilibrium is introduced into them.