Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information

This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake a costly action or investment that together produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. Two cases are considered: (i) where agents are risk neutral and are subject to limited liability constraints and (ii) where agents are risk averse, have quasi-linear preferences in consumption and actions but where limited liability constraints do not bind. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division of the surplus over time so as to avoid expropriation. In the risk-neutral case, there may be an initial phase in which one agent overinvests and the other underinvests. However, both actions and surplus converge monotonically to a stationary state in which there is no overinvestment and surplus is at its maximum subject to the constraints. In the risk-averse case, there is no overinvestment. For this case, we establish that dynamics may or may not be monotonic depending on whether or not it is possible to sustain a first-best allocation. If the first-best allocation is not sustainable, then there is a trade-off between risk sharing and surplus maximization. In general, surplus will not be at its constrained maximum even in the long run.

Memory in contracts: the experience of the EBRD (1991-2003)

The objective of this paper is to identify the role of memory as a screening device in repeated contracts with asymmetric information in financial intermediation. We use an original dataset from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. We propose a simple empirical method to capture the role of memory using the client's reputation. Our results unambiguously isolate the dominant effect of memory on the bank's lending decisions over market factors in the case of established clients.

Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the optimal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts. Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms operating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term contracts to save on the junior workers' wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not) hire workers through long-term contracts.

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates a trade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractual relationships. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificing managerial selection may be optimal at early stages of economic development and when access to information is limited. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increases the return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, where managerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Better institutions, in the form of a richer contracting environment and less severe informational frictions, speed up the transition to short-term relationships.

Decentralization of contracts with interim sidecontracting

This paper gives a new explanation for the phenomena of subcontracting. A model in which a principal contracts two agents who work in a sequence on a project, have soft information and can collude is considered. Side-contracts between agents can be signed at any stage of the game. Due to limited liability and moral hazard agents obtain a rent. The principal’s problem is to find the preferable contracting structure. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized contracting structure can be superior to a centralized structure for the principal. The paper derives the conditions under which this holds. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Contract delegation, Collusion, Interim side-contracting, Moral hazard.

Fonaments i actuacions de lideratge sistèmic d'un equip de bàsquet professional i futures aplicacions

El treball de recerca “Fonaments i actuacions de lideratge sistèmic d’un equip de bàsquet professional i futures aplicacions” fa l’anàlisi d’una experiència real vinculada al món de l’esport professional. Es pretén donar a conèixer com l’estructuració del coneixement de l’entrenador pot afavorir el bon funcionament de l’equip. L’estructuració ens genera criteri i coherència a l’hora de prendre decisions.Es reconeix a l’entrenador com una persona treballadora, apassionada per la seva feina i en constant creixement individual. Valors com la humilitat, l’entusiasme, el compromís, la generositat i l’autoexigència es converteixen en adjectius fonamentals del nostre entrenador.L’estudi en l’autoconeixement en conceptes com lideratge, nivells neurològics, talent i motivació esdevenen el pal de paller en la construcció de l’equip. Un equip amb identitat pròpia, on el benefici pel bé comú (equip) està per sobre de tot, cooperatiu, compromès, i on la figura de l’entrenador intuïtiu amb coneixement influeix més per convenciment que per autoritat.El treball del dia a dia de l’entrenador i de l´equip es fonamenta en l’organització dels pilars de l’entrenador: flexibilitat, creixement de l’entrenador, equip, marges col·lectiu i individual són els motors del bon funcionament del col·lectiu. En el treball presentat, es destaca la importància de saber diferenciar, en el rendiment d’un equip, dues vessants: una més objectiva (tècnica, tàctica, estratègia i física) i l’altra on el factor humà és determinant. La investigació aprofundeix en aquest segon factor i el reconeix com a preferent. Per acabar es presenten tot un seguit d’actuacions utilitzades al llarg de la investigació amb la finalitat de generar, mantenir i millorar l’equip al mateix temps que es mostren diferents eines per tal d’optimitzar l’eficiència de les actuacions. La investigació pretén ser una experiència útil i enriquidora a l’hora d’estructurar el coneixement per tal de poder ser utilitzat en futures aplicacions.

Fit Futures - Executive Summary (PDF 298 KB)

Executive Summary of the Fit Futures Report

Fit Futures: Focus on Food, Activity and Young People (PDF 861 KB)

The Fit Futures: Focus on Food, Activity and Young People report

Community Health Nursing: Current Practice and Possible Futures (PDF 298 KB)

Community Health Nursing: Current Practice and Possible Futures

Mesoclitic Romance futures and conditionals vs participle preposing

(INFINITIVE + CLITIC + AUX) is an evidential configuration in Old Spanish and Old Catalan, whereas (PARTICIPLE + CLITIC + AUX) is an instance of weak or unmarked focus fronting. The evidentiality of mesoclitic structures can be put forward on the bases of three main arguments: a) mesoclisis is not compulsory (i.e., whenever you have a clitic, you can either have mesoclisis or proclisis/enclisis); b) mesoclitic futures and conditionals areattested in interrogative sentences (with wh- elements); and c) they are not found in derived adverbial clauses (which is what you expect if they have an evidential value, since they bring about intervention effects corresponding to the derivational account of conditional and temporal sentences, for example - see Haegeman 2007 and ff.), and are related to high modal expressions (thus interfering with MoodPIrrealis)

Cellules souches cancéreuses et futures modalités thérapeutiques du cancer. [Cancer stem cells and future therapeutic implications].

A growing body of evidence indicates that a subpopulation of tumor cells, the so-called cancer stem cells (CSCs), drive tumor growth and metastasis and preclude therapy efficiency. CSCs have been isolated in virtually all type of tumors. These findings may have important consequences for clinical prognostic. Current cancer research aims to unravel the CSCs' unique biological mechanisms. The development of new CSCs-targeted treatments shed therefore new hopes in improving cancer therapy.

Iowa Department of Transportation Office of Contracts Letting Summary, July 1, 2002 - June 30, 2003

Summary of contracts let by Iowa DOT Office of Contracts in 12 regular and three emergency/special lettings during FY 2003 for construction and maintenance work. It also contains a comparison of quantities and unit contract prices for various items of highway construction work for projects let in fiscal years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003.

A Review of Service Contracts for Selected State Agencies

State Agency Audit Report

Department of Administrative Services, Information Technology Enterprise, A Review of Selected Service Contracts, April 1, 1998 - June 30, 2003

Other Audit Reports - Special Report