In pursuit of regulatory compliance: a study of planning enforcement structures in Northern Ireland

As devolution expands across the UK, Northern Ireland (NI) is witnessing the development of new architecture to devolve planning powers. With serious criticism targeted at the legislative provisions for enforcement, this investigation endeavours to assess the robustness of the planning framework through a synergy of theory, law and practice. The paper demonstrates the value of theory in not only supplying a lens that allows both legislative frameworks and praxis to be deconstructed, but also in enabling the identification and scrutiny of underlying problems that pervade the system.

Environmental affairs enforcement report

This is a list of actions taken against businesses that are not in compliance with environmental regulations including underground storage tanks, hazardous waste, drinking water, water pollution and solid waste. It is broken down by enforcement by various divisions of DHEC including the Bureau of Land and Waste Management, Bureau of Water, Bureau of Air Quality, Bureau of Environmental Health Services and Division of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management.

Environmental affairs enforcement report

This is a list of actions taken against businesses that are not in compliance with environmental regulations including underground storage tanks, hazardous waste, drinking water, water pollution and solid waste. It is broken down by enforcement by various divisions of DHEC including the Bureau of Land and Waste Management, Bureau of Water, Bureau of Air Quality, Bureau of Environmental Health Services and Division of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management.

Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.

Natural-Resource Exploitation with Costly Enforcement of Property Rights

This paper proposes a model of natural-resource exploitation when private ownership requires costly enforcement activities. For a given wage rate, it is shown how enforcement costs can increase with labor's average productivity on a resource site. As a result, it is never optimal for the site owner to produce at the point where marginal productivity equals the wage rate. It may even be optimal to exploit at a point exhibiting negative marginal returns. An important parameter in the analysis is the prevailing wage rate. When wages are low, further decreases in the wage rates can reduce the returns from resource exploitation. At sufficiently low wages, positive returns can be rendered impossible to achieve and the site is abandoned to a free-access exploitation. The analysis provides some clues as to why property rights may be more difficult to delineate in less developed countries. It proposes a different framework from which to address normative issues such as the desirability of free trade with endogenous enforcement costs, the optimality of private decisions to enforce property rights, the effect of income distribution on property rights enforceability, etc.

Patent pools and competition law : an examination of the enforcement strategies of competition authorities

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit, option recherche"