Agency Conflicts and Corporate Payout Policies: A Global Study

We investigate the roles of finn and country level agency conflicts in determining corporate payout policics. Based on a large sample of 29,610 firms in 42 countries from 2001 to 2006, we show there is a form of "pecking order" in investors' ability to extract cash (whether as dividends only or share repurchases) from firms. Although investors are able to use their legal powers to extract cash from firms in high protection countries, their ability to do so can be substantially hindered when agency costs at the firm level are high. In poor protection countries, investors seem to take whatever cash they can get, even though the amount may be small, and with scant regard for investment opportunities and firm level agency conflicts. Finally, compared to repurchases, we find dividends are more likely to be the sole method of payout in high protection countries and in non insider-dominated firms.

The determinants of corporate sustainability performance

This paper investigates the factors that drive high levels of corporate sustainability performance (CSP), as proxied by membership of the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index. Using a stakeholder framework, we examine the incentives for US firms to invest in sustainability principles and develop a number of hypotheses that relate CSP to firm-specific characteristics. Our results indicate that leading CSP firms are significantly larger, have higher levels of growth and a higher return on equity than conventional firms. Contrary to our predictions, leading CSP firms do not have greater free cash flows or lower leverage than other firms.

The impact of the Malaysian code on corporate governance: compliance, institutional investors and stock performance

In 2001, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) became an integral part of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Rules, which requires all listed firms to disclose the extent of compliance with the MCCG. Our panel analysis of 440 firms from 1999 to 2002 finds that corporate governance reform in Malaysia has been successful, with a significant improvement in governance practices. The relationship between ownership by the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and corporate governance has strengthened during the period subsequent to the reform, in line with the lead role taken by the EPF in establishing the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group. The implementation of MCCG has had a substantial effect on shareholders' wealth, increasing stock prices by an average of about 4.8%. Although there is no evidence that politically connected firms perform better, political connections do have a significantly negative effect on corporate governance, which is mitigated by institutional ownership.

Impact of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 on initial public offering prospectus earnings forecasts

Commencing 13 March 2000, the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth) introduced changes to the regulation of corporate fundraising in Australia. In particular, it effected a reduction in the litigation risk associated with initial public offering prospectus disclosure.We find that the change is associated with a reduction in forecast frequency and an increase in forecast value relevance, but not with forecast error or bias. These results confirm previous findings that changes in litigation risk affect the level but not the quality of disclosure. They also suggest that the reforms’ objectives of reducing fundraising costs while improving investor protection, have been achieved.

Ownership structure and concentration and the timeliness of corporate earnings : Malaysian evidence

This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership concentration and structure relate to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags in Malaysia. Based on a sample of 1,276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, the results show that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags. Specifically, closely-held firms are more timely in their price discovery and have shorter reporting lags, particularly if the largest shareholder is a foreigner or a financial institution. Government-owned firms have longer reporting lags, as expected, but we find no evidence that family-owned firms have significantly different timeliness of price discovery and reporting lags than other firms. Additional analysis shows that prior to the implementation of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, firms were more timely in their price discovery but longer in their reporting lag.

Towards the development of a best practice index for the disclosure of organisations' climate change-related corporate governance practices

The aim of this study is to develop a disclosure guide for climate-change-related corporate governance (CCCG) practices. Drawing from existing climate change policy guidelines together with content analysis of leading Australian companies’ disclosure practices, we develop a best practice index for the disclosure of CCCG practises. The best practice index is further informed, validated and refined by the contribution of experts from a range of stakeholder groups. Our index represents the most comprehensive list generated to date, utilising experts’ opinions, in relation to CCCG disclosure practices. This CCCG disclosure index would be useful for companies seeking to provide information in relation their CCCG practices

Corporate governance and risk management : the role of risk management and compensation committees

This paper examines the role of compensation and risk committees in managing and monitoring the risk behaviour of Australian financial firms in the period leading up to the global financial crisis (2006–2008). This empirical study of 711 observations of financial sector firms demonstrates how the coordination of risk management and compensation committees reduces information asymmetry. The study shows that the composition of the risk and compensation committees is positively associated with risk, which, in turn, is associated with firm performance. More importantly, information asymmetry is reduced when a director is a member of both the risk and compensation committees which moderate the negative association between risk and firm performance for firms with high risk.

