Beckett's Letters

Review article: The Letters of Samuel Beckett 1929–1940, edited by Martha Dow Fehsenfeld and Lois More Overbeck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. xcix, 782, £30.00. ISBN: 978-0521867931.

A review of Islamic mutual funds’ financial performance and investment style in Muslim and non-Muslim countries

Islamic finance has grown beyond its reputation of providing small-scale banking options and now provides investment and financing options for complex large-scale commercial transactions. Islamic investments are one area that has attracted the attention of investors due to its performance, especially during the economic downturn. The Shari’ah compliance nature of Islamic funds provides an opportunity for those Muslim investors to be part of the global investment sector who have previously been reluctant to invest in conventional mutual funds. The fact that the funds’ managers are prohibited from investing in activities such as weapons production, alcohol production and interest-bearing finance operations, makes Islamic mutual funds also attractive for those Non-Muslim investors who wish to invest ethically. Today there are hundreds of Islamic equity indices offered by Dow Jones, FTSE, MSCI and S&P. Despite the growing importance of Islamic funds, there have been limited studies exploring the performance of Islamic funds worldwide. Due to very limited data sets and not too rigorous analytical methods, these existent studies have neither investigated Islamic funds’ financial performance in noticeable detail nor analysed the investment style of more than six funds. For instance, relevant questions such as the financial performance of Islamic mutual funds’ beyond their investment styles or a difference in performance between funds from Muslim and non-Muslim countries have nearly not been investigated at all. Very recently, a study by Hoepner, Rammal and Rezec (2011) analysed the financial performance and investment style of 262 Islamic equity funds from 20 countries in five regions (Africa, Asia-Pacific, Europe, Gulf Cooperative Council-GCC, and North America). As comparison, previous studies did not even analyse 60 funds. Hoepner et al.’s study sampled a period of two decades and was therefore able to test the performance of the funds during economic booms as well as economic downturns. The findings of the study provide new insights into the performance of Islamic mutual funds in Muslim and Western markets and during financial crisis.

Paleoamerican Morphology in the Context of European and East Asian Late Pleistocene Variation: Implications for Human Dispersion Into the New World

Early American crania show a different morphological pattern from the one shared by late Native Americans. Although the origin of the diachronic morphological diversity seen on the continents is still debated, the distinct morphology of early Americans is well documented and widely dispersed. This morphology has been described extensively for South America, where larger samples are available. Here we test the hypotheses that the morphology of Early Americans results from retention of the morphological pattern of Late Pleistocene modern humans and that the occupation of the New World precedes the morphological differentiation that gave rise to recent Eurasian and American morphology. We compare Early American samples with European Upper Paleolithic skulls, the East Asian Zhoukoudian Upper Cave specimens and a series of 20 modern human reference crania. Canonical Analysis and Minimum Spanning Tree were used to assess the morphological affinities among the series, while Mantel and Dow-Cheverud tests based on Mahalanobis Squared Distances were used to test different evolutionary scenarios. Our results show strong morphological affinities among the early series irrespective of geographical origin, which together with the matrix analyses results favor the scenario of a late morphological differentiation of modern humans. We conclude that the geographic differentiation of modern human morphology is a late phenomenon that occurred after the initial settlement of the Americas. Am J Phys Anthropol 144:442-453, 2011. (c) 2010 Wiley-Liss, Inc.

Cell-cell signal-dependent dynamic interactions between HD-GYP and GGDEF domain proteins mediate virulence in Xanthomonas campestris

