A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are madecompatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is donethrough a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibilityproblems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only majorcooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of mostcooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept(like most papers in the Nash program do). Finally, the mechanisms in theNash program are adapted into the model.

Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games

By introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that coalitional games and social choice problems are equivalent (implying that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This facilitates the understanding of the role of invariance and randomness in the Nash program. Also, the extent to which mechanisms in the Nash program perform ``real implementation'' is examined.

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.

La caza de cachalote en el Perú. Estadísticas de captura para los años 1947 - 1961 y un intento de analizar las condiciones de la población en el periodo 1954 - 1961

Presenta datos basicos del numero cachalotes capturados cada años desde 1947 en la region del Pacifico Sureste. Datos sobre el esfuerzo y la captura por unidad de esfuerzo de las operaciones de caza de Pisco para el periodo 1954-1961 y de Paita para el 1957-1961. Ademas, la estructura de la poblaciòn, la abundancia de la poblacion y su relacion con el esfuerzo.

Filmi poikki... : poliittinen elokuvasensuuri Suomessa 1939-1947

Summary: Cut! : political film censorship in Finland, 1939-1947

Looking backward on Hawkeyeland, 1947.

This is a reprint for the Iowa Centennial Committee of an article orginally published in the Morell magazine, Dec. 1946, by William J. Peterson. It is the history of Iowa, leading up to and including the first 100 years of becoming a state.

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.