Decentralized Computation of Pareto Optimal Pure Nash Equilibria of Boolean Games with Privacy Concerns

In Boolean games, agents try to reach a goal formulated as a Boolean formula. These games are attractive because of their compact representations. However, few methods are available to compute the solutions and they are either limited or do not take privacy or communication concerns into account. In this paper we propose the use of an algorithm related to reinforcement learning to address this problem. Our method is decentralized in the sense that agents try to achieve their goals without knowledge of the other agents’ goals. We prove that this is a sound method to compute a Pareto optimal pure Nash equilibrium for an interesting class of Boolean games. Experimental results are used to investigate the performance of the algorithm.

Gas liquid equilibria at high pressures

Este trabalho tem como objectivo a medição da solubilidade de gases em líquidos a altas pressões. Para a realização experimental foi usada uma célula de altas pressões de volume variável e um método de observação directa para a detecção das transições de fase. As condições usadas neste trabalho experimental foram temperaturas entre 276.00 e 373.15 K e pressões ate 100 MPa. Numa primeira fase foram efectuadas medições de solubilidade de metano em anilina pura e para uma solução aquosa de composição mássica igual a 5% em anilina. A anilina é fundamentalmente usada em processos como a produção de borracha, de poliuretanos, pigmentos e tintas, fármacos, herbicidas e fungicidas. É usualmente produzida através de processos de redução do nitrobenzeno por reacção com o HCl. De facto, esta síntese é um processo químico complexo onde um grande número de processos compete entre si. Alterações nas condições do processo com a possível formação de produtos intermediários podem afectar a eficiência do processo. Para a sua melhoria foi sugerido que o hidrogénio usado fosse simultaneamente produzido e gasto no reactor principal. Neste caso e para a produção do mesmo, era necessário adicionar metano e água ao reactor. Tendo por base a ideia de que as reacções onde o hidrogénio é reagente e produto ocorrem em simultâneo, torna-se clara a importância do estudo da solubilidade do metano em anilina pura e em soluções aquosas desta. Numa segunda fase foi estudada a solubilidade do dióxido de carbono em soluções aquosas de tri-iso-butil(metil)fosfónio tosilato, com composições molares são de 4, 8 e 12% em líquido iónico. Este pertencente à família dos fosfónios. Possui uma viscosidade e densidade elevadas, é térmica e quimicamente estável e ainda possui uma elevada polaridade. Apresenta uma miscibilidade completa em água e nos solventes mais usuais, como o diclorometano e tolueno, não sendo no entanto míscivel em hexano. O tri-isobutil( metil)fosfónium tosilato é usado como solvente nos processos de hidroformilação de olefinas e ainda em processos de captura e conversão de dióxido de carbono. Neste trabalho experimental, a temperatura e a pressão foram inicialmente aumentadas até o sistema atingir o equilíbrio. A pressão é diminuída lentamente até se verificar o aparecimento/desaparecimento da última bolha de gás. A pressão à qual a última bolha de gás desaparece representa a pressão de equilíbrio para aquela temperatura. Este procedimento foi efectuado para vários sistemas e várias temperaturas.

High temperature vapour-liquid equilibria of water-polyalcohol mixtures

Tese de doutoramento, Química (Química Tecnológica), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências, 2014

Molecular simulation of gas adsorption equilibria in nanoporous materials

This work is divided into two distinct parts. The first part consists of the study of the metal organic framework UiO-66Zr, where the aim was to determine the force field that best describes the adsorption equilibrium properties of two different gases, methane and carbon dioxide. The other part of the work focuses on the study of the single wall carbon nanotube topology for ethane adsorption; the aim was to simplify as much as possible the solid-fluid force field model to increase the computational efficiency of the Monte Carlo simulations. The choice of both adsorbents relies on their potential use in adsorption processes, such as the capture and storage of carbon dioxide, natural gas storage, separation of components of biogas, and olefin/paraffin separations. The adsorption studies on the two porous materials were performed by molecular simulation using the grand canonical Monte Carlo (μ,V,T) method, over the temperature range of 298-343 K and pressure range 0.06-70 bar. The calibration curves of pressure and density as a function of chemical potential and temperature for the three adsorbates under study, were obtained Monte Carlo simulation in the canonical ensemble (N,V,T); polynomial fit and interpolation of the obtained data allowed to determine the pressure and gas density at any chemical potential. The adsorption equilibria of methane and carbon dioxide in UiO-66Zr were simulated and compared with the experimental data obtained by Jasmina H. Cavka et al. The results show that the best force field for both gases is a chargeless united-atom force field based on the TraPPE model. Using this validated force field it was possible to estimate the isosteric heats of adsorption and the Henry constants. In the Grand-Canonical Monte Carlo simulations of carbon nanotubes, we conclude that the fastest type of run is obtained with a force field that approximates the nanotube as a smooth cylinder; this approximation gives execution times that are 1.6 times faster than the typical atomistic runs.

