Handwritten sheet of paper detailing the cost of transporting boxes containing the Gravatt’s level

Handwritten sheet of paper detailing the cost of transporting boxes containing the Gravatt’s level from London to St. Catharines. This sheet is signed by S.D. Woodruff, Jan. 11, 1847.

Approximate cost of completing the railway from Port Dalhousie to St. Catharines and an estimate of the cost of the piers at Port Dalhousie signed by William Hamilton Merritt

Approximate cost of completing the railway from Port Dalhousie to St. Catharines and an estimate of the cost of the piers at Port Dalhousie signed by William Hamilton Merritt (5 pages, handwritten), July 8, 1854.

Approximate estimate of the cost of completing the Port Dalhousie Railway to the Grand Central Railway Station at Lock 12

Approximate estimate of the cost of completing the Port Dalhousie Railway to the Grand Central Railway Station at Lock 12. This document is badly torn and burned but most of the text is legible, July 14, 1854.

Estimated cost of the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway sent to George Rykert by S.D. Woodruff

Estimated cost of the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway sent to George Rykert by S.D. Woodruff, Aug. 5, 1854.

Approximate estimate of the cost of constructing and completing the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway to St. Catharines

Approximate estimate of the cost of constructing and completing the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway to St. Catharines signed by S.D. Woodruff (2 pages, handwritten), Jan. 8, 1855.

Cost of the railway from Port Dalhousie to St. Catharines

Cost of the railway from Port Dalhousie to St. Catharines (1 page, handwritten), Jan. 11, 1855.

Approximate estimate of the cost of extending the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway from Geneva Street to the Great Western Railway Station at Lock no. 12

Approximate estimate of the cost of extending the Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway from Geneva Street to the Great Western Railway Station at Lock no. 12 (2 copies) [one appears to be a rough copy] (2 pages, handwritten), Feb. 2, 1855.

Letter of estimate sent to S.D. Woodruff for the total cost of construction and equipment of the extension of the line to Port Colborne

Letter of estimate sent to S.D. Woodruff for the total cost of construction and equipment of the extension of the line to Port Colborne [this is unsigned]. There is an envelope with this letter that suggests that it is from Mr. Shanly, Mar. 12, 1857.

Chart of estimate of cost of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway extension Line no. 1

Chart of estimate of cost of Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway extension Line no. 1 signed by Mr. Shanly, Mar. 12, 1857.

Chart of the estimated cost of Line no. 1

Chart of the estimated cost of Line no. 1, n.d.

Chart outlining Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway cost of planks, bridge, railway crossing and approaches thereto

Chart outlining Port Dalhousie and Thorold Railway cost of planks, bridge, railway crossing and approaches thereto, n.d.

Approximate estimate of the cost of macadamizing, grading, bridging and putting in culverts from Hurst’s Bridge above Thorold to Port Robinson

Approximate estimate of the cost of macadamizing, grading, bridging and putting in culverts from Hurst’s Bridge above Thorold to Port Robinson (2 pages, handwritten), n.d.

List of abstracts (2 pages, handwritten) stating the cost of S.D. Woodruff dwelling and barns

List of abstracts (2 pages, handwritten) stating the cost of S.D. Woodruff dwelling and barns, January, 1878.

Determining the Social Cost of the Project Proposed by the Regie Intermunicipale de Gestion des Dechets sur l'Ile de Montreal.

Rapport de recherche

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.