RpfG is a paradigm for a class of widespread bacterial two-component regulators with a CheY-like receiver domain attached to a histidine-aspartic acid-glycine-tyrosine-proline (HD-GYP) cyclic di-GMP phosphodiesterase domain. In the plant pathogen Xanthomonas campestris pv. campestris (Xcc), a two-component system comprising RpfG and the complex sensor kinase RpfC is implicated in sensing and responding to the diffusible signaling factor (DSF), which is essential for cell-cell signaling. RpfF is involved in synthesizing DSF, and mutations of rpfF, rpfG, or rpfC lead to a coordinate reduction in the synthesis of virulence factors such as extracellular enzymes, biofilm structure, and motility. Using yeast two-hybrid analysis and fluorescence resonance energy transfer experiments in Xcc, we show that the physical interaction of RpfG with two proteins with diguanylate cyclase (GGDEF) domains controls a subset of RpfG-regulated virulence functions. RpfG interactions were abolished by alanine substitutions of the three residues of the conserved GYP motif in the HD-GYP domain. Changing the GYP motif or deletion of the two GGDEF-domain proteins reduced Xcc motility but not the synthesis of extracellular enzymes or biofilm formation. RpfG-GGDEF interactions are dynamic and depend on DSF signaling, being reduced in the rpfF mutant but restored by DSF addition. The results are consistent with a model in which DSF signal transduction controlling motility depends on a highly regulated, dynamic interaction of proteins that influence the localized expression of cyclic di-GMP.

Competição oligopolística em ambiente de incerteza knightiana

Este artigo aplica rn.n teori,ma de existência de equilibrios de Nash sob incerteza (Dow & Werlang, 1~4) a um problema clássico da Teoria da Competição Oligopolística. Particularmente, mostra como se pode mapear todos os equilibrios de Cournot (que incluem as soluções de monopólio e de bloqueio total da produção) unicamente em função da aversão à incerteza dos produtores. Os efeitos das variações destes parâmetros sobre as produções de equilibrio são estudados. Também, as soluções de Cournot sob incerteza são comparadas com a solução do monopolio standard. Particularmente, mostra-se: que existe um nível de incerteza tal que toda aversão à incerteza (do mercado) superior à este nível, induz os agentes a produzir, agregadamente, quantidades menores que as de monopolio. Enfim, as soluções de equilibrio são particularizadas explícitamente nos casos da Demanda Linear e do Duopolio de Cournot

Estimação de regressões aditivas via backfitting e integração marginal: performance em pequenas amostras

Nesta dissertação realizou-se um experimento de Monte Carlo para re- velar algumas características das distribuições em amostras finitas dos estimadores Backfitting (B) e de Integração Marginal(MI) para uma regressão aditiva bivariada. Está-se particularmente interessado em fornecer alguma evidência de como os diferentes métodos de seleção da janela hn, tais co- mo os métodos plug-in, impactam as propriedades em pequenas amostras dos estimadores. Está-se interessado, também, em fornecer evidência do comportamento de diferentes estimadores de hn relativamente a seqüência ótima de hn que minimiza uma função perda escolhida. O impacto de ignorar a dependência entre os regressores na estimação da janela é tam- bém investigado. Esta é uma prática comum e deve ter impacto sobre o desempenho dos estimadores. Além disso, não há nenhuma rotina atual- mente disponível nos pacotes estatísticos/econométricos para a estimação de regressões aditivas via os métodos de Backfitting e Integração Marginal. É um dos objetivos a criação de rotinas em Gauss para a implementação prática destes estimadores. Por fim, diferentemente do que ocorre atual- mente, quando a utilização dos estimadores-B e MI é feita de maneira completamente ad-hoc, há o objetivo de fornecer a usuários informação que permita uma escolha mais objetiva de qual estimador usar quando se está trabalhando com uma amostra finita.

Preferences, common knowledge and speculative trade

We study the proposition that if it is common knowledge that en allocation of assets is ex-ante pareto efficient, there is no further trade generated by new information. The key to this result is that the information partitions and other characteristics of the agents must be common knowledge and that contracts, or asset markets, must be complete. It does not depend on learning, on 'lemons' problems, nor on agreement regarding beliefs and the interpretation of information. The only requirement on preferences is state-additivity; in particular, traders need not be risk-averse. We also prove the converse result that "no-trade results" imply that traders' preferences can be represented by state-additive utility functions. We analyze why examples of other widely studied preferences (e.g., Schmeidler (1989)) allow "speculative" trade.