On Stackelberg Equilibria with Differentiated Products: the Critical Role of the Strategy Space.

Nous Considerons Dans Cet Article un Modele de Duopole Avec Produits Differencies; Nous Montrons Que le Caractere Substituts Vs Complements de Ces Produits Est un Facteur Important Dans la Determination du Mode de Concurrence Strategique (Cournot-Bertrand, Nash Mixte, Stackelberg; En Prix Ou Quantites) Que L'on Est Susceptible D'observer. Si les Produits Sont Substituts (Complements), la Concurrence Sera du Type Cournot (Bertrand) Plutot Que du Type Nash Mixte a Moins Qu'une Firme Puisse Affirmer Son Leadership et Forcer une Concurrence a la Stackelberg Mais Quel Soit le Role Tenu Par une Firme, Il Sera Preferable Pour Elle Que la Concurrence S'exprime En Quantite (Prix). Par Ailleurs, la Concurrence a la Bertrand Est Toujours la Meilleure du Point de Vue des Consommateurs et du Point de Vue de L'efficacite Sociale, et Ce, Que les Produits Soient Susbtituts Ou Complements.

(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules which are minimally manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find a competitive and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

Conflict, wages, and multiple equilibria

Firms’ compensation practices affect the protection of investors’ interests and the degree of economic inequality by changing the stakes of engaging in appropriation activities versus respecting the status quo. We use a general equilibrium model where workers can either work peacefully or join a guerrilla movement that expropriates entrepreneurs. If workers are peaceful, they receive a competitive wage. If they join a guerrilla movement, they receive a share of the appropriated wealth, which depends positively on the number of guerrilla members. In this framework, we find one low-income, low-wage equilibrium with guerrilla activity and one peaceful, high-income, high-wage equilibrium. The peaceful equilibrium can be reached through redistribution policies, which can be implemented at the firm level. In essence, through their compensation policies entrepreneurs, not the state might be able to protect their assets against expropriation and simultaneously control the internal principal-agent problem.

AQA A2 Unit 4 Chemistry : kinetics, equilibria and organic chemistry.

Guía de apoyo para alumnos de educación secundaria de segundo ciclo que sigan la especificación de AQA (Assessment and Qualifications Alliance) en el nivel A2 del área de química. Está dividida en tres secciones: una introducción con consejos y técnicas para la realización del examen; una guía de contenido con los principales conceptos y temas (cinética, equilibrio, ácidos y bases, nomenclatura e isomería en química orgánica, compuestos del grupo carbonilo, química aromática, aminas, aminoácidos, polímeros, análisis y síntesis orgánica y determinación de estructura); y una sección con preguntas de examen y respuestas comentadas por un examinador.

A simple model of multiple equilibria and default. CEPS Working Document No. 366, 16 July 2012

This Working Document by Daniel Gros presents a simple model that incorporates two types of sovereign default cost: first, a lump-sum cost due to the fact that the country does not service its debt fully and is recognised as being in default status, by ratings agencies, for example. Second, a cost that increases with the size of the losses (or haircut) imposed on creditors whose resistance to a haircut increases with the proportional loss inflicted upon them. One immediate implication of the model is that under some circumstances the creditors have a (collective) interest to forgive some debt in order to induce the country not to default. The model exhibits a potential for multiple equilibria, given that a higher interest rate charged by investors increases the debt service burden and thus the temptation to default. Under very high debt levels credit rationing can set in as the feedback loop between higher interest rates and the higher incentive to default can become explosive. The introduction of uncertainty makes multiple equilibria less likely and reduces their range.