The Pay-Off Method as a Tool for Evaluating the Risk and Profitability of Public Real Estate Investments

Real option valuation, in particular the fuzzy pay-off method, has proven to be useful in defining risk and visualizing imprecision of investments in various industry applications. This study examines whether the evaluation of risk and profitability for public real estate investments can be improved by using real option methodology. Firstly, the context of real option valuation in the real estate industry is examined. Further, an empirical case study is performed on 30 real estate investments of a Finnish government enterprise in order to determine whether the presently used investment analysis system can be complemented by the pay-off method. Despite challenges in the application of the pay-off method to the case company’s large investment base, real option valuation is found to create additional value and facilitate more robust risk analysis in public real estate applications.

Competitive Effects of Non-Controlling Minority Acquisitions – Sufficient to merit further EU merger regulation?

Partial ownership interests are a widespread phenomenon in modern corporate environment. Unless minority shareholding affords the target to exercise control over the target, they do currently not have to be notified to the European Commission under EU merger regime. However, economic research has long suggested that when linking competing or non-horizontally positioned undertakings particularly in industries with few competitors, minority shareholdings even far below the majority of shares or voting rights could lead to higher prices or lower output volumes to the detriment of consumers. The Commission has recognized this issue and proceeded to suggest an extension of the merger regime to catch also certain non-controlling minority acquisitions. Horizontal non-controlling minority shareholdings create a positive correlation between the sales revenues of the partial acquirer and target. Through the equity interest the acquirer will internalise a fraction, proportional to the financial rights attached to the shareholding, of the profit of the target. This will incentivise the acquirer to contribute to increasing the target’s business profits by increasing its own sales price (horizontal unilateral effects). When a minority stake is held in a vertically related or a conglomerate company, the minority acquirer could be allowed to hamper or eliminate the target’s rivals’ access either to inputs (input foreclosure) or customers (customer foreclosure), depending on which level of the supply chain the parties are (vertical unilateral effects). Under certain circumstances minority share acquisitions could also lessen competition because they facilitate collusion between companies active in the market (coordinated effects). Economic theory confirms that non-controlling minority shareholdings may under certain circumstances create anti-competitive effects that are unlikely to be remedies by pro-competitive effects. However, they are likely to be of less significant nature than anticompetitive effects created by full mergers. This derives fore mostly from the fact that a minority share acquirer carries all the costs associated with its unilateral action but will internalise only a fraction of the lost profits. This is likely to limit the acquirer’s incentive to raise price and the profitability of such behavior. Having in mind that the number of potentially problematic cases is expected to be next to negligible, the limited potential competitive effects of non-controlling minority share acquisitions cannot be seen to clearly merit extension of the scope of the EUMR. The system suggested by the Commission is particularly ill-fitted for such purpose given the clear lack of legal certainty and considerable administrative burden associated with it.

Arrêt du grand conseil qui fixe ce qui doit être payé par le Sr Pavé, en qualité de secrétaire du roi, pour signature, mise au net, papier et façon d'un décret forcé intervenu aux requêtes du palais

[Acte. 1748-11-08. Paris]

You get what you pay for : independent music and Canadian public policy

The aim of this MA thesis is to demonstrate how corporate concentration within the global music industry specifically affects the Canadian music industry's ability to compete for its own national audience as well as audiences worldwide. Federal public policies, regulatory regimes and subsidies are considered within the context of the structure of the global marketplace which is, in effect, an oligopoly controlled by four major corporations. Through an extensive literature review of political economy theory, Canadian public policies and music studies, as well as personal interviews conducted with Canadian musicians, entrepreneurs and public servants, I will situate my research within the body of political economy theory; present a detailed report of the structure of the global music industry; address the key players within the industry; describe the relationship between the major corporations and the independent companies operating in the industry; discuss how new technologies affect said relationships; consider the effectiveness of Canadian public policies in safeguarding the national music industry; and recommend steps that can be taken to remedy the shortcomings of Federal policies and regulatory regimes.

Letter Regarding an Affidavit discussing the Half Pay of Daniel Shannon, Ensign- June 13, 1820

A letter regarding an affidavit discussing the half pay of Daniel Shannon from the 25th June to the 21st of December 1819.

Notice to Half Pay Officers and Out Pensioners of Chelsea and Kilmainham Hospitals- 1821

Discusses the half pay and pensions of Officers living within His Majesty's Dominions. At the bottom, there is also a comment made by Robert Morrogh to Daniel Shannon concerning the above notice.

Letter Regarding Ensign Daniel Shannon's Military Pay from the Commissariat Office- 30 May 1817

A letter stating that Military Half Pay would from then on be paid from the Commissariat Office. As a result, they require a new letter of attorney. It also states the half pay amount of Daniel Shannon.

A List of Officers of the reduced Independent Companies who are to receive half pay from the days hereafter mentioned, to the 24th of December 1791, both days inclusive, or to the days of their death or Provision respectively.

Sir George Yonge (1732-1812) was a baronet, politician and colonial governor. He was a Member of Parliament for Honiton from 1754-1761 and 1763-1796, British Secretary at War from 1782-1783 and 1783-1794, and Governor of the Cape colony from 1799-1801.

Report of the committee appointed to inquire what amendments are necessary to the Act granting bounties in land and extra pay to certain Canadian volunteers: January 11, 1817, read, and, together with the bill herewith reported, ordered to be printed. (1817)

Includes (p. 3-4) a letter from the Acting Secretary of War to the chairman of the committee dated Department of War, December 26th, 1816.

List of Officers of the reduced Independent Companies who are to receive half pay - 1791

A List of Officers of the reduced Independent Companies who are to receive half pay from the days hereafter mentioned, to the 24th of December 1791, both days inclusive, or to the days of their death or Provision respectively. The document includes 153 names of Captains, Lieutenants, and Ensigns. Among the names are Isaac Brock and his brother Irwin Brock. It is signed by George Yonge.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for the months of June, July, August and September, 1854

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of June, July, August and September, 1854.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll the months of April and May, 1854, signed by S.D. Woodruff, May 31, 1854

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of April and May, 1854, signed by S.D. Woodruff, May 31, 1854.