Homothetic preferences

This paper describes properties of upper semi-continuous homothetic preferences. First we give conditions for the existence of an upper semi-continuous representation which is homogeneous of degree one. Then we show that with the additional assumptions of monotonicity or strict convexity, the preference is continuous. Several counterexamples illustrate the tightness of the results.

Uncertainty aversion and the optmal choice of portfolio

In this paper we apply the theory of declsion making with expected utility and non-additive priors to the choice of optimal portfolio. This theory describes the behavior of a rational agent who i5 averse to pure 'uncertainty' (as well as, possibly, to 'risk'). We study the agent's optimal allocation of wealth between a safe and an uncertain asset. We show that there is a range of prices at which the agent neither buys not sells short the uncertain asset. In contrast the standard theory of expected utility predicts that there is exactly one such price. We also provide a definition of an increase in uncertainty aversion and show that it causes the range of prices to increase.

Laws of large numbers for non-additive probabilities

We apply the concept of exchangeable random variables to the case of non-additive robability distributions exhibiting ncertainty aversion, and in the lass generated bya convex core convex non-additive probabilities, ith a convex core). We are able to rove two versions of the law of arge numbers (de Finetti's heorems). By making use of two efinitions. of independence we rove two versions of the strong law f large numbers. It turns out that e cannot assure the convergence of he sample averages to a constant. e then modal the case there is a true" probability distribution ehind the successive realizations of the uncertain random variable. In this case convergence occurs. This result is important because it renders true the intuition that it is possible "to learn" the "true" additive distribution behind an uncertain event if one repeatedly observes it (a sufficiently large number of times). We also provide a conjecture regarding the "Iearning" (or updating) process above, and prove a partia I result for the case of Dempster-Shafer updating rule and binomial trials.

The consistency of welfare judgements with a representative consumer

This paper is about economies with a representative consumer. In general a representative consumer need not exist, although there are several well known sets of sufficient conditions under which Qne will. It is common practice, however, to use the representative consumer hypothesis without specifically assuming any of these. We show, firstly, that it is possible for the utility of the representative consumer to increase when every actual consumer is made worse off. This shows a serious shortcoming of welfare judgements based on the representatíve consumer. Secondly, in economies where this does not occur, there exists a social welfare function, which we construct, which is consistent with welfare judgements based on the utility of the representative consumer. Finally we provide a converse to Samuelson' s 1956 representative consumer result, which relates it to Scitovsky's community indifference curves.

The ex-Ante non-optimality of the Dempster-Schafer updating rule for ambiguous beliefs

The most widely used updating rule for non-additive probalities is the Dempster-Schafer rule. Schmeidles and Gilboa have developed a model of decision making under uncertainty based on non-additive probabilities, and in their paper “Updating Ambiguos Beliefs” they justify the Dempster-Schafer rule based on a maximum likelihood procedure. This note shows in the context of Schmeidler-Gilboa preferences under uncertainty, that the Dempster-Schafer rule is in general not ex-ante optimal. This contrasts with Brown’s result that Bayes’ rule is ex-ante optimal for standard Savage preferences with additive probabilities.

Oligopolistic competition under knightian uncertainty

This artic/e applies a theorem of Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow & Werlang, 1994) to the classic Coumot model of oligopolistic competition. It shows, in particular, how one can map all Coumot equilibrium (which includes the monopoly and the null solutions) with only a function of uncertainty aversion coefficients of producers. The effect of variations in these parameters over the equilibrium quantities are studied, also assuming exogenous increases in the number of matching firms in the game. The Cournot solutions under uncertainty are compared with the monopolistic one. It shows principally that there is an uncertainty aversion level in the industry such that every aversion coefficient beyond it induces firms to produce an aggregate output smaller than the monopoly output. At the end of the artic/e equilibrium solutions are specialized for Linear Demand and for Coumot duopoly. Equilibrium analysis in the symmetric case allows to identify the uncertainty aversion coefficient for the whole industry as a proportional lack of information cost which would be conveyed by market price in the perfect competition case (Lerner Index).