Corruption and individual ethics: insights from a public procurement auction

This article proposes an auction model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of the contest. Players as firms face a social dilemma in the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease with the bribe (and increase with higher quality). We find that the presence of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilibrium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.

Uptake of agri-environmental schemes in the Less-Favoured Areas of Greece: The role of corruption and farmers' responses to the financial crisis

Vine-growing in the Less-Favoured Areas of Greece is facing multiple challenges that might lead to its abandonment. In an attempt to maintain rural populations, Rural Development Schemes have been created that offer the opportunity to rural households to maintain or expand their farming businesses including vine-growing. This paper stems from a study that used data from a cross-sectional survey of 204 farmers to investigate how farming systems and farmers’ perception of corruption, amongst other socio-economic factors, affected their decisions to continue vine-growing through participation in Rural Development Schemes, in three remote Less-Favoured Areas of Greece. The Theory of Planned Behaviour was used to frame the research problem with the assumption being that an individual’s intention to participate in a Scheme is based on their prior beliefs about it. Data from the survey were reduced and simplified by the use of non-linear principal component analysis. The ensuing variables were used in selectivity corrected ordered probit models to reveal farmers’ attitudes towards viticulture and rural development. It was found that economic factors, perceived corruption and farmers’ attitudes were significant determinants on whether to participate in the Schemes. The research findings highlight the important role of perceived corruption and the need for policies that facilitate farmers’ access to decision making centres.

Parliamentarians and corruption in Africa: the challenge of leadership and the practice of politics

This report, compiled on behalf of the African Parliamentary Network Against Corruption (APNAC), surveys the attitudes of African parliamentarians toward corruption. It is the first study of its kind to investigate the manner in which corruption impacts directly upon the political behaviour, practices and attitudes of those elected members sitting in parliaments across the continent. If the problems of corruption are to be tackled in the African continent, then the role of elected members of legislative assemblies will surely be a crucial factor.

Does corruption matter for international entrepreneurship?

This study asks how key regulations influence nascent international entrepreneurship in countries with varying levels of corruption. Using regulatory capture theory and institutional theory, we hypothesize and test the effects of tax, export regulations, and corruption, on international entrepreneurship. We consider direct effects of these regulations as well as a possible moderating effect of corruption on nascent international entrepreneurship. Our findings indicate that the effect of regulations on international nascent entrepreneurship vary depending on types of regulation. Interestingly, we find that corruption plays a dual role, serving as both grease and sand for nascent international entrepreneurship. Corruption worsens the burden of regulations which have financial costs element. Another interesting finding is that corporate tax is not a significant deterrent factor for IE when corruption is low.

Taxes, corruption, and entry

Tax policies and corruption are important institutional considerations which can shape entrepreneurship. We investigate how tax rates, and the interaction between corruption and tax rates, influence variations in entry across a panel of 72 countries in the period 2005–2011. We use a series of panel estimations as well as several robustness checks to test these effects, using relevant controls for economic development, the size of the state, and other regulatory and tax policy measures. We find that higher tax rates consistently discourage entry. Further, we find that although the direct influence of corruption on entry is also consistently negative, the interaction influence of corruption and tax rate is positive. This indicates that corruption can offset the negative influence of high taxes on entry. We discuss the implications of our findings for policymakers and future research.

Wickedness, Governance and Collective Sanctions: : Can Corruption be Tamed?

Tackling a problem requires mostly, an ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then applying the necessary mechanisms to solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be tackled happens to be “complex, “ “ill-structured,” and/or “wicked.” Corruption is one of those kinds of problems. Both in its global and national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural in nature, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even wicked. Qualities of the kind impose modest expectations regarding possibilities of any definitive solution to this insidious phenomenon. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem of corruption using existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the “long-term memory” of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on the interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to ‘subvert’ that phenomenon’s entire matrix. Concepts such as collective responsibility, collective punishment and sanctions are introduced as relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, subversion of some of the most prevalent aspects of corruption. These concepts may help in the evolving of a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies.

Corruption, governance and collective sanctions: : can a wicked problem be tamed?

Tackling a problem requires mostly, an ability to read it, conceptualize it, represent it, define it, and then applying the necessary mechanisms to solve it. This may sound self-evident except when the problem to be tackled happens to be “complex, “ “ill-structured,” and/or “wicked.” Corruption is one of those kinds of problems. Both in its global and national manifestations it is ill-structured. Where it is structural in nature, endemic and pervasive, it is perhaps even wicked. Qualities of the kind impose modest expectations regarding possibilities of any definitive solution to this insidious phenomenon. If so, it may not suffice to address the problem of corruption using existing categories of law and/or good governance, which overlook the “long-term memory” of the collective and cultural specific dimensions of the subject. Such socio-historical conditions require focusing on the interactive and self-reproducing networks of corruption and attempting to ‘subvert’ that phenomenon’s entire matrix. Concepts such as collective responsibility, collective punishment and sanctions are introduced as relevant categories in the structural, as well as behavioral, subversion of some of the most prevalent aspects of corruption. These concepts may help in the evolving of a new perspective on corruption fighting strategies.

Self-interest and ideology : bureaucratic corruption in Vietnam

Remedies for corruption in socialist-transforming East Asia (China and Vietnam) primarily apply ‘public choice’ theory, invoking Weberian imagery of socially detached bureaucratic decision-making. However, as the episodes of corruption accumulate, it is becoming clear that existing legalistic conceptions of corruption must give way to analytical methods that take into account broader social and institutional perspectives. This article evaluates public choice theory by examining ideological explanations for bureaucratic corruption in Vietnam.

Corruption in the media's gaze

This paper examines a government's incentive to engage in corruption in the presence of independent media. Different versions of a sequential-move game show how collusion between a media-firm and a government as well as a government's ability to ‘spin’ the media allegations can undermine corruption deterrence. Further, because of gains from exposing scandal, the media-firm can face incentives to raise false allegations. The paper shows how such false allegations can provide perverse incentives that favor corruption.

The nature of corruption deterrence in a competitive media sector

This paper compares the deterrence provided by a competitive media sector towards government induced corruption with that of a media monopoly in a setting where the media might raise both true as well as false allegations of corruption. It finds that competition’s impact on corruption deterrence is not necessarily better than a monopoly but rather hinges on a delicate balance between government’s kickback from corruption and the media’s potential benefit from exposure. While the paper does identify conditions in which a competitive media sector would improve upon the deterrence provided by a monopoly, it also find conditions under which it would do no better than a monopoly and in some situations its strategic response could be even worse especially when it intensifies effort towards justifying false allegations.

Partners in crime : collusive corruption and search

This paper analyzes corruption as a collusive act which requires the participation of two willing partners. An agent intending to engage in a corrupt act must search for a like-minded partner. When many people in the economy are corrupt, such a search is more likely to be fruitful. Thus when an agent engages in a search, he raises the net benefit of searching for other similar agents in the economy, creating an externality. This introduces a non-convexity in the model, which consequently has multiple equilibria. The economy can be in stable equilibrium with a high or low level of corruption.

Starting from the high-corruption equilibrium, a sufficient increase in vigilance triggers a negative cascade, leading the economy to a new equilibrium in which no agent finds it profitable to search for corrupt partners. The no-corruption equilibrium continues to be stable if vigilance is then relaxed. This suggests that the correct way to deal with corruption is to launch a ``big push'' with large amounts of resources. Once the level of corruption declines, these resources can be withdrawn.