Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for the months of June, July, August and September, 1854

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of June, July, August and September, 1854.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll the months of April and May, 1854, signed by S.D. Woodruff, May 31, 1854

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of April and May, 1854, signed by S.D. Woodruff, May 31, 1854.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for the months of June, July, August and September, 1854, signed by S.D. Woodruff, Sept. 30, 1854

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of June, July, August and September, 1854, signed by S.D. Woodruff, Sept. 30, 1854.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for the months of October, November and December, 1854

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of October, November and December, 1854.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for the months of October, November and December, 1854, signed by S.D. Woodruff, Jan. 8, 1855

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of October, November and December, 1854, signed by S.D. Woodruff, Jan. 8, 1855.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for the months of January and February, 1855

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of January and February, 1855.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for the months of October, January, February and March, 1855, signed by S.D. Woodruff, Mar. 22, 1855

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of October, January, February and March, 1855, signed by S.D. Woodruff, Mar. 22, 1855.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for the months of April and May, 1855, signed by S.D. Woodruff, June 13, 1855

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of April and May, 1855, signed by S.D. Woodruff, June 13, 1855.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for the months of June, July and August, 1855, signed by S.D. Woodruff. There is an envelope included with this document, Aug. 21, 1855

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of June, July and August, 1855, signed by S.D. Woodruff. There is an envelope included with this document, Aug. 21, 1855.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for the months of March, April and May, 1856

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of March, April and May, 1856.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for the months of March, April and May, 1856, signed by S.D. Woodruff, June 3, 1856

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of March, April and May, 1856, signed by S.D. Woodruff, June 3, 1856.

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for the months of June, July and August, 1856, signed by S.D. Woodruff, Sept. 2, 1856

Port Dalhousie and the Thorold Railway pay roll for services of engineering and contingencies furnished for the months of June, July and August, 1856, signed by S.D. Woodruff, Sept. 2, 1856.

Contentious Contracts

This paper offers an explanation of rationally contracts where incompeteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a relationship with two-sided moral hazard in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex ante efficient.

Le discours organisationnel et la construction de la responsabilité sociale d’entreprise : une comparaison d’entreprises chiliennes et canadiennes

Cette recherche se propose d’étudier, d’un point de vue ethnométhodologique, la manière dont des entreprises de deux pays (le Chili et le Canada) et trois secteurs productifs (Banque, télécommunications et forestier) construisent leur responsabilité sociale à partir de leur discours, c’est à dire à la manière dont elles s’auto-positionnent par rapport à cette question. Sans vouloir généraliser, la comparaison des entreprises canadiennes et chiliennes a pour objectif de savoir dans quelle mesure des entreprises établies dans des pays représentant différents degrés de développement construisent des discours différents ou similaires par rapport à la question de leur responsabilité sociale. Pour tenter de répondre à cette question, nous étudierons ce sujet à travers l’analyse du message ou de la lettre du Président Directeur Général (PDG) présentées sur leurs rapports de responsabilité sociale, ce qui nous permettra de montrer comment les entreprises construisent et s’auto-positionnent, dans leur discours officiel, par rapport à la question de leur responsabilité sociale. En nous basant sur ces analyses, nous discuterons des similitudes et des différences identifiées et nous montrerons ainsi dans quelle mesure la responsabilité sociale est construite sur des références globales plus larges, ou sur des contingences qui émergent du contexte.

Toward a rational-choice foundation of non-additive theories

A classical argument of de Finetti holds that Rationality implies Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). In contrast, the Knightian distinction between Risk and Ambiguity suggests that a rational decision maker would obey the SEU paradigm when the information available is in some sense good, and would depart from it when the information available is not good. Unlike de Finetti's, however, this view does not rely on a formal argument. In this paper, we study the set of all information structures that might be availabe to a decision maker, and show that they are of two types: those compatible with SEU theory and those for which SEU theory must fail. We also show that the former correspond to "good" information, while the latter correspond to information that is not good. Thus, our results provide a formalization of the distinction between Risk and Ambiguity. As a consequence of our main theorem (Theorem 2, Section 8), behavior not-conforming to SEU theory is bound to emerge in the presence of Ambiguity. We give two examples of situations of Ambiguity. One concerns the uncertainty on the class of measure zero events, the other is a variation on Ellberg's three-color urn experiment. We also briefly link our results to two other strands of literature: the study of ambiguous events and the problem of unforeseen contingencies. We conclude the paper by re-considering de Finetti's argument in light of our findings.