Ownership, corporate governance and timeliness of price discovery : Australian evidence

This study investigates whether and how a firm’s ownership and corporate governance affect its timeliness of price discovery, which is referred to as the speed of incorporation of value-relevant information into the stock price. Using a panel data of 1,138 Australian firm-year observations from 2001 to 2008, we predict and find a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and the timeliness of price discovery. We test the identity of the largest shareholder and find that only firms with family as the largest shareholder exhibit faster price discovery. There is no evidence that suggests that the presence of a second largest shareholder affects the timeliness of price discovery materially. Although we find a positive association between corporate governance quality and the timeliness of price discovery, as expected, there is no interaction effect between the largest shareholding and corporate governance in relation to the timeliness of price discovery. Further tests show no evidence of severe endogeneity problems in our study.

Ownership, corporate governance and liquidity in Caribbean firms

This thesis provides the first evidence on how ownership structure and corporate governance relate to stock liquidity in the Caribbean. Based on panel data of 71 firms from three selected Caribbean markets − Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago − results show that firms with concentrated ownership are associated with lower liquidity. The identity of the largest shareholder also matters: family firms and firms with foreign holding companies are more liquid than government firms. Although the second largest shareholding does not appear to matter to liquidity, there is some evidence showing that firms with foreign holding companies as the second largest shareholder are less liquid. Caribbean firms suffer from poor corporate governance but this study is unable to establish a significant relationship between corporate governance and liquidity.

CFO inside debt and corporate innovation

This thesis examines the importance of CFO incentives on the value maximization of firm. It examines the association between CFO inside debt compensation i.e., CFO pensions and deferred compensation, and investment in corporate innovation. It finds that instead of encouraging innovation, CFO inside debt appears to have a dampening effect on investment in innovation.

Corporate ownership, corporate governance reform and timeliness of earnings : Malaysian evidence

This paper provides the first evidence showing that ownership concentration and the identity of the largest shareholder matter to the timeliness of corporate earnings, measured by a stock price-based timeliness metric and the reporting lag. Using panel data of 1276 Malaysian firms from 1996 to 2009, we find a non-linear relationship between concentrated ownership, measured by the largest shareholding in a firm, and the reporting lag but not the timeliness of price discovery. Although firms with government as the largest shareholder and political connections have a significantly shorter reporting lag, only the former are timelier in price discovery. Firms with family and foreigners as the largest shareholder however are less timely in price discovery. While the reporting lag is shorter in the period after the integration of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) into Bursa listing rules, its impact on the timeliness of price discovery is mostly immaterial.

Ownership, corporate governance and IPO post-listing liquidity

This thesis investigates how ownership structure and corporate governance relate to the post-listing liquidity of IPO firms. Using a sample of 1,049 Chinese IPOs from 2001 to 2010, the results show firms with a broader shareholder base and higher ownership concentration have greater post-listing liquidity. So do firms with higher state ownership and lower institution ownership. Corporate governance is also important; post-listing liquidity is higher for firms with CEO duality, a larger and more independent board, and more frequent board meetings. The 2005 Split Share Structure Reform, which increased the proportion of tradable shares, has a positive impact on liquidity.

Continuous disclosure compliance: Does corporate governance matter?

Our study investigates the quality of firms’ continuous disclosure compliance during mandatory continuous disclosure reform, and whether the compliance quality is impacted by corporate governance, using the New Zealand market as the setting. We use a novel coding of different categories of disclosures (nonroutine, non-procedural and internal), which represents the extent of proprietary insider information inherent in disclosures, to evaluate firms’compliance quality. Our findings provide evidence that firms’ compliance quality improved after the reform, and this improvement is inconsistently impacted by corporate gvernance. Our findings provide important implications for regulators in their quest for a superior disclosure regime

The impact of corporate governance on private placements in Australia

In private placement transactions, issuing firms sell a block of securities to just a small group of investors at a discounted price. Non-participating shareholders suffer from ownership dilution and lose the opportunity to receive the discount. This thesis provides the first evidence on whether and how corporate governance can protect non-participating shareholders' interests. Results from an examination of 329 private placements issued by the top 250 Australian firms between 2002 and 2009 demonstrate that firms with higher governance quality are more likely to issue a share purchase plan (SPP) along with the private placement, thus providing greater protection to non-participating shareholders' interests.