The nature of corruption deterrence in a competitive media sector
Data(s) |
01/08/2006
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Resumo |
This paper compares the deterrence provided by a competitive media sector towards government induced corruption with that of a media monopoly in a setting where the media might raise both true as well as false allegations of corruption. It finds that competition’s impact on corruption deterrence is not necessarily better than a monopoly but rather hinges on a delicate balance between government’s kickback from corruption and the media’s potential benefit from exposure. While the paper does identify conditions in which a competitive media sector would improve upon the deterrence provided by a monopoly, it also find conditions under which it would do no better than a monopoly and in some situations its strategic response could be even worse especially when it intensifies effort towards justifying false allegations.<br /> |
Identificador | |
Idioma(s) |
eng |
Publicador |
Springer-Verlag |
Relação |
http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30003548/n20060237.pdf http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30003548/vaidya-thenatureofcorruption-2006.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-006-0010-3 |
Direitos |
Springer-Verlag, 2006 |
Palavras-Chave | #corruption #deterrence #media #governance |
Tipo |
Journal Article |