Orthographic facilitation in oral vocabulary acquisition

An experiment investigated whether exposure to orthography facilitates oral vocabulary learning. A total of 58 typically developing children aged 8-9 years were taught 12 nonwords. Children were trained to associate novel phonological forms with pictures of novel objects. Pictures were used as referents to represent novel word meanings. For half of the nonwords children were additionally exposed to orthography, although they were not alerted to its presence, nor were they instructed to use it. After this training phase a nonword-picture matching posttest was used to assess learning of nonword meaning, and a spelling posttest was used to assess learning of nonword orthography. Children showed robust learning for novel spelling patterns after incidental exposure to orthography. Further, we observed stronger learning for nonword-referent pairings trained with orthography. The degree of orthographic facilitation observed in posttests was related to children's reading levels, with more advanced readers showing more benefit from the presence of orthography.

Influencing energy efficient occupant behavior through improved building and control design

There is growing pressure on the construction industry to deliver energy efficient, sustainable buildings but there is evidence to suggest that, in practice, designs regularly fail to achieve the anticipated levels of in-use energy consumption. One of the key factors behind this discrepancy is the behavior of the building occupants. This paper explores how insights from experimental psychology could potentially be used to reduce the gap between the predicted and actual energy performance of buildings. It demonstrates why traditional methods to engage with the occupants are not always successful and proposes a model for a more holistic approach to this issue. The paper concludes that achieving energy efficiency in buildings is not solely a technological issue and that the construction industry needs to adopt a more user-centred approach.

Auditory distraction eliminates retrieval induced forgetting: implications for the processing of unattended sound

The Retrieval-Induced Forgetting (RIF) paradigm includes three phases: (a) study/encoding of category exemplars, (b) practicing retrieval of a sub-set of those category exemplars, and (c) recall of all exemplars. At the final recall phase, recall of items that belong to the same categories as those items that undergo retrieval-practice, but that do not undergo retrieval-practice, is impaired. The received view is that this is because retrieval of target category-exemplars (e.g., ‘Tiger’ in the category Four-legged animal) requires inhibition of non-target category-exemplars (e.g., ‘Dog’ and ‘Lion’) that compete for retrieval. Here, we used the RIF paradigm to investigate whether ignoring auditory items during the retrieval-practice phase modulates the inhibitory process. In two experiments, RIF was present when retrieval-practice was conducted in quiet and when conducted in the presence of spoken words that belonged to a category other than that of the items that were targets for retrieval-practice. In contrast, RIF was abolished when words that either were identical to the retrieval-practice words or were only semantically related to the retrieval-practice words were presented as background speech. The results suggest that the act of ignoring speech can reduce inhibition of the non-practiced category-exemplars, thereby eliminating RIF, but only when the spoken words are competitors for retrieval (i.e., belong to the same semantic category as the to-be-retrieved items).

Consolidation power of extrinsic rewards: reward cues enhance long-term memory for irrelevant past events

Recent research suggests that extrinsic rewards promote memory consolidation through dopaminergic modulation processes. However, no conclusive behavioral evidence exists given that the influence of extrinsic reward on attention and motivation during encoding and consolidation processes are inherently confounded. The present study provides behavioral evidence that extrinsic rewards (i.e., monetary incentives) enhance human memory consolidation independently of attention and motivation. Participants saw neutral pictures, followed by a reward or control cue in an unrelated context. Our results (and a direct replication study) demonstrated that the reward cue predicted a retrograde enhancement of memory for the preceding neutral pictures. This retrograde effect was observed only after a delay, not immediately upon testing. An additional experiment showed that emotional arousal or unconscious resource mobilization cannot explain the retrograde enhancement effect. These results provide support for the notion that the dopaminergic memory consolidation effect can result from extrinsic reward. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)(journal abstract)

On the transfer of prior tests or study events to subsequent study

Tests, as learning events, are often more effective than are additional study opportunities, especially when recall is tested after a long retention interval. To what degree, though, do prior test or study events support subsequent study activities? We set out to test an implication of Bjork and Bjork’s (1992) new theory of disuse—that, under some circumstances, prior study may facilitate subsequent study more than does prior testing. Participants learned English–Swahili translations and then underwent a practice phase during which some items were tested (without feedback) and other items were restudied. Although tested items were better recalled after a 1-week delay than were restudied items, this benefit did not persist after participants had the opportunity to study the items again via feedback. In fact, after this additional study opportunity, items that had been restudied earlier were better recalled than were items that had been tested earlier. These results suggest that measuring the memorial consequences of testing requires more than a single test of retention and, theoretically, a consideration of the differing status of initially recallable and nonrecallable items.

Type-1 error inflation in the traditional by-participant analysis to metamemory accuracy: a generalized mixed-effects model perspective

In order to examine metacognitive accuracy (i.e., the relationship between metacognitive judgment and memory performance), researchers often rely on by-participant analysis, where metacognitive accuracy (e.g., resolution, as measured by the gamma coefficient or signal detection measures) is computed for each participant and the computed values are entered into group-level statistical tests such as the t-test. In the current work, we argue that the by-participant analysis, regardless of the accuracy measurements used, would produce a substantial inflation of Type-1 error rates, when a random item effect is present. A mixed-effects model is proposed as a way to effectively address the issue, and our simulation studies examining Type-1 error rates indeed showed superior performance of mixed-effects model analysis as compared to the conventional by-participant analysis. We also present real data applications to illustrate further strengths of mixed-effects model analysis. Our findings imply that caution is needed when using the by-participant analysis, and recommend the mixed-effects model analysis.

Distraction control processes in free recall: benefits and costs to performance

How is semantic memory influenced by individual differences under conditions of distraction? This question was addressed by observing how visual target words—drawn from a single category—were recalled whilst ignoring spoken distracter words that were either members of the same, or members of a different (single) category. Working memory capacity (WMC) was related to disruption only with synchronous, not asynchronous, presentation and distraction was greater when the words were presented synchronously. Subsequent experiments found greater negative priming of distracters amongst individuals with higher WMC but this may be dependent on targets and distracters being comparable category exemplars. With less dominant category members as distracters, target recall was impaired – relative to control – only amongst individuals with low WMC. The results highlight the role of cognitive control resources in target-distracter selection and the individual-specific cost implications of such cognitive control.

Time to decide? Simplicity and congruity in comparative judgment

What is the relationship between magnitude judgments relying on directly available characteristics versus probabilistic cues? Question frame was manipulated in a comparative judgment task previously assumed to involve inference across a probabilistic mental model (e.g., “which city is largest” – the “larger” question – versus “which city is smallest” – the “smaller” question). Participants identified either the largest or smallest city (Experiments 1a, 2) or the richest or poorest person (Experiment 1b) in a three-alternative forced choice (3-AFC) task (Experiment 1) or 2-AFC task (Experiment 2). Response times revealed an interaction between question frame and the number of options recognized. When asked the smaller question, response times were shorter when none of the options were recognized. The opposite pattern was found when asked the larger question: response time was shorter when all options were recognized. These task-stimuli congruity results in judgment under uncertainty are consistent with, and predicted by, theories of magnitude comparison which make use of deductive inferences from declarative knowledge.

Contrasting cases

This paper concerns the philosophical significance of a choice about how to design the context-shifting experiments used by contextualists and anti-intellectualists: Should contexts be judged jointly, with contrast, or separately, without contrast? Findings in experimental psychology suggest (1) that certain contextual features are difficult to evaluate when considered separately, and there are reasons to think that one feature that interests contextualists and anti- intellectualists—stakes or importance—is such a difficult to evaluate attribute, and (2) that joint evaluation of contexts can yield judgments that are more reflective and rational in certain respects. With those two points in mind, a question is raised about what source of evidence provides better support for philosophical theories of how contextual features affect knowledge ascriptions and evidence: Should we prefer evidence consisting of "ordinary" judgments, or more reflective, perhaps more rational judgments? That question is answered in relation to different accounts of what such theories aim to explain, and it is concluded that evidence from contexts evaluated jointly should be an important source of evidence for contextualist and anti-intellectualist theories, a conclusion that is at odds with the methodology of some recent studies in experimental epistemology.

Contrasting effects of changing rhythm and content on auditory distraction in immediate memory

Across five experiments, the temporal regularity and content of an irrelevant speech stream were varied and their effects on a serial recall task examined. Variations of the content, but not the rhythm, of the irrelevant speech stimuli reliably disrupted serial recall performance in all experiments. Bayesian analyses supported the null hypothesis over the hypothesis that irregular rhythms would disrupt memory to a greater extent than regular rhythms. Pooling the data in a combined analysis revealed that regular presentation of the irrelevant speech was significantly more disruptive to serial recall than irregular presentation. These results are consistent with the idea that auditory distraction is sensitive to both intra-item and inter-item relations and challenge an orienting-based account of auditory distraction.

Erroneous and veridical recall are not two sides of the same coin: evidence from semantic distraction in free recall

Two experiments examined the extent to which erroneous recall blocks veridical recall using, as a vehicle for study, the disruptive impact of distractors that are semantically similar to a list of words presented for free recall. Instructing participants to avoid erroneous recall of to-be-ignored spoken distractors attenuated their recall but this did not influence the disruptive effect of those distractors on veridical recall (Experiment 1). Using an externalised output-editing procedure—whereby participants recalled all items that came to mind and identified those that were erroneous—the usual between-sequence semantic similarity effect on erroneous and veridical recall was replicated but the relationship between the rate of erroneous and veridical recall was weak (Experiment 2). The results suggest that forgetting is not due to veridical recall being blocked by similar events.

Want to block earworms from conscious awareness?B(u)y gum!

Three experiments examine the role of articulatory motor planning in experiencing an involuntary musical recollection (an “earworm”). Experiment 1 shows that interfering with articulatory motor programming by chewing gum reduces both the number of voluntary and the number of involuntary—unwanted—musical thoughts. This is consistent with other findings that chewing gum interferes with voluntary processes such as recollections from verbal memory, the interpretation of ambiguous auditory images, and the scanning of familiar melodies, but is not predicted by theories of thought suppression, which assume that suppression is made more difficult by concurrent tasks or cognitive loads. Experiment 2 shows that chewing the gum affects the experience of “hearing” the music and cannot be ascribed to a general effect on thinking about a tune only in abstract terms. Experiment 3 confirms that the reduction of musical recollections by chewing gum is not the consequence of a general attentional or dual-task demand. The data support a link between articulatory motor programming and the appearance in consciousness of both voluntary and unwanted musical recollections.

Processing speed, executive function, and age differences in remembering and knowing

A group of young (n=52, M=23.27 years) and old (n=52, M=68.62 years) adults studied two lists of semantically unrelated nouns. For one list a time of 2 s was allowed for encoding, and for the other, 5 s. A recognition test followed where participants classified their responses according to Gardiner’s (1988) remember–know procedure. Age differences for remembering and knowing were minimal in the faster 2-s encoding condition. However, in the longer 5-s encoding condition, younger persons produced significantly more remember responses, and older adults a greater number of know responses. This dissociation suggests that in the longer encoding condition, younger adults utilized a greater level of elaborative rehearsal governed by executive processes, whereas older persons employed maintenance rehearsal involving short-term memory. Statistical control procedures, however, found that independent measures of processing speed accounted for age differences in remembering and knowing and that independent measures of executive control had little influence. The findings are discussed in the light of contrasting theoretical accounts of recollective experience in old age.

Negative priming in free recall reconsidered

Recent investigations of the phenomenon of forgetting have been driven mostly by the development of a novel theoretical framework which places great emphasis on inhibitory control (Anderson, 2003; Anderson & Spellman, 1995; Bjork, 1989). Whereas traditional, interference-based theories consider forgetting to be a by-product of storing new information, the inhibitory framework postulates a specialized mechanism, or a group of mechanisms, that serves the function of ‘deactivating’ information which is currently irrelevant. This process of inhibiting currently irrelevant information is thought to have lasting consequences, affecting memory for the irrelevant information on subsequent tests. The active and functional perspective on forgetting embedded in the inhibitory framework opens new fields for examining the role of forgetting in cognitive functioning. Differences in the ability to inhibit irrelevant information have been postulated to play important roles in a range of clinical conditions (e.g., Soriano, Jiménez, Román, & Bajo, 2009; Storm & White, 2010) and the trajectory of cognitive development (e.g., Aslan & Bäuml, 2010) as well as contributing to individual differences in many other cognitive and social domains (Redick, Heitz, & Engle, 2007).

When enough is not enough: information overload and metacognitive decisions to stop studying information

People are often exposed to more information than they can actually remember. Despite this frequent form of information overload, little is known about how much information people choose to remember. Using a novel “stop” paradigm, the current research examined whether and how people choose to stop receiving new—possibly overwhelming—information with the intent to maximize memory performance. Participants were presented with a long list of items and were rewarded for the number of correctly remembered words in a following free recall test. Critically, participants in a stop condition were provided with the option to stop the presentation of the remaining words at any time during the list, whereas participants in a control condition were presented with all items. Across five experiments, we found that participants tended to stop the presentation of the items to maximize the number of recalled items, but this decision ironically led to decreased memory performance relative to the control group. This pattern was consistent even after controlling for possible confounding factors (e.g., task demands). The results indicated a general, false belief that we can remember a larger number of items if we restrict the quantity of learning materials. These findings suggest people have an incomplete understanding of how we remember excessive amounts